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Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution: Why 
Courts Get Trademark Cases Wrong 
Repeatedly 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.* 
ABSTRACT 
Trademark law has de-evolved. It has transitioned from an 
efficient mechanism for ensuring competition into an inefficient 
regime for capturing economic rents. In this Article, I focus on the 
role that party self-interest has played in biasing the evolution of 
trademark law. This self-interest tends to lead parties to (1) 
challenge efficient legal rules and seek to replace them with 
inefficient, anticompetitive rules, and (2) accede to inefficient, 
anticompetitive rules once they are in place. Almost by definition, 
when a rule of trademark law promotes competition, it reduces the 
market surplus or rents that current producers capture. As a result, 
parties will seldom spend resources either to defend an efficient 
trademark rule or to challenge an inefficient trademark rule in the 
hope of replacing it with a more efficient rule. Instead, inefficient 
trademark rules offer a party, usually the trademark owner, the 
opportunity to capture rents. As a result, at least one party will have 
a correspondingly strong interest in defending such inefficient 
trademark rules or, if necessary, challenging efficient trademark 
rules in the hope of replacing them with inefficient trademark rules. 
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The net result has been something of a perfect storm for 
trademark law. Efficient legal rules are repeatedly challenged until 
they are replaced with inefficient legal rules, at which point no one 
challenges them. The entirely predictable result of this process is 
exactly what scholars have observed: courts have re-written 
trademark law so that it protects far too much and far too broadly. 
Rather than ensure competition, it serves to restrict competition and 
to maximize the profits of trademark owners. Rather than promote 
consumer welfare, it has become a form of corporate welfare. 
We cannot, however, fix the problems with trademark law 
through substantive trademark doctrine. Substantive reform, even 
radical substantive reform, would simply provide a new starting 
point from which inefficient common law evolution would again 
proceed. To fix the ongoing de-evolution of trademark law, we need 
to change the process of trademark litigation to ensure, first, that 
parties have an adequate incentive to defend and fight for efficient 
legal rules, and second, that courts have the information they need to 
recognize the efficient legal rule and render judgment accordingly. In 
this Article, I identify and evaluate several possible mechanisms for 
solving trademark’s ongoing common law de-evolution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Once upon a time, trademark law served the interests of consumers. No 
more. Today, trademark law serves the interests of trademark owners. 
Somewhat surprisingly, courts, and not Congress, are to blame for 
trademark’s evolution from efficient market regulator to inefficient rent 
protector. If we look back at the Trademark Act of 1946, more generally 
known as the Lanham Act, Congress provided for a narrowly tailored regime of 
limited protection that promoted competition and enhanced consumer welfare. 
Yet, since the enactment of the Lanham Act, courts have re-written the statute 
into a bloated and sometimes-incoherent morass. As a result, trademark law 
today protects far too much and reaches far too broadly. Rather than ensure 
competition, it serves instead to restrict competition and to maximize the 
profits of trademark owners. Rather than promote consumer welfare, it has 
become a form of corporate welfare. 
A number of scholars have decried various doctrinal developments that 
reflect this trend. These substantive critiques have focused on: (1) the 
expanding subject matter of trademark law;1 (2) the expanding scope of the 
infringement standards and over enforcement of trademark rights;2 (3) an 
 
 1. For my own previous work on this subject, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress 
Emperor’s New Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does Not Belong on the Principal Register, 51 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1131 (2000) [hereinafter Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor] (explaining the mistakes in law and 
policy that led to the recognition of trade dress protection under the Lanham Trademark Act). For 
works by other authors, see, for example Peter J. Karol, Affixing the Service Mark: Reconsidering the 
Rise of an Oxymoron, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 357 (2013) (observing that much of recent 
trademark expansionism can be tied to lax service-mark requirements, and criticizing brand-owner 
abuse of the service mark registration regime); Alexandra J. Roberts, How to Do Things with Word 
Marks: A Speech-Act Theory of Distinctiveness, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1035 (2014) (arguing that trademark 
law overprotects descriptive terms). 
 2. For my own previous work on this subject, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark 
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999) [hereinafter Lunney, Trademark Monopolies] (analyzing the 
shift from deception-based trademark protection to property-based trademark protection). For works 
by other authors, see, for example, Mark Bartholomew, Trademark Morality, 55 WM. & MARY. L. 
REV. 85, 157 (2013) (arguing that “by expansively defining probative intent, judges protect established 
brands at the expense of young upstarts. By and large, the judicial focus on intent helps only trademark 
plaintiffs.”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution 
Cases, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 541 (2008) (arguing that dilution theories are 
so broad that other doctrines—like the use in commerce requirement—need to function as bulwarks 
that cabin overbroad claims); Michael Handler, What Can Harm the Reputation of a Trademark? A 
Critical Re-evaluation of Dilution by Tarnishment, 106 TRADEMARK REP. 639 (2016) (criticizing 
tarnishment theories of dilution as overbroad and empirically unlikely to track actual harm to brands); 
Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial 
Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709 (2007) (arguing that dilution laws are unconstitutional limitations on 
speech because dilution is not limited to speech that is false or misleading); Mark A. Lemley & Mark 
P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2209 n.30 (2016) (collecting examples of 
overbroad trademark enforcement); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 
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undue weakening of the limitations on trademark protection and the 
prerequisites to obtain protection;3 and (4) a general disconnect between 
sensible trademark policy and actual trademark doctrine.4 Despite the wide 
range of these critical perspectives, none as yet have explored why judicial law-
making has gone so badly wrong in trademark law. Of course, in any human 
system, occasional mistakes will happen. Yet, the mistakes in trademark cases 
have not been isolated: they have been consistent, even systematic. Bad 
decisions tend to stick. Good decisions don’t. Instead, good decisions tend to 
be either distinguished and rewritten until they are meaningless, or extended to 
different facts and become bad decisions.5 The question is, why? Why have 
 
MICH. L. REV. 137, 137 (2010) (arguing that trademark owners empirically enforce marks against 
uses even when “neither mark owners nor consumers suffer any injury from that use”); Jeremy N. 
Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769 (2012) (criticizing post-sale theories of confusion 
endorsed by the lower federal courts); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law 
and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 507 (2008) (“[T]he cognitive theory of dilution . . . does 
not rest on sufficient empirical evidence to justify its adoption.”); Alfred C. Yen, The Constructive 
Role of Confusion in Trademark, 93 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2014) (arguing that consumer confusion should 
not be categorically treated as harmful because certain amounts or types of confusion may be socially 
and economically valuable). 
 3. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Cybermarks, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1375 (2010) (criticizing trademark 
protection for functional uses of marks, such as searching and indexing); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. 
Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2007) 
(arguing that undue expansion of the concept of trademark use in the sale of key word advertisements 
on the Internet improperly expands the scope of trademark infringement by converting parties who, at 
best, might be secondarily liable to direct infringers); Jake Linford, Are Trademarks Ever Fanciful?, 
105 GEO. L.J. 731 (2017) (criticizing the notion of fanciful trademarks by noting that trademark 
holders rely on sound symbolism); Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 385–88; Roberts, 
supra note 1 (arguing that trademark law overprotects descriptive terms); Vanessa P. Rollins, 
Trademark Fair Use: Braun® Versus the Bunny, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 285 (2009) 
(arguing that trademark law employs unduly narrow approaches to fair use). 
 4. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs 
on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 777 (2004) (“[C]ourts have stretched trademark 
doctrine . . . based . . . not on the normative goals of trademark law, but on unexplored instincts and 
tenuous presumptions about consumer expectations and practices.”); Mary LaFrance, Steam Shovels 
and Lipstick: Trademarks, Greed, and the Public Domain, 6 NEV. L.J. 447 (2006) (exploring 
anticompetitive consequences of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern 
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999) (arguing that courts produce 
economically inefficient results by treating trademarks as real property); Jessica Litman, Breakfast 
with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999) (arguing that 
trademark doctrine has become disconnected from its economic and normative justifications); Lunney, 
Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 421–39 (showing that existing trademark doctrine generates 
market power and associated welfare losses without any offsetting welfare gains); Mark P. McKenna, 
A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67 (2012) (arguing that 
expansive trademark protection does not protect consumers and suggesting how trademark scope 
should be redefined to protect consumers); P. Sean Morris, Trademarks as Sources of Market Power: 
Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, 35 J.L. & COM. 163 (2017) (examining empirical examples 
of market foreclosure and entry barriers to argue that trademark law causes anticompetitive results). 
 5. For example, in trade dress protection, the United States Patent and Trademark Office first 
allowed the registration of trade dress on the principal register in 1958. The trade dress at issue was the 
truly unusual shape of the Haig & Haig pinch whiskey bottle. See Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm’r Pat. 1958). Twenty-four years later, the Court of Customs and Patent 
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courts repeatedly expanded trademark protection in ways that any reasonable, 
objective evaluation would show is undesirable? 
As it turns out, at least part of the answer is deceptively simple: courts are 
captives of their own process, and that process is party driven. Faced with a 
given legal rule, parties decide whether to comply or violate the rule; they 
decide whether to litigate or settle any resulting dispute; and they decide what 
arguments and theories to advance and then provide the information the court 
uses to resolve the dispute. Parties thus set the judicial agenda, and they control 
the information available for judicial decision-making. Perhaps most 
importantly, in doing all of this, parties act in their own self-interest. To the 
extent that parties are rational and self-interested, they will not care whether an 
existing legal rule is efficient or inefficient, nor will they care about the costs or 
benefits that an existing legal rule imposes on others. They will care only about 
how the existing legal rule affects them. 
The party-driven nature of the judicial process introduces, among other 
issues, three potential biases into the evolution of legal rules: (1) selection bias; 
(2) activity bias; and (3) framing bias.6 First, a selection bias arises because the 
parties’ incentives lead them to bring the wrong cases to court for judicial 
resolution. In order to maximize their profits, trademark owners repeatedly 
bring litigation challenging efficient or defending inefficient interpretations of 
trademark law. At the same time, that same self-interest will often influence 
potential parties not to challenge inefficient or defend efficient interpretations 
of trademark law. Second, even before litigation begins, activity bias arises in 
markets as parties decide which legal rules to challenge and with which to 
comply. Once again, parties’ potential self-interests lead them to act in ways 
that will lead to litigation challenging efficient interpretations of trademark 
law, but not inefficient ones. Third, framing bias arises because the standing 
rules of trademark law frame the dispute as one between two competitors. The 
standing rules thus implicitly frame the question for the court as: Who, as 
 
Appeals approved the registration of the far more ordinary and everyday shape of the Glass Plus 
bottle. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343–44 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 6. See infra Part III.A. As this Article will discuss, law and economics scholars, beginning 
with Paul Rubin, have focused on the role that party self-interest plays in shaping the evolution of 
common law rules. See Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 
(1977); see also infra notes 197–217 and accompanying text. Initially, they thought that this self-
interest, acting like the invisible hand of the market, would lead the common law to evolve toward 
efficient legal rules, but they eventually concluded that such efficient evolution would happen in only 
rare and special circumstances. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve 
the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 145 (1980) (showing that—rather than 
applying generally—the common law process leads to efficient legal rules only in the exceptional 
circumstance where every rule but the best rule is challenged); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental 
Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 
575, 577–79 (1997) (discussing misalignments between private and social incentives in litigation). 
This Article extends that analysis and is the first to apply it to the evolution of trademark law as a case 
study. 
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between these two competitors, should prevail? Yet the real question in 
trademark litigation should be: How do I rule so that consumers prevail? 
Both selection bias and activity bias arise in the evolution of trademark 
law because trademark litigation often entails asymmetric stakes. In trademark 
litigation, courts have, at least traditionally, rarely awarded damages.7 Instead, 
courts have traditionally awarded the successful trademark plaintiff injunctive 
relief that orders a defendant to stop using the infringing mark. As a result, the 
stakes in trademark litigation are usually whether the defendant may continue a 
given course of conduct or must cease. This choice between allowing and 
prohibiting the use of the mark and the corresponding choice between a 
narrower and broader interpretation of trademark protection represents a 
decision between encouraging and discouraging competition—or in some 
cases, between competition and monopoly. Given a choice between more 
competition and less, the optimal legal rule is almost always the legal rule that 
leads to more competition. As a general matter, competition leads to lower 
prices, greater consumer choice, and a more efficient allocation of available 
resources.8 More competition is therefore almost always better than less.9 
Unfortunately, while increased competition is great for consumers, it does 
not usually generate much in the way of economic rents for sellers. In fact, 
increased competition tends to reduce, even eliminate, the combined rents or 
producer surplus available to competitors in the market. While increased 
competition can sharply increase consumer surplus, consumers do not have 
standing under federal trademark law. Only commercial market participants 
(i.e. sellers) do. As a result, if trademark law is or becomes inefficiently 
 
 7. See, e.g., Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 194 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that 
“damages awards turn out to be comparatively rare in trademark cases primarily, it appears, because of 
the difficulty of proving them.”) (citing Michael J. Freno, Trademark Valuation: Preserving Brand 
Equity, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1055, 1062–63 (2007)). The two exceptions to this general rule are (1) 
reverse confusion, and (2) counterfeiting cases. 
 8. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 85–86 (1921) (noting that 
perfect competition produces the optimal allocation of available resources and thereby maximizes 
social welfare); see also F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 12–19 (Edward Jaffe et al. eds., 2d ed. 1970) (same); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE 
THEORY OF PRICE 38 (1942) (same); Francis M. Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 
47 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (1957) (same); Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 
ECONOMICA 167, 170 (1934) (“The output which monopoly alone can evoke is not normally regarded 
as preferable to the alternative products which free competition would allow to emerge.”). 
 9. I recognize the limitations that Lipsey and Lancaster’s work on second-best theory places 
on this statement. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 22 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 11, 13 (1956) (proving that once the conditions of perfect competition are not satisfied in 
one market, it becomes impossible to say whether social welfare will increase or decrease by making 
another market more competitive). In this particular context, however, I believe that increasing 
competition in consumer markets is welfare-enhancing for the usual reasons—specifically lower 
prices and greater consumer choice. But if second-best theory makes an overall welfare claim 
impossible, this Article’s analysis remains important and relevant as a positive description of the 
process. I will also freely confess, as between trademark owners and consumers, a distributive 
preference for consumers. 
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anticompetitive, challenging the law is socially desirable, but unlikely. 
Moreover, unlike the legislature, federal courts may not simply reach out and 
rule on whatever injustices they perceive in our society. Rather, under Article 
III, they must wait for parties to bring disputes before them. 
Unfortunately, the expected returns for a trademark defendant challenging 
an inefficient, anticompetitive trademark rule usually do not justify the expense 
of such a challenge. Although prevailing in litigation would enable a trademark 
defendant to remain in or enter a market—and to thereby capture whatever 
profit, rent, or surplus it can—prevailing in litigation also enables other 
competitors to do likewise. Moreover, these other competitors can enter the 
market without bearing the cost of litigation.10 Because prices in reasonably 
competitive markets are a function of marginal cost, even a prevailing 
trademark defendant will find it difficult to recoup its litigation expenses by 
raising its prices. If it tried to do so, other competitors, who did not bear the 
cost of litigation, will undercut its prices and take its sales.11 Similarly, because 
the market is competitive, any given competitor will not usually earn sufficient 
rents directly to cover the costs of litigation. As a result, a self-interested 
trademark defendant will seldom find it worthwhile to spend the resources 
necessary to challenge an inefficient interpretation of trademark law. Rather 
than bear the cost of litigation, most would-be defendants modify their 
behavior to comply with the law, even if it is inefficient. Or if sued, they tend 
 
 10. Non-mutual collateral estoppel would allow a similarly situated defendant to assert the 
prior ruling to bar the trademark plaintiff from asserting a claim it had previously lost against a 
different defendant. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) 
(recognizing non-mutual collateral estoppel in patent litigation and holding that a patentee is estopped 
from asserting a patent against a defendant after a court has found the patent invalid in litigation 
involving another defendant). 
 11. Patent law confronts a similar free rider problem for defendants challenging the validity of 
questionable patents. Challenging such patents is a public good, but may not be in the self-interest of 
any given defendant. If a defendant successfully invalidates a patent or enters a market by establishing 
non-infringement, other competitors can follow the path the defendant paid to blaze. Prices will fall 
and consumer surplus will rise sharply. However, the successful defendant will capture relatively little 
of the resulting welfare gain. While the process is similar in trademark, there is a fundamental 
difference. The existing literature focuses on inadequate incentives to challenge a particular patent. 
This Article shows that a similar process creates inadequate incentives to challenge inefficient 
interpretations of trademark law, rather than a particular trademark, though that may also be true. 
There is extensive literature on the inadequacy of the incentive to challenge questionable patents, 
particularly in the pharmaceutical patent and reverse payment settlement context. See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAYOFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8 (2010); 
Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation 
Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., FTC v. Actavis: The Patent-Antitrust 
Intersection Revisited, 93 N.C. L. REV. 375, 387–88 (2015) [hereinafter Lunney, FTC v. Actavis]; John 
R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 333–34 (2001) [hereinafter Thomas, Patent Bounties]; see also Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1483 (2013) 
(recognizing that this problem may apply to intellectual property cases more generally). 
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to settle. The net result of this selection process is exactly what we have 
observed in trademark law: bad decisions tend to stick. 
Efficient and pro-competitive interpretations of trademark law will, on the 
other hand, face repeated challenges. Almost by definition, successfully 
challenging an efficient interpretation of trademark law will lead to less 
competition. It may do so directly, by prohibiting a would-be competitor from 
entering a market altogether. Or it may do so indirectly, by increasing a 
competitor’s costs or the degree of product differentiation in the market. Where 
increased competition reduces economic rents, decreased competition increases 
them. For a trademark plaintiff, the prospect of capturing those increased rents 
provides a powerful incentive to challenge an efficient interpretation of 
trademark law if they believe they have a chance to persuade a court to re-
interpret trademark law in a way that reduces competition. As a result, even if a 
court gets it right in a given case and adopts an efficient, pro-competitive 
interpretation of trademark law, we should expect self-interested trademark 
plaintiffs to repeatedly challenge the resulting legal rule. Given heterogeneity 
in the a priori beliefs of judges as to the merits of various legal rules, such 
repeated challenges will, sooner or later, find a sympathetic judicial ear. When 
they do, the original pro-competitive interpretation of trademark law will 
become less so, as later decisions limit and distinguish it. The inevitable result 
of this process is, again, exactly what we have observed: good decisions don’t 
last. 
The net result has been a perfect storm for trademark law: in the face of 
an efficient legal rule, self-interested trademark plaintiffs litigate until the rule 
becomes inefficient. At which point, self-interested trademark defendants 
largely accede to it. In trademark law, the party-driven nature of litigation thus 
brings exactly the wrong cases to court. Parties, by and large, choose to litigate 
cases that seek to move trademark law towards a set of legal rules that are both 
inefficient and anticompetitive, maximizing trademark owners’ profits at the 
expense of the broader public interest.12 
Unfortunately, courts, as captives of their process, are not likely to 
recognize and consistently reject the inefficient legal interpretations trademark 
plaintiffs repeatedly advance. The same asymmetric stakes that bring the wrong 
cases to court also make judicial mistakes on trademark issues more likely. 
Because of the asymmetric stakes, trademark owners will have more to spend 
on litigation. With their greater resources, trademark owners can hire better 
lawyers, retain more-persuasive experts, and gather evidence more extensively. 
Just as courts do not have perfect information on the efficient legal rule, they 
also do not have perfect information as to the facts of any given case. Inside the 
courtroom, asymmetric resources are likely to skew courts’ and juries’ views of 
 
 12. Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–102 (1974) (explaining how well-to-do parties prevail in 
litigating content of legal rules). 
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the truth. Outside the courtroom, these asymmetric resources support a whole 
ecosystem of lawyers and trade groups, dedicated to establishing the 
propositions not only that trademark owners deserve these rents, but that 
interpreting the law in a manner that ensures trademark owners can capture 
more of these rents is good for the economy and society as a whole. The 
resulting praise for expanding trademark law and criticism of any narrowing, 
again, make it difficult for courts to recognize and correct their mistakes. 
The asymmetric stakes and resulting selection bias that bring the wrong 
cases for judicial resolution also skew the nature of the cases and defendants 
that courts will see. An average defendant will seldom bother litigating a case 
that falls near trademark’s traditional or existing prohibitions. Instead, they will 
litigate only those cases where they feel that they have a very high chance of 
winning—cases where the plaintiff is advancing some novel theory or 
otherwise stretching trademark’s traditional reach. For that reason, most cases 
that are litigated will be outliers. Courts will not, however, readily recognize 
them as such. Because they have limited information, courts will tend to look at 
the set of litigated cases to define what constitutes a “normal” or typical 
trademark dispute. But if all litigated cases are outliers, using the set of 
litigated cases to define “normal” will prove misleading. A given trademark 
plaintiff’s claim will not seem outrageous compared to other litigated claims if 
only outrageous claims are litigated. 
At the same time, the same asymmetric stakes also create a second 
potential bias: activity bias. Once a court has held that certain conduct 
constitutes trademark infringement, that initial ruling will change the associated 
market in ways that tend to reinforce the appearance that the court’s initial 
ruling was correct. Mainstream manufacturers and retailers will avoid the 
conduct at issue and leave the field to more opportunistic and thinly capitalized 
entities.13 The quality of would-be defendants’ goods will fall. As the risk of a 
finding of trademark infringement rises, so too does the risk that goods will be 
 
 13. In the field of sports merchandising, when the issue of selling unauthorized t-shirts bearing 
a team’s emblem first arose in the 1970s, we see defendants such as Champion Products—a well-
known, mainstream sportswear manufacturer. See Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 
F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir. 1982). After the courts expanded trademark law to prohibit such 
unauthorized merchandise, Champion Products and other mainstream manufacturers and retailers 
acted in their self-interest and acceded to the rule. As a result, when the issue arose thirty years later, 
the defendant was Smack Apparel—a thinly capitalized, opportunistic retailer, rather than a well-
known, mainstream sportswear manufacturer. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 
465, 477–78 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1268 (2009). Smack Apparel was willing to risk its 
capital on the uncertain, or perhaps not so uncertain, borders of the merchandising prohibition for the 
same reason drug dealers and bootleggers were: the illegality, or perhaps questionable legality, of the 
behavior limited competition and ensured a high profit margin. In the trademark world, counterfeiting 
is profitable precisely because trademark law prohibits it. Paradoxically, counterfeiting—if done 
successfully—becomes more profitable as trademark prohibitions on counterfeiting are more 
stringently enforced. See infra notes 256–260 (providing further discussion of the Smack Apparel 
case). 
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seized as a remedy.14 As the risk of seizure rises, a party’s willingness to invest 
capital in, and hence ensure the quality of, the associated goods will fall. As a 
result, the risk that consumers will be tricked into buying lower quality goods 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, if we have two legal rules, one 
of which is repeatedly challenged, while the other is left unchallenged, there is 
a natural and human tendency to believe that there must be some underlying 
problem with the first rule, but not the second. Unfortunately, that very natural 
tendency is exactly wrong in the trademark context. Rather than reflect the 
efficiency or desirability of the underlying rule, it simply reflects the parties’ 
asymmetric stakes. Thus, instead of helping courts recognize their mistakes, the 
asymmetric stakes will lead parties in the marketplace to respond in ways that 
tend to reinforce a court’s initially mistaken ruling. 
In addition to the previously recognized problems of selection and activity 
bias, a third potential source of bias for judicial law-making generally is the 
framing bias that arises from resolving issues in the context of litigation. 
Through standing rules, litigation frames a dispute as a conflict between the 
interests of the plaintiff and the defendant. The litigation frame implicitly 
suggests that the role of the court is to decide, as between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, where justice lies. But focusing exclusively on fairness, justice, or 
equity as between the parties directly before the court can lead a court badly 
astray—because litigants may not properly represent the interests of other 
potential parties and the public. That is why hard facts make bad law. 
In the trademark context, viewing the dispute as a conflict between the 
interests of the plaintiff and the defendant is particularly pernicious. Such a 
framing omits entirely what is usually the most important interest, that of 
consumers. The stakes in trademark law are not just asymmetric, but 
misleadingly so. The self-interest of the plaintiff and the defendant fails to 
encompass the substantial welfare gains that increased competition brings to 
consumers. The asymmetric stakes for the parties thus fail to reflect the true 
and full welfare implications of a trademark rule for society generally. Because 
of standing rules, consumers are not a party before the court; they have no 
opportunity to present evidence showing how the court’s ruling will affect their 
welfare. The trademark plaintiff and defendant, on the other hand, are parties 
before the court and do have the opportunity to present evidence on how the 
court’s ruling will affect them. It is only natural for a court to focus on the 
parties before it. While both parties can argue and present evidence attempting 
to show that their position would also improve consumer welfare, courts 
justifiably greet such evidence with skepticism, as it comes second-hand from a 
self-interested party. The litigation frame thus encourages a court to view a 
 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2008) (providing “seizure of goods” as a remedy for use of a 
counterfeit mark). 
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trademark dispute as a dispute solely between the parties and to ignore or 
downplay the consumer interest. 
Since the work of Kahneman and Tversky,15 we know that how we frame 
an issue will influence how we resolve the issue. In trademark disputes, we can 
usually frame the question to be answered in two ways. First, we can frame the 
question as whether the plaintiff or the defendant better deserves to capture 
producer surplus associated with a market or a demand that the plaintiff has 
created.16 Second, we can frame the question as whether consumers would be 
better off if the plaintiff or the defendant prevailed. The standing rules of 
trademark litigation implicitly suggest that the first frame is the correct one. 
But from a social welfare or utilitarian perspective the second framing of the 
question is correct. Unfortunately, while some courts have been able to look 
beyond a defendant’s seeming opportunism and recognize that the second 
frame is the correct one,17 most have not. Seeing the dispute as simply a 
question of who gets to collect surplus that the trademark plaintiff’s efforts 
have created, courts are too quick to rule in favor of trademark plaintiffs. The 
frame that trademark litigation creates has thus contributed to trademark law’s 
de-evolution. 
This is not to say that trademark’s evolution has been entirely one-sided. 
While the general trend of trademark law has been towards decidedly broader 
protection, that trend has not been universal. Courts have sometimes narrowed 
the availability or scope of trademark protection by creating specific defenses 
or limitations on protection. These cases and their associated doctrinal 
developments serve as an important reminder that although trademark plaintiffs 
usually have more at stake in trademark litigation, that is not always true. In 
some cases, a particular defendant, because of their market position, the nature 
 
 15.  See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
 16. For an example of a court making this frame explicit, consider the Third Circuit’s 
explanation for allowing the University of Pittsburgh to enforce merchandising rights despite forty 
years of non-enforcement: 
It is, however, equally beyond question that, while the market for imprinted soft goods, in 
the sense of their physical availability to the public and the public’s corresponding 
knowledge of that availability, exists as a result of Champion’s efforts, the ultimate demand 
for the product is a direct result of the efforts of Pitt to make its name widely known 
through athletic and educational accomplishments. With negligible exception, a consumer 
does not desire a “Champion” T-shirt, he (or she) desires a “Pitt” T-shirt. The entire 
impetus for the sale is the consumer’s desire to identify with Pitt or, perhaps more 
realistically, with Pitt’s successful athletic programs. From this point of view, then, it is 
Champion which seeks to profit from Pitt’s investment, particularly in its athletic program. 
This formulation of the issue reflects a growing and unsettled aspect of the law of unfair 
competition both at common law and under the Lanham Act. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 17. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that “[d]isapproval of 
the copyist’s opportunism may be an understandable first reaction, ‘[b]ut this initial response to the 
problem has been curbed in deference to the greater public good.’ American Safety Table Co. v. 
Schreiber, 269 F.2d at 272.”). 
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of their industry, or other circumstances, has both: (1) a stake in the specific 
litigation at issue, and (2) a broader economic interest tied to the conduct at 
issue in the litigation. In at least some of these cases, the plaintiff’s stake is far 
more limited, encompassing only the specific use at issue. In such cases, we 
should expect the trademark defendant not only to fight, but to fight harder than 
the opposing trademark plaintiff. Just as we expect trademark law to evolve in 
favor of trademark plaintiffs generally because plaintiffs usually have more to 
gain from winning, the evolutionary perspective suggests that, in those 
exceptional cases where a given trademark defendant has more to gain, we 
should expect trademark law to develop in ways that favor that defendant and 
others similarly situated. Again, this is what we observe. 
Unfortunately, cases where a trademark defendant has more to gain have 
proven to be the exception, rather than the rule. As a result, these cases have 
not been enough to turn trademark law’s expansive, evolutionary tide. 
Moreover, rather than serve to limit the expansion of trademark protection 
generally, courts have tended to use these exceptional cases as a basis for 
creating specialized doctrines or defenses that narrow trademark protection 
only for a particular use or a specific class of defendants. The resulting increase 
in trademark law’s complexity has sharply increased the costs and risks of 
trademark litigation. As a result, trademark law is becoming an increasingly 
two-tiered system. For those that can afford litigation, trademark law produces 
reasonably sensible, albeit expensive, results; but for those that cannot afford 
trademark litigation, trademark law has become something else entirely. It has 
become a mockery of justice that bars entities both from enforcing their own 
trademark rights and from defending themselves against bullies. 
The net result of these evolutionary pressures is that trademark law has 
become both inefficient and unduly complex. Simply put, the expanded forms 
of trademark protection we have today create market power with no redeeming 
pro-competitive benefits. Against this generally overbroad protection, courts 
have created a range of narrow, complex, and idiosyncratic defenses that 
insulate only particular uses by particular users in particular situations. 
Unfortunately, fixing trademark law will require more than mere 
correction of substantive trademark doctrine. The judicial decisions that have 
systematically expanded trademark protection in ways that maximize 
trademark owners’ rents while reducing consumer welfare are not accidents; 
they are the inevitable result of a common law evolutionary process that is 
biased in favor of trademark plaintiffs. Absent some fundamental change in the 
process of trademark litigation or common law development, even if we could 
adopt a “perfect” trademark regime, it would not last. It would simply provide 
a new starting point, similar to the 1946 Lanham Trademark Act, from which 
inefficient common law development of trademark doctrine would proceed. 
More fundamental structural change is therefore required. 
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To explore these issues, Part I begins with a review of the judicial 
expansion of trademark protection over the last century, exploring how courts 
have sacrificed both efficiency and consumer welfare to increase the profits of 
trademark owners.18 Part II, then, examines that process and looks at how cases 
are selected for litigation. Through this examination, it identifies the ways in 
which the different incentive structures facing trademark plaintiffs and 
trademark defendants are likely to bias trademark’s common law evolution. 
Part III explores possible solutions to the structural defects in the trademark 
litigation process. 
My key point, though, is simple. Addressing the problems that have 
developed with trademark law requires not only changes to specific substantive 
trademark doctrine, but also changes to the structure and process of trademark 
litigation. Such structural reform must ensure: first, that more of the right cases 
are selected for judicial resolution, so that inefficient legal rules tend to be 
challenged, while efficient legal rules are not; and second, that courts do a 
better job of resolving correctly the cases before them. Only through such 
structural reform can we ensure that whatever substantive doctrinal revisions 
we make to trademark law will endure. If we do not make such structural 
changes, then these evolutionary pressures will continue to influence the 
development of trademark law. As bad as trademark law is today, in terms of 
inefficiency and undue complexity, left unchecked, these evolutionary 
pressures will lead to a trademark law of tomorrow that is far, far worse. With 
these thoughts in mind, we now turn to the story of trademark’s evolution. 
I. 
TRADEMARK LAW’S EVOLUTION: FROM CONSUMER WELFARE TO CORPORATE 
WELFARE 
Although the Court has suggested that Congress, in enacting the 
Trademark Act of 1946, “significantly changed and liberalized the common 
law,”19 that is untrue. With only two or perhaps three limited exceptions,20 
Congress retained the traditional scope and limitations of the common law. 
Congress did not adopt the radically expanded trademark protection we suffer 
from today. The judiciary did. Before and after the Trademark Act’s enactment 
in 1946, courts radically expanded the subject matter and scope of trademark 
protection by systematically overturning Congress’s carefully considered 
 
 18. In noting these doctrinal changes, I am not suggesting that courts have intentionally 
sacrificed consumer welfare for corporate welfare. To the contrary, I am fairly certain that courts 
would advance consumer welfare if they knew how. But courts are captives of their own process. 
 19. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 171 (1995). 
 20. The two innovations found in the Trademark Act were: (1) Congress allowed descriptive 
words that had become distinctive (in the trademark sense) to be registered as trademarks, see id.; and 
(2) Congress created the incontestability defense, limiting the grounds on which an incontestably 
registered trademark could be challenged. A third possible innovation is the recognition of service 
marks. 
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judgment on the proper scope and limits of trademark protection. We now turn 
to two of the more egregious examples of trademark law’s judicial de-
evolution. 
A. Judicial Expansion of Trademark Protection: A Tale of Two Examples 
1. Expanding the Infringement Standard 
Our first tale concerns the judicial expansion of trademark’s infringement 
standard. It begins with the standard that Congress adopted in the Trademark 
Acts of 1881 and 1905. In both of those Acts, Congress defined the scope of 
trademark protection using identical language: 
Any person who shall, reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably 
imitate any trade-mark registered under this act and affix the same to 
merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those 
described in the registration, shall be liable to an action on the case for 
damages for the wrongful use of said trade-mark . . . .21 
As set forth, the language contained two important and express limitations 
on the scope of trademark protection. First, it limited protection to instances 
where a defendant had “reproduce[d], counterfeit[ed], cop[ied], or colorably 
imitate[d]” a registered mark.22 In practice, this limited protection to a 
defendant’s use of either the same or a nearly identical mark. Second, it further 
limited protection to those instances where a defendant used the same mark on 
“merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties.”23 In practice, 
this limited protection to a defendant’s use of the same types of goods. These 
statutes thus expressly required a would-be trademark plaintiff to satisfy the so-
called double identity test—by showing that a defendant used the same mark 
on the same goods.24 
Under this standard, the use of the same mark on a different product did 
not constitute trademark infringement. For example, in 1912, Borden’s 
Condensed Milk, which had long used Borden as the brand name for its 
condensed milk, sued another company that began using the name “Borden’s” 
for ice cream.25 Although the district court granted relief, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed and rejected the claim.26 The court held that because milk and ice 
 
 21. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 503–04 (emphasis added); Trademark Act of 
1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 728. 
 22. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 503–04; Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 
Stat. 724, 728 (containing the same “reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate” language). 
 23. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 503–04; Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 
Stat. 724, 728 (containing the same “merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties” 
language). 
 24. For a modern application of the double-identity test, see Rebecca Tushnet, Registering 
Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 932–34 
(2017). 
 25. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912). 
 26. Id. at 515. 
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cream were not competing products, there could be no unfair competition.27 
Recognizing that ice cream and milk did not share the “same descriptive 
properties,” the plaintiff nevertheless argued that it should be entitled to relief 
for two reasons.28 First, it intended to enter the ice cream market.29 The court 
rejected this argument, insisting that the law “deals with acts and not 
intentions.”30 Because the defendant actually began selling ice cream under the 
Borden’s name first, the defendant held the rights to that name for ice cream.31 
The plaintiff’s intent to enter that market was simply irrelevant.32 Second, the 
plaintiffs argued that it was selling its condensed milk to ice cream 
manufacturers, and that could lead ice cream dealers to mistakenly believe that 
the plaintiff had made the defendant’s product.33 The court also rejected this 
argument, holding that the specter of confusion was simply too “speculative 
and remote” to justify relief.34 
Just five years later, however, the Second Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion on similar facts in Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co.35 In that 
case, the plaintiff had used the name “Aunt Jemima’s” for self-rising flour for 
years, when the defendant began using “Aunt Jemima’s” for syrup.36 Because 
the two goods did not have “the same descriptive properties,” the district court 
dismissed the complaint.37 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.38 Although 
the court acknowledged the traditional limits of trademark law, it nonetheless 
felt that the two products were sufficiently related that consumers were likely 
to believe that the plaintiff had made the defendant’s product.39 It therefore 
granted relief and enjoined the defendant’s use.40 As the court explained: 
It is said that even a technical trade-mark may be appropriated by any 
one in any market for goods not in competition with those of the prior 
user. This was the view of the court below in saying that no one 
wanting syrup could possibly be made to take flour. But we think that 
goods, though different, may be so related as to fall within the 
mischief which equity should prevent. Syrup and flour are both food 
products, and food products commonly used together. Obviously the 
public, or a large part of it, seeing this trade-mark on a syrup, would 
 
 27. Id. at 514. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 514–15. 
 30. Id. at 515 (quoting George v. Smith, 52 F. 830, 832 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892)). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 36. Id. at 412. 
 37. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 234 F. 804, 805 (E.D.N.Y. 1916), rev’d, 247 F. 
407 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 38. Aunt Jemima Mills Co., 247 F. at 409–10. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 412. 
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conclude that it was made by the complainant.41 
Although the case law proceeded in fits and starts, sometimes embracing 
the Aunt Jemima approach, and sometimes the traditional “same descriptive 
properties” approach,42 gradually the courts began to embrace the broader Aunt 
Jemima approach. Although plainly inconsistent with the statutory language of 
the Trademark Act of 1905, this did not appear to trouble courts much. 
Eventually, they simply held that Congress had intended to adopt the related 
goods test when it used the “same descriptive properties” language in the 1905 
Act.43 
Although the Second Circuit in Aunt Jemima expanded trademark’s 
infringement standard to encompass use of the same mark on related goods, 
this expansion nevertheless retained trademark’s traditional focus on confusion 
as to source. As the Aunt Jemima court itself found, syrup and self-rising flour 
were sufficiently related that “the public, or a large part of it, . . . would 
conclude that [the defendant’s product] was made by the complainant.”44 
Just seven years after Aunt Jemima, however, the Sixth Circuit expanded 
the infringement standard further yet, and abandoned confusion as to source as 
a requirement for finding trademark infringement.45 In Vogue Co. v. 
Thompson-Hudson Co., the plaintiff had long used the name “Vogue”—along 
with a mark depicting a woman and a capital letter “V,” known as the “V-
Girl”—for its fashion magazine.46 When the defendant thereafter adopted a 
strikingly similar V-Girl for its hats, the plaintiff sued, alleging trademark 
 
 41. Id. at 409–10. 
 42. The Supreme Court confronted the question whether trademark protection extended 
beyond goods with the same descriptive qualities in Beech-Nut Co. v. Lorillard. Co., 273 U. S. 629 
(1927). The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue: “It may be true that in a case like the 
plaintiff’s its rights would not be sufficiently protected by an injunction against using the marks upon 
goods of the same class as those to which the plaintiff now applies it and to which its registration is 
confined. Upon that we express no opinion.” Id. at 632. 
 43. As Judge Learned Hand explained: 
There remains the question of registration, the goods not being of the ‘same descriptive 
properties’ in the colloquial sense. It would plainly be a fatuity to decree the registration of 
a mark whose use another could at once prevent. The act cannot mean that, being drafted 
with an eye to the common law in such matters. While we own that it does some violence 
to the language, it seems to us that the phrase should be taken as no more than a recognition 
that there may be enough disparity in character between the goods of the first and second 
users as to insure against confusion. That will indeed depend much upon trade conditions, 
but these are always the heart of the matter in this subject. It is quite true that in Rosenberg 
v. Elliott (C. C. A.) 7 F.(2d) 962, the court felt bound to find that caps and suits had the 
same descriptive properties, quite independently of the confusion which had arisen. We 
cannot say that that is the case here, for the fact that flash-lights and locks are made of 
metal does not appear to us to give them the same descriptive properties, except as the trade 
has so classed them. But we regard what the trade thinks as the critical consideration, and 
we think the statute meant to make it the test, despite the language used. 
Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (L. Hand, J.) (citation omitted). 
 44. Aunt Jemima Mills Co., 247 F. at 410. 
 45. Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924). 
 46. Id. at 509–10. 
2018] TRADEMARK’S JUDICIAL DE-EVOLUTION 1211 
infringement.47 The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that 
no reasonable consumer would believe that Vogue magazine had begun 
manufacturing the defendant’s hats.48 Although the Sixth Circuit agreed that 
such confusion as to source was unlikely, it nonetheless reversed.49 In the Sixth 
Circuit’s view, the defendant’s use would likely lead consumers to believe that 
the plaintiff had sponsored or endorsed the defendant’s hats.50 It held that such 
sponsorship confusion was sufficient to sustain the cause of action.51 
As the court explained: 
Plaintiff’s magazine is so far an arbiter of style, and the use of 
plaintiff’s trade-mark upon defendants’ hats so far indicates that the 
hats were at least sponsored and approved by the plaintiff, that the 
same considerations which make the misrepresentation so valuable to 
defendants make it pregnant with peril to plaintiff.52 
As the twentieth century wore on, courts continued to expand the 
infringement standard. In 1955, the Second Circuit expanded the infringement 
standard to encompass confusion arising post sale among onlookers, rather than 
at the time of purchase by the purchaser.53 In 1968, a federal district court 
expanded the infringement standard to encompass confusion as to affiliation or 
association, a much broader and more ambiguous standard than confusion as to 
source or endorsement.54 In 1975, the Second Circuit expanded the 
infringement standard to encompass initial interest confusion—confusion that 
 
 47. Id. at 510. 
 48. As the Sixth Circuit explained: 
The District Court thought that, so far as the case counted on unfair competition, it must be 
dismissed, because there was no competition between the publishing of the magazine and 
the manufacture of hats, and that, so far as it counted on trade-mark infringement, it failed, 
because magazines and hats are not articles ‘of the same descriptive qualities.’ 
Id. 
 49. Id. at 512. 
 50. Id. at 511. 
 51. Id. at 512. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-LeCoultre Watches, Inc., 
221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955); see also Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 
1991) (holding that cars which were intended to mimic the appearance of Ferraris infringed upon 
Ferrari’s trade dress in its cars even though purchasers were not confused); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that sale of low-priced imitation Rolexes 
constituted trademark infringement even though purchasers were not confused). 
 54. Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 297 F. Supp. 1330, 1337–38 (N.D. Ga. 1968). 
In an attempt to justify the expansion, the court explained: 
Given the general situation where the public is generally unaware of the specific corporate 
structure of those whose products it buys, but is aware that corporate diversification, 
mergers, acquisitions and operation through subsidiaries is a fact of life, it is reasonable to 
believe that the appearance of “Black Label” on cigarettes could lead to some confusion as 
to the sponsorship of EITHER or both the cigarettes and the beer. Whether the public 
concludes (if it really draws a specific conclusion) that plaintiff’s Black Label beer may 
have become connected with Philip Morris, or that Carling may now be putting out 
cigarettes is immaterial. 
Id. at 1337. 
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initially attracts the attention of consumers to the defendant’s goods, even 
though it is dispelled before any actual purchase.55 In the same year, the Fifth 
Circuit expanded the infringement standard to create a merchandising right for 
professional and, by extension, amateur sport teams.56 It did so by holding that 
use of a sports team’s logo on merchandise, or as merchandise, inevitably led 
consumers to believe that the team had sponsored or approved the use.57 In 
1977, the Tenth Circuit expanded the infringement standard to encompass 
reverse confusion—confusion where, rather than mistakenly believing that the 
plaintiff made the defendant’s goods, consumers mistakenly believe that the 
defendant made the plaintiff’s goods.58 
Congress, for its part, did not take the lead in expanding trademark 
protection. On the only two occasions when Congress appeared to expand the 
infringement standard,59 it merely adopted statutory language that recognized 
what courts had already done.60 Thus, in the 1946 Act itself, Congress replaced 
 
 55. Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 
1341–42 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 56. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); see also Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 
76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing a similar merchandising right for popular television shows). 
 57. As the court explained: 
The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that the defendant duplicated the 
protected trademarks and sold them to the public knowing that the public would identify 
them as being the teams’ trademarks. The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source 
and origin of the trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act. 
See Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, 510 F.2d at 1012. In a later decision, the Fifth Circuit insisted that this 
language, despite what it says, did not do away with the confusion requirement: 
Boston Hockey also reiterated our unbroken insistence on a showing of confusion, and we 
believe that our opinion must be read in that context. Under the circumstances there—
involving sales to the consuming public of products bearing trademarks universally 
associated with Boston Hockey—the fact that the buyers knew the symbols originated with 
Boston Hockey supported the inescapable inference that many would believe that the 
product itself originated with or was somehow endorsed by Boston Hockey. 
Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 389 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 58. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1371–72 (10th 
Cir. 1977) (applying Colorado law). Applying Indiana law, the Seventh Circuit had rejected the 
reverse confusion theory just nine years before. Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 
F.2d 627, 633–34 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968). 
 59. On a third occasion, Congress amended the infringement standard through a 1962 
Housekeeping Amendment to the Lanham Act. Some courts have cited this action as an excuse for 
their own expansions of the trademark infringement standard. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 
F.2d 1235, 1244 (6th Cir. 1991) (relying on the “1967” [sic] Amendment as evidence that Congress 
intended public confusion generally to be actionable); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. 
Supp. 484, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (relying on the 1962 Amendment as evidence that confusion of 
public, and not just purchasers or prospective purchasers, was actionable); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. 
A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 694 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (justifying its finding of 
infringement, in part, based on differences between how the Lanham Act was “originally drafted” and 
how it had been amended). But as discussed, Congress did not intend this amendment to expand the 
infringement standard in the ways courts have interpreted. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra 
note 2, at 469–75. 
 60. Some may argue that Congress broadened the infringement standard through two other 
statutory amendments: (1) the 1962 Housekeeping Amendments to the Lanham Act; and (2) the 
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the “same descriptive properties” language of the 1881 and 1905 Trademark 
Acts with language adopting Aunt Jemima’s likelihood of confusion as to 
source approach.61 And in 1988, Congress amended section 43(a) to encompass 
confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship.62 But in these amendments, Congress 
simply acceded to parts of the broader infringement standard that courts had 
created. 
In short, trademark’s infringement standard expanded substantially over 
the course of the twentieth century, and the judiciary is responsible for that 
expansion. 
2. Expanding Trademark Subject Matter: The Rise of Trade Dress 
Protection 
Our second tale concerns the administrative and judicial expansion of the 
subject matter eligible for protection as a trademark, and in particular, the rise 
of so-called “trade dress” protection. Today, the phrase “trade dress” refers to 
those aspects of a product’s packaging or its configuration, shape, or design 
that consumers use to identify the product’s source.63 In form, a trade dress 
claim looks and sounds like a trademark claim: by imitating distinctive 
packaging or product features, competitors can trick consumers into buying 
their products mistakenly believing they are getting the original. In substance, 
however, a trade dress claim is usually an attempt to bar the imitation of a new 
and popular product outright. It seeks to bar not only unfair competition, but 
competition generally. 
Because trade dress protection poses inherently greater risks to 
competition,64 before the 1946 Trademark Act, trademark protection was 
available only for words, emblems, or symbols affixed to products.65 The shape 
 
 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. I have explained why both arguments are wrong in another 
article. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 408–10, 469–78. 
 61. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1114(1)(a) (2012)). Although the relevant statutory language is routinely ignored today, Congress 
retained the language imposing the first identity requirement, i.e. that the defendant’s mark be nearly 
identical, in the 1946 Act. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 503 (“Any person who 
shall reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any trade-mark registered under this act . . . .”), 
with Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2012)) 
(“Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—(a) use in commerce any reproduction, 
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark . . . .”). 
 62. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994)). 
 63. As the Court recognized in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., where distinctive trade 
dress includes a product’s “total image and overall appearance” “and may include features such as 
size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.” 505 
U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992) (quoting Taco Cabana v. Two Pesos, 932 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1991) 
and John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
 64. See, e.g., Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at 1162–75. 
 65. Today, this is often referred to as the “technical” trademark limitation. See id. at 1140–41. 
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or configuration of a product could not qualify as a trademark; at best, imitation 
of the configuration of a product or its packaging could give rise to a claim for 
unfair competition.66 This was an important distinction. While both claims 
focus on whether a defendant’s actions are likely to trick or deceive consumers 
as to the source of the goods they are buying, for a trademark claim, both 
secondary meaning and a likelihood of confusion can be inferred from the 
similarity of the marks alone.67 In contrast, for unfair competition, the 
deception had to be shown.68 It was not enough to show that a defendant had 
imitated a popular product.69 Proving unfair competition required something 
 
 66. See, e.g., Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 572 (1893) (determining that, 
without a patent, the similar product was “the common property of all mankind” while still considering 
whether there was unfair competition); Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lenel, Inc., 181 F.2d 3, 4–5 (5th Cir. 
1950) (“It is elementary that a color or container cannot be a trade-mark. . . . [T]here can be no trade-
mark in a package, the shape of a bottle, or a letter of the alphabet.”); Société Anonyme de la 
Distillerie de la Liqueur Benedictine de L’Abbaye de Fecamp v. Puziello, 250 F. 928, 928 (E.D.N.Y. 
1918) (granting relief for imitation of packaging under the theory of unfair competition and noting that 
“[t]he statute of February 20, 1905, allowing the registration of a trade-mark in use for more than 10 
years, does not alter the fundamental proposition, that a trade-mark is a design or mark rather than a 
container or package.”); Phila. Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Rouss, 40 F. 585, 587 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889) (“[I]n 
ordinary circumstances, the adoption of packages of peculiar form and color alone, unaccompanied by 
any distinguishing symbol, letter, sign, or seal, is not sufficient to constitute a trade-mark.”); Adams v. 
Heisel, 31 F. 279, 280 (C.C.E.D. Ohio 1887) (“It is well settled that a person cannot obtain the 
monopoly incident to a trade-mark by the mere form of a vendable commodity that may be adopted.”); 
WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS AND ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS 
§ 89c at 109 (2d ed. 1885) (noting that “[t]here are decisions which, at the first glance, seem to hold 
that the mere form of the vendible article may constitute a technical trade-mark. Careful analyses 
cannot fail to induce the conclusion, that the principles of unfair competition, rather than those 
appertaining to trade-marks, were the bases of judgment.”); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF 
TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 53, 54, 57 (4th ed. 1924). 
 67. See, e.g., Md. Stadium Auth. v. Becker, 806 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (inferring both secondary 
meaning and a likelihood of confusion from the defendant’s intentional copying of a word mark, 
“Camden Yards”), aff’d, 36 F.3d 1093 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 68. See Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266, 269–70 
(7th Cir. 1943) (stating that “[t]he essence of unfair competition is fraud. And like fraud, it is never 
presumed, and its existence must be established by a clear preponderance of the evidence.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 69. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938) (noting that “a particular 
manufacturer can no more assert exclusive rights in a form . . . which, in the minds of the public, is 
primarily associated with the article rather than a particular producer, than it can in the case of a name 
with similar connections in the public mind.”); William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 
526, 531 (1924) (stating that “[t]he petitioner or anyone else is at liberty under the law to manufacture 
and market an exactly similar preparation . . . . [b]ut the imitator of another’s goods must sell them as 
his own production.”); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 257 (2d Cir. 1962), 
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); Modern Aids, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 264 F.2d 93, 94 (2d Cir. 
1959) (per curiam) (noting that “[e]ven [where a plaintiff is entitled to relief against an imitator for 
unfair competition], however, the relief would go no further than to require the defendant to make 
plain to buyers that the plaintiff was not the source of the machines sold by it”); Paramount Indus., Inc. 
v. Solar Prods. Corp., 186 F.2d 999, 1001–02 (2d Cir. 1951); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Frances Denney, 
Inc., 99 F.2d 272, 273 (3d Cir. 1938) (per curiam); Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. 
Supp. 609, 613 (D.R.I. 1976) (stating that “[i]t is well established that copying another’s article is not, 
standing alone, unfair competition. It must be shown that the defendant so confusingly presented his 
product through packaging, labeling or otherwise as to lead purchasers to believe that they were 
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more.70 Moreover, even where deception was shown, relief was usually limited 
to a requirement of proper labeling.71 
While unfair competition law thus provided some protection against 
imitation of a product’s design or packaging, that protection was difficult to 
obtain. Even when obtained, the remedy was sharply limited. In William R. 
Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., for example, the plaintiff brought suit against 
the defendant when the defendant copied the plaintiff’s popular product.72 The 
plaintiff’s product, known as Coco-Quinine, was a mixture of chocolate and 
quinine, and was sold as a medicinal or pharmaceutical compound.73 The 
defendant’s product was a similar chocolate and quinine mixture known as 
Quin-Coco.74 Soon after the defendant began selling its compound, the plaintiff 
 
buying the plaintiff’s article.”); Remco Indus., Inc. v. Toyomenka, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 948, 952, 955 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Key West Hand Print Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 287, 292 (S.D. Fla. 
1965). For other differences, see generally Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade Marks and Trade 
Names—An Analysis and Synthesis: I, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168 (1930) (describing greater 
requirements, and narrower scope of protection, for trade names under the doctrine of unfair 
competition as compared to protection of trademarks). 
 70. See Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917) (noting 
that so long as defendant was careful to identify goods as its own, the defendant was fully entitled to 
“copy the plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest detail”); see also Warner & Co., 265 U.S. at 
532 (allowing competitor to use chocolate as flavoring for quinine mixture but requiring proper 
labeling to identify defendant’s product as its own); West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 
F.2d 581, 586, 589, 595 (6th Cir. 1955) (“The identical imitation of the goods of another does not in 
itself constitute unfair competition.”); Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of Am., Inc., 136 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir. 
1943) (copying of cylinder-shaped bubble gum not actionable as unfair competition where defendant’s 
product labeled as its own); Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 
266, 269 (7th Cir. 1943) (“Copying a design not patentable is not unfair competition.”); Sinko v. 
Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1939) (finding imitation of the plaintiff’s product not 
actionable); Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 67 F.2d 218, 220 (6th Cir. 1933) (similarity in 
appearance in defendant’s products not actionable); Meccano, Ltd. v. Wanamaker, 250 F. 450, 452–53 
(2d Cir. 1918) (defendant not liable for unfair competition as long as it properly labels its similar 
products as its own), aff’d, 253 U.S. 136 (1920); John H. Rice & Co. v. Redlich Mfg. Co., 202 F. 155, 
158–60 (3d Cir. 1913) (similarity in product’s design and appearance alone not actionable as unfair 
competition); Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904) (noting that “[u]nfair competition is 
not established by proof of similarity in form, dimensions, or general appearance alone.”); Globe-
Wernicke Co. v. Fred Macey Co., 119 F. 696, 704 (6th Cir. 1902). 
 71. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs., Inc., 467 F.2d 304, 309–10 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(finding no unfair competition despite similarity between original and imitator because defendant had 
plainly labeled its product as its own); Modern Aids, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., Inc., 264 F.2d 93, 94 
(2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (noting that even if plaintiff can show consumer deception as a result of 
defendant’s imitation, relief is limited to the requirement of proper labeling); West Point Mfg. Co. v. 
Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 588, 589 (6th Cir. 1955); J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile 
Co., 120 F.2d 949, 955–56 (8th Cir. 1941) (ruling that “[l]abeling is the usual and accepted method of 
distinguishing the goods of one manufacturer from those of another in the market” and limiting relief 
to requirement of proper labeling and accuracy in statements made concerning defendant’s products). 
 72. 265 U.S. 526, 528 (1924). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 528–29. 
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sued, alleging, inter alia,75 unfair competition due to the similarities between 
the products.76 The trial court rejected the claim, but the Third Circuit reversed 
and held that the defendant should be unconditionally enjoined from using 
chocolate in its product.77 The Supreme Court disagreed, however.78 In its 
view, the wrong was not in imitating the plaintiff’s product.79 Rather, the 
wrong was in suggesting to pharmacists “that, without danger of detection, 
prescriptions and orders for Coco-Quinine could be filled by substituting Quin-
Coco.”80 It was this deceptive passing-off, not the mere imitation of a popular 
product, that made the defendant’s competition unfair.81 Despite finding for the 
plaintiff, the Court limited relief to a requirement that the defendant label its 
product in a manner that clearly distinguished it from Coco-Quinine and that 
affirmatively stated it was not to be substituted for Coco-Quinine when a 
prescription called for, or a customer asked for, Coco-Quinine.82 
As the William R. Warner & Co. decision reflects, the protection available 
to a plaintiff against product imitation under the rubric of unfair competition 
was sharply limited. In enacting the Trademark Act of 1946, Congress retained 
this traditionally limited scope. In the Act, Congress expressly barred the 
registration of trade dress on the principal register, as well as its protection 
under section 43(a). To do so, Congress in 1943 expressly amended the bill that 
would become the Trademark Act of 1946. At the behest of the Department of 
Justice, Congress amended the bill to limit the subject matter of “trademarks” 
and “service marks” eligible for registration on the principal register and for 
protection under section 43(a) to “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof.”83 Now, readers who are familiar with only the last thirty 
years of trademark decisions may point out that Justice Breyer, in Qualitex, 
interpreted the words “symbol or device” in the Act to encompass “anything at 
all that is capable of carrying meaning.”84 Unfortunately, the Court’s 
interpretation is not just wrong, but exactly the opposite of what Congress 
 
 75. The plaintiff also alleged trademark infringement due to the similarities in the parties’ 
names for their respective products. The Court rejected the claim on the grounds that a descriptive 
name could not serve as a trademark. Id. at 529. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 533. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 530. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 532–33. 
 83. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 
(2016)) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those 
manufactured or sold by others . . . .”). For a more detailed discussion of these issues, please see 
Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at 1148–50. 
 84. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (“Since human beings 
might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this 
language, read literally, is not restrictive.”). 
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intended. The Court took language that Congress specifically intended to limit 
the scope of trademark subject matter, by defining that subject matter in terms 
of historically recognized categories, and interpreted that language to broaden 
the scope of trademark subject matter. 
In giving the phrase “symbol or device” a broad interpretation, the 
Qualitex Court violated virtually every major canon of statutory construction. 
First, the Court interpreted the Act as if the 1943 narrowing amendment had 
not occurred.85 Second, the Court gave the words “symbol or device” their 
broad ordinary meaning, rather than the narrower meaning that they carried as 
terms of art within trademark law.86 Third, the Court’s broad interpretation 
made the other words in the statutory definition, “word” and “name,” 
redundant.87 Fourth, even though Congress used different words to define the 
subject matter for the principal register and the supplemental register, the 
Court’s broad interpretation essentially rewrote the Act to define the 
“trademarks” and “service marks” that are eligible for registration on the 
principal register as broadly as the “marks” that are eligible for registration 
only on the supplemental register.88 Fifth, the Court also ignored the relevant 
 
 85. Compare Trade-marks: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Patents on H.R. 82, 
78th Cong. 14 (1944) (“The term ‘trade-mark’ includes any word, name, symbol or device or any 
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and 
distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others.”), and Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 
60 Stat. 427 (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those 
manufactured or sold by others . . . .”), with H.R. 4744, 76th Cong. § 46 (1939), reprinted in Trade-
marks: Hearings on H. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 
76th Cong. 172 (1939), at 9, 172 (“The term ‘trade-mark’ includes any mark which is entitled to 
registration under the terms of this Act and whether registered or not.”). See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442–43 (1987) (noting that “[f]ew principles of statutory construction are more 
compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language 
that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.”) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392–93 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); see also Stone v. I.N.S., 514 
U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment 
to have real and substantial effect.”). 
 86. See McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991); Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (stating that “where Congress borrows terms of art in which are 
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts 
the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it 
was taken . . . .”); Woods v. Lawrence Cty., 66 U.S. 386, 399 (1861) (noting that “terms of art are to 
be understood in their technical sense when used in a statute”). 
 87. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140–41 (1994) (noting that courts must 
construe statutes to give effect, if possible, to every provision); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 
115 (1879) (stating that “[i]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect 
shall, if possible, be accorded to every word”). 
 88. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. at 432 (1987) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 
16, 23 (1983)). 
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legislative history wherein Congress explained that it was adopting the 
amendment specifically to bar trade dress protection.89 
Of course, the Qualitex decision was not the first judicial mistake on the 
trade dress issue. Rather, it was the culmination of a forty-year succession of 
errors. Almost as soon as the ink was dry on the Trademark Act, would-be 
trade dress owners began petitioning the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
and the judiciary to overturn Congress’s carefully considered decision to 
relegate trade dress to the supplemental register.90 In 1952, for example, 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing, better known as “3M,” sought to register 
the now-classic shape of a cellophane tape dispenser on the principal register.91 
But the PTO refused. The Chief Examiner specifically rejected the argument 
that Congress intended “symbol or device” to be interpreted broadly.92 As the 
Chief Examiner explained with respect to the word “device,” for example: 
The word “device” appearing in the definition of trademark cannot aid 
applicant. The word “device,” which also appears in the older 
definitions, is not used as referring to a mechanical or structural device 
but is used in the sense of one of the definitions of the word; “an 
artistic figure or design used as a heraldic bearing or as an emblem, 
badge, trade mark, or the like,” rather than in one of the other 
meanings of the word.93 
Rather than refer to a mechanical device, Congress intended the word “device” 
to carry its technical meaning within trademark law as a coat of arms or other 
form of heraldry. 
But would-be trade dress owners did not give up. Year after year, they 
continued to seek registration of their trade dress on the principal register.94 
 
 89. See Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at 1150–52 (quoting Mr. Rogers’ 
statement that the broader language allowing registration of trade dress on the supplemental register 
was solely for the purpose of enabling registration of trade dress in foreign countries that recognized 
such protection). 
 90. Congress expressly defined “marks” eligible for registration on the supplemental register 
to include both “package” and “configuration of goods” and thus provided for registration of trade 
dress on the supplemental register. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(c) (2012). The supplemental register, however, 
provides no substantive domestic rights. See, e.g., Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distributing, 
Inc., 763 F.3d 524, 530 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that a “Supplemental Registration confers no 
substantive trademark rights beyond those under common law [and] [s]ection 26 of the Lanham Act 
expressly excludes Supplemental Registrations from certain advantages gained by registration on the 
Principal Register”) (quoting 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:36 
(4th ed. 2014)). Providing for registration on the supplemental register does, however, facilitate 
obtaining protection in other countries that require proof of a domestic registration before they will 
register a foreign mark. 
 91. Ex parte Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74, 76 (Chief Exam’r 1952). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Ex parte Babson Bros. Co., 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 115, 116 (Chief Exam’r 1954) 
(“What applicant is attempting to register is a ‘configuration of goods’ and it has been held in a 
number of cases that such configuration, if registrable, cannot be registered on the Principal Register 
but only the Supplemental Register.”); Ex parte Boye Needle Co., 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 124 
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Case after case, their petitions were rejected. Finally, twelve years later in 
1958, they found a sympathetic administrative ear. And with a stroke of her 
pen, the new Commissioner of Trademarks Daphne Robert Leeds overturned 
Congress’s decision on the issue and allowed trade dress on the principal 
register.95 
Once the PTO got the federal trade dress ball rolling, courts were eager to 
lend a hand. Indeed, when the PTO tried to slow the trade dress trend it had 
started, courts rejected its attempts. In 1960, in In re Kotzin, when the PTO 
refused to register the placement and shape of a clothing tag on its own—
without the associated words or symbols that appeared on the tag—the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals insisted that the applicant could obtain registration 
as long as it could show secondary meaning.96 In 1964, in In re Mogen David 
Wine Corp., when the PTO refused to register the shape of a wine bottle 
because it was protected by a design patent, the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals again reversed.97 In 1982, in In re Morton-Norwich Products, when 
the PTO refused to register the shape of the Glass Plus spray bottle on the 
grounds that it was functional, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
reversed and sharply narrowed the functionality limitation on trade dress 
protection.98 In 1985, in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., when the PTO 
refused to register the color pink uniformly applied to fiberglass insulation as a 
trademark, the Federal Circuit reversed and held that a uniform color could 
serve as a trademark.99 
The other federal appellate courts, although a bit late to the game, soon 
joined in. In 1976, the Eighth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to 
 
(Chief Exam’r 1953); Burgess Battery Co. v. Marzall, 101 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D.D.C 1951), aff’d sub 
nom. Burgess Battery Co. v. Watson, 204 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (“The omission of reference to 
labels or dress of goods in connection with the principal register and the inclusion thereof on the 
supplemental register would seem to indicate an intention to confine such matters to the supplemental 
register.”); Ex parte Am. Enka Corp., 81 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 476, 478 (Comm’r Pat. 1949) (noting that 
“this definition [of a trademark] was apparently taken, directly, or indirectly from that contained in the 
treatise on the ‘Law of Trade-Marks,’ by Francis H. Upton, published in 1860, prior to the enactment 
of any provision in Federal law for the registration of trade marks”). 
 95. See Ex parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm’r Pat. 1958). 
 96. 276 F.2d 411, 414–15 (C.C.P.A. 1960). 
 97. 328 F.2d 925, 932 (C.C.P.A. 1964); see also In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1347 
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (reversing PTO’s refusal to register the shape of a home thermostat as a trademark 
where a design patent protected the shape and the shape was the product itself). 
 98. 671 F.2d 1332, 1343–44 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 99. 774 F.2d 1116, 1127–28 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Given that the PTO initially rejected the notion 
that a uniform color could serve as a trademark and only changed its position when the Federal Circuit 
forced it to do so, it is more than a little curious that Justice Breyer in his Qualitex opinion relies on the 
PTO’s position as support for the Court’s conclusion that a uniform color could serve as a trademark. 
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 172 (1995) (noting that “the Patent and 
Trademark Office had adopted a clear policy (which it still maintains) permitting registration of color 
as a trademark”). 
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protect trade dress under section 43(a).100 Other circuits were not far behind.101 
Strikingly, none of these decisions even discussed the fact that Congress 
specifically amended the language of section 43(a) to preclude trade dress 
protection. As the circuit courts gleefully jumped on the trade dress express, the 
Supreme Court was eventually presented with the opportunity to fix the lower 
courts’ mistake. However, rather than correct the mistake, the Court joined the 
parade through its 1992 decision in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana. In a truly 
embarrassing opinion,102 the Court further loosened the standards for protecting 
trade dress by holding that trade dress could be inherently distinctive and thus 
receive protection without proof of secondary meaning.103 The Court offered 
no explanation or basis for rewriting section 43(a) to encompass trade dress 
protection, but simply assumed that Congress must have intended such 
protection all along. Just three years later in Qualitex Corp. v. Jacobsen 
Products, the Court had a second chance to correct the mistaken expansion of 
subject matter eligible for trademark protection. Instead, it chose once again to 
rubber stamp those mistakes. Indeed, it went a step further and tried to justify 
the judicial recognition of trade dress protection by pointing to the broad 
ordinary language meaning of the phrase “symbol or device” in the statute.104 
 
 100. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 86 (1976); see also LeSportsac, Inc. v. K mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985); Original 
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 830–32 (11th Cir. 1982); Sun-Fun 
Products, Inc. v. Suntan Research & Development Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 101. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 102. Although there are a number of aspects of the decision that are embarrassing, two are 
particularly so. First, the Court insisted there was no textual basis for treating traditional trademarks 
and trade dress differently. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) (“It 
would be a different matter if there were textual basis in § 43(a) for treating inherently distinctive 
verbal or symbolic trademarks differently from inherently distinctive trade dress.”). Contrary to the 
Court’s insistence, however, Congress added the “word, name, symbol, or device” language to section 
43(a) specifically to preclude trade dress protection. See, e.g., Walter J. Derenberg, The Lanham 
Trade-Mark Act of 1946: Practical Effects and Experiences After One Year’s Administration, 38 
TRADE-MARK REP. 831, 835 (1948) (noting that items that might qualify as trade dress “were 
deliberately left outside the definition of a ‘trademark’ in section 45” and are therefore not eligible for 
registration on the principal register). Hence, there is a quite clear and express statutory basis for 
treating traditional trademarks and trade dress differently. Second, the Court further insisted it cannot 
“engraft[] onto § 43(a) a requirement of secondary meaning” not otherwise found in the statutory 
language. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774. Yet at the same time, the Court had no trouble “engrafting” 
onto the statute a functionality limitation. Id. at 775 (noting that “[o]nly nonfunctional, distinctive trade 
dress is protected under § 43(a)”). Of course, there was no functionality limitation in the statute in 
1992. Congress added a functionality limitation to section 2 six years later, in 1998. See Trademark 
Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 150-330, § 201(a)(2)(A)(ii), 112 Stat. 3064, 3069 (1998) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2016)). Because Congress intended to preclude trade 
dress protection altogether in 1946, there was no need for a functionality limitation in the statute. 
Congress did not add such a limitation until the courts forced its hand in 1998 and 1999. See 
Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 150-330, § 201(a)(2)(A)(ii), 112 Stat. 3064, 
3069 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2016)); Trademark Amendments Act of 
1999, Pub. L. No. 43, § 5, 113 Stat. 218, 220 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2016)). 
 103. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776. 
 104. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). 
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The Court was apparently unaware that Congress added that phrase precisely to 
bar trade dress protection.105 
As courts formally recognized product design and packaging as a type of 
trademark despite Congress’s expressly stated intention to the contrary, they 
also watered down the requirements for protection against product imitation 
and thereby broadened the scope of that protection. First, where the common 
law once required actual proof of secondary meaning, the Supreme Court’s 
Two Pesos decision eliminated that requirement for non-generic, non-
descriptive product packaging.106 Even where courts required proof of 
secondary meaning, they allowed the trier of fact to infer it from the uniqueness 
of a design, the extent of sales or advertising, or the fact of imitation itself.107 
Second, where the common law once defined a product feature as functional so 
long as it served “a substantial and desirable use,”108 courts narrowed the 
functionality limitation to encompass only those features that were “essential to 
the use or purpose of the article or . . . affect[ed] the cost or quality of the 
article.”109 Third, where the common law once required deceptive acts in 
addition to mere product similarity, courts held that similarity alone was 
sufficient to support an infringement finding.110 Finally, where the common 
 
 105. The defendant in the case, Jacobson Products, did argue that pre-1946 Supreme Court 
cases had stated that a uniform color was not eligible for trademark protection, id. at 169-73, but did 
not apparently explain to the Court how, when, and why Congress added the “word, name, symbol, or 
device” language to the bill that became the Trademark Act of 1946. 
 106. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776. But see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 
205 (2000) (restricting the Two Pesos analysis to product packaging and requiring proof of secondary 
meaning for product design claimed as trade dress). 
 107. Compare A.C. Gilbert Co. v. Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1930) (ruling that similarity 
resulting from imitation and “many sales and much advertising” did not establish secondary meaning 
in design of article), and Gen. Time Instruments Corp. v. U.S. Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853, 854–55 (2d 
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948) (ruling that sale of 3,000,000 clocks and expenditure of 
$2 million in advertising from 1939 to 1946 was insufficient to establish secondary meaning), with 
Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., Inc., 870 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 
(1989) (finding secondary meaning based upon sales and advertising expenditures alone). 
 108. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531 (1924) (finding that 
defendant could imitate exactly the chocolate flavoring of plaintiff’s medication because it “serves a 
substantial and desirable use”); see also Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 
572 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding the pink color for a stomach remedy functional because it was ‘“designed 
to present a pleasing appearance to the customer and to the sufferer’”); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 
198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952); J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 
(8th Cir. 1941) (“A feature of goods is functional . . . if it affects their purpose, action or performance; 
or the facility or economy of processing, handling or using them.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
TORTS § 742 (1938)); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917); 
Smith v. Krause, 160 F. 270, 271 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908) (refusing to protect the words “Merrie 
Christmas,” woven into a ribbon as a trademark because “the fact that it has ‘Merrie Christmas’ 
inscribed upon it adds a value to it over the value of a plain ribbon”). 
 109. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982). 
 110. The evidence of confusion in the Sears and Compco cases has become entirely typical of 
the type of evidence sufficient to establish infringement. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 
U.S. 225, 226 (1964) (holding evidence of confusion consisted of similar appearance plus: (1) labels 
were not attached to showroom lamps; (2) customers had asked manufacturer of higher priced lamp 
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law once limited relief to a requirement of proper labeling, courts held that 
proper labeling was no longer sufficient to avoid an infringement finding. 
Courts would prohibit the imitation of desired product features even where a 
defendant was careful to identify the imitation as its own.111 
As with the infringement standard, Congress was not the one to expand 
the subject matter of trademark protection and weaken the limitations on so-
called trade dress protection. It was the courts. Despite Congress’s express 
direction to the contrary, courts first recognized trade dress as a type of 
protectable trademark, then steadily whittled away the common law’s 
limitations on the availability and scope of that newly recognized protection. 
B. Separating the Wheat from the Chaff: When Expansive Trademark 
Protection Hurts Consumers 
Essentially all of this judicial expansion in trademark protection hurts 
consumers and reduces social welfare. In the marketplace, social welfare is the 
aggregate welfare of the market participants. Thus, social welfare is maximized 
when the sum of producer and consumer welfare in that marketplace is 
maximized. If we use producer and consumer “surplus”—defined as the 
economic benefit captured in excess of marginal cost—as a measure of that 
welfare, then social welfare is maximized when the total surplus to the 
producers and consumers in a given market is maximized.112 In a perfectly 
competitive market, competition drives prices down to the marginal cost of 
production.113 In such a competitive market, producers that are more efficient 
than the marginal producer earn some surplus,114 but consumers capture the 
 
about the difference in the lamps; and (3) two customers, who purchased the more expensive lamp, 
complained to the manufacturer of the more expensive lamps when they learned that “substantially 
identical lamps” were available at a “much lower price”); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 
376 U.S. 234, 236–37 (1964) (explaining evidence of confusion consisted of similar appearance plus a 
request by a single plant manager that Day-Brite service was what turned out to be fixtures made by 
Compco); see also Am. Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 270 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding 
unfair competition from product simulation even though court recognized that “[t]here is some but not 
much evidence of actual confusion”). 
 111. Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to say that proper labeling is itself a wrong. See, 
e.g., Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1220–21 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting that 
“Fruehauf’s reliance upon the fact that its trailer was labeled as its own product and sold through its 
own channels of distribution is not only misplaced, but also self-defeating. . . . [S]uch a marketing 
practice by a dominant figure in the market tends to promote rather than ensure against confusion.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 112. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 11, 67 (1988) 
(noting that when the goods at issue are only a small share of consumer expenditures and price 
changes therefore generate small income effects, “it may be appropriate to assume . . . that the 
consumer surplus is a good approximation of welfare”). 
 113. See, e.g., id. at 6 (“A key property of competitive equilibrium is that each good is sold at 
marginal cost.”). 
 114. In the traditional analysis, supply curves slope upward and demand curves slope 
downward. Price is set at the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. In a competitive 
market, this is at the marginal cost of the marginal supplier. All of the non-marginal suppliers face 
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vast majority of the available surplus.115 By restricting competition, policy 
makers can increase prices in the market and thereby shift some of the surplus 
from consumers to producers. But shifting surplus from consumers to 
producers does not merely redistribute wealth. To shift surplus from consumers 
to producers requires raising prices, and raising prices inevitably imposes some 
degree of deadweight loss, as some consumers will be unable to afford the 
higher prices.116 As a result, to increase producer surplus by any given amount, 
we must transfer at least that much surplus from consumers and reduce 
consumer surplus yet further as a result of the deadweight losses higher prices 
impose.117 Moreover, when the prospect of producer surplus appears, producers 
may spend real resources competing to capture it. Such rent-seeking 
expenditures can convert what would have been surplus into cost.118 For that 
reason, maximizing total surplus in a market requires maximizing consumer 
surplus in the market.119 Or to put it in a more familiar form, competition 
maximizes social welfare; monopoly and market power reduce it.120 
Applying this simple rule to trademark law requires a realistic appraisal of 
whether a given trademark decision will yield competition and, if so, what sort 
 
lower marginal costs and so earn rents equal to the difference between their marginal cost and the 
price. For a graphical illustration, see id. at 9. 
 115. Consumers capture surplus equal to the difference between their reservation value for a 
good and the price of that good. For example, if I am very thirsty, I might be willing to pay ten dollars 
for a bottle of water. In a competitive market, I do not have to pay my full reservation value, but only 
the market price for such a bottle. The difference remains in my pocket as consumer surplus. For a 
graphical illustration, see, for example, id. at 8. 
 116. As Tirole has explained: 
In contrast with the behavior of a competitive firm . . . , a firm exercising monopoly power 
over a given market can raise its price above marginal cost without losing all its clients. 
Such behavior leads to a price that is too high and to a “dead-weight” welfare loss for 
society . . . . 
Id. at 65. 
 117. See, e.g., id. at 76 (noting that “monopoly pricing lowers consumer surplus and raises a 
firm’s profit relative to a competitive behavior. The decrease in surplus exceeds the increase in profit 
by an amount equal to the dead-weight loss.”). 
 118. See, e.g., id. at 76 (stating that “[i]t is clear that the existence of this potential rent may lead 
to rent-seeking behavior. Firms will tend to spend money and exert effort to acquire the monopoly 
position; once installed in that position, they will tend to keep on spending money and exerting effort 
to maintain it.”) The practice of paying radio stations and other public performance venues to play a 
particular song in order to increase the popularity of, and hence demand for, the song is one example. 
See, e.g., R. H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 269 (1979) 
(providing a detailed account of payola throughout the past century). 
 119. See, e.g., id. at 9 (noting that “[t]he total surplus is maximized when the consumer price is 
equal to the marginal cost . . . .”). 
 120. This is the first theorem of welfare economics. See, e.g., id. at 6 (noting that “[r]oughly 
stated, the first [fundamental welfare theorem] says that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto 
optimal . . . .”). For application of this principal more generally in intellectual property scholarship, 
see, for example, Kristelia A. García, Facilitating Competition by Remedial Regulation, 31 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 183, 190 (2016); Andrea M. Hall, Standing the Test of Time: Likelihood of Confusion in 
Multi Time Machine v. Amazon, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 815, 842 (2016); Camilla A. Hrdy, Patent 
Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1325 (2016); Louis Kaplow, On the 
Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 683, 686 (2011). 
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of competition. Compare, for example, the welfare consequences of the Vogue 
hat case with those of the Boston Professional Hockey decision. By enjoining 
the defendant from selling hats labeled “Vogue”, the Vogue court did not 
prohibit the defendant from entering the market for fashionable hats. The 
defendant was free to do so as long as it did not use a mark for its hats that 
would mislead consumers. It could still make and sell fashionable hats; it just 
had to market them under a different name.121 In contrast, by prohibiting the 
defendant from selling the emblems of NHL teams and from selling 
merchandise bearing those emblems, the Boston Professional Hockey court 
effectively barred the defendant from entering the market for such merchandise 
altogether. While the defendant remained free to sell t-shirts or other 
merchandise without the NHL symbols, a significant number of consumers 
likely would not consider them acceptable substitutes for real NHL 
merchandise. After the court’s decision, for consumers who wanted such 
merchandise, there would be only one source: the NHL itself. Moreover, unlike 
the Vogue mark, the emblem on a jersey plays no trademark role. It conveys no 
otherwise unobservable information regarding the quality or nature of the 
merchandise.122 The Boston Professional Hockey decision thus replaced 
competition with monopoly and thereby reduced social welfare.123 
Moreover, we cannot justify the Boston Professional Hockey decision on 
the basis that the NHL created the demand for the merchandise, a version of “if 
value, then right,”124 as the court seemed to.125 Neither can we justify it on the 
slightly different basis that the NHL will reinvest the surplus from merchandise 
sales into improving the product.126 If either were a sufficient basis for 
 
 121. I have defined the relevant market as the market for fashionable hats. For an extensive 
justification of that market definition, see Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 421–38; 
see also Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market 
Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055 (2012) [hereinafter Lemley & McKenna, Market 
Definition] (advocating a similar approach). 
 122. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait 
Accompli, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 478–95 (2005); Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 395–
99, 433–37. 
 123. I recognize that some consumers may prefer authorized merchandise, but the leagues can 
satisfy that demand by identifying their apparel as “official” or “authorized.” That some consumers 
may want official merchandise provides no justification for depriving other consumers of the choice to 
buy unauthorized apparel by prohibiting the sale of such merchandise altogether. 
 124. Felix Cohen used the “if value, then right” phrase to capture the argument that if a person 
or entity creates value, the law should recognize a legal right in the creator to capture that value. See 
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 
(1935). 
 125. See Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 
1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). (“The argument that confusion must be 
as to the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where the trademark, 
originated by the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the emblem.”). 
 126. As Arnold Plant once said, “a special case for a monopoly . . . cannot rest on the general 
proposition that if business men are enabled to make monopoly profits, some of them will be devoted 
to good works.” ARNOLD PLANT, THE NEW COMMERCE IN IDEAS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15 
(1953). 
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accepting monopoly, then monopoly would become preferable to competition 
generally—an absurd outcome. As a general rule, competitive markets already 
provide the efficient level of incentive for firms to invest in quality products.127 
In those rare and exceptional cases where competitive markets are likely 
to fail to provide sufficient incentive, patent and copyright provide incentives 
to fill the gap.128 Even if patent and copyright leave some gaps unfilled, we 
should not use trademark law to address remaining gaps.129 In contrast to 
trademark, patent and copyright are expressly tailored to address such instances 
of market failure. Their limitations on subject matter and prerequisites serve to 
provide protection only in cases where the nature and extent of creative 
investment make market failure likely.130 At the same time, their scope of 
protection, available defenses such as copyright fair use, and limited duration 
serve to provide both protection and a corresponding incentive sufficient to 
correct the likely market failure without imposing undue social cost.131 
Trademark has none of these features. Its subject matter is not limited, and 
its prerequisites are not tailored to define when the nature and extent of the 
creative investment makes market failure likely.132 Similarly, its scope and 
duration of protection are not designed to provide an incentive that is precisely 
sufficient to correct that market failure without imposing undue social costs.133 
 
 127. Klein and Leffler have modeled brands as an informal guarantee of product quality. See 
generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981). In their model, consumers continue to purchase brands 
that honor their implicit and informal guarantee of quality and abandon those that do not. Id. at 620–
21. As part of their model, Klein and Leffler show that some degree of supra-competitive pricing is 
necessary to make this informal guarantee effective. Id. at 621–23. The rents associated with that 
pricing provide the incentive for maintaining quality and the punishment for failing to do so. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Lothar Determann & David Nimmer, Software Copyright’s Oracle from the 
Cloud, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 168 (2015); Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute 
Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 4 n.3 (2016); Philip Merksamer, 
Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom: Metastasis of Mayo and Myriad and the Evisceration of Patent 
Eligibility for Molecular Diagnostics, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 495, 500 (2016). 
 129. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 456–62. 
 130. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
259, 321 (2016); Jamie F. Cárdenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An Empirical and 
Economic Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1307 
(2014) (arguing that patent exclusivity is required because of high investment costs); Pamela 
Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software 
Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1292–94 (2016) (arguing that copyright 
protection should focus on helping investors recoup costs). To be clear, I am not talking about the 
market failure that arises from imperfect information. Trademark law is tailored to address that market 
failure. The question then becomes whether the mark at issue is: (1) providing material and otherwise 
unobservable information to the consumer; and (2) that information cannot be made available through 
a cheaper (to competition) means. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 431–32. 
 131. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Patent Law’s Parismony Principle, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1693, 
1710–11 (2010); Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1383, 1385–86 (2014); Hannibal Travis, Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian 
Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 777 (2000). 
 132. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 457–59. 
 133. See id. at 458–59. 
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Most obviously, where patent and copyright protection both have defined and 
limited terms, trademark protection is potentially perpetual, lasting as long as 
the protected “mark” remains in use and retains its distinctiveness. 
In sum, to maximize total surplus, courts should strive to maximize 
consumer surplus. To maximize consumer surplus, courts should resolve 
trademark disputes to promote competition and to minimize monopoly and 
market power. Yet, courts have not done so. To understand why, the following 
Section takes a preliminary look at the judicial decisions through which 
trademark law has become inefficient for consumers. 
C. Judicial Decision Making: A Dysfunctional Process 
Looking at the judicial de-evolution of trademark law over the course of 
the last hundred years, certain dysfunctional patterns emerge. First, pro-
competitive trademark decisions tend to be challenged repeatedly until they are 
distinguished or rewritten, while anticompetitive decisions tend to stick. 
Second, sound reasoning that supports efficient interpretations of trademark 
law is ignored, and absurdly weak reasoning that supports inefficient 
interpretations triumphs. Third, trademark defense counsel often fail to make 
relevant arguments in the initial cases, and stare decisis makes it difficult to 
correct them afterwards. 
All it takes is one bad decision for an anticompetitive trademark rule to 
stick. Consider, for example, the path by which so-called trade dress became 
eligible for registration on the principal register. Almost as soon as the ink 
dried on the Trademark Act of 1946, applicants attempted to register various 
forms of trade dress on the register. In a series of well-reasoned decisions from 
1949 to 1954, the Patent and Trademark Office repeatedly denied the 
registrability of trade dress on the principal register.134 But parties seeking trade 
dress registration did not give up. They kept at it for a decade until finally, in 
1958, they found a receptive, and perhaps corrupt,135 administrator willing to 
overturn Congress’s carefully considered decision on the issue and allow the 
registration of trade dress on the principal register.136 Thus, the pro-competitive 
rule denying registration to trade dress was repeatedly challenged until the law 
changed. 
Compare that to the recognition of a merchandising right for sports teams. 
In its 1975 Boston Professional Hockey decision, the Fifth Circuit rewrote 
trademark law to give professional sports teams the right to control the sale of 
 
 134. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 135. As I have explained elsewhere, see Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at 
1156 n.88, Assistant Commissioner Leeds rewrote the law to allow trade dress registration on the 
principal register for a company that would become her client when she left the Office and returned to 
private practice. 
 136. See Ex parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm’r Pat. 1958). 
2018] TRADEMARK’S JUDICIAL DE-EVOLUTION 1227 
merchandise bearing their team names and logos.137 A few years later, in 1982, 
the Third Circuit reiterated and reinforced the merchandising right in its 
University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products decision.138 In that case, after a 
bench trial, the district court found that laches precluded the University of 
Pittsburgh’s enforcement of the merchandising right where Champion had been 
selling unlicensed apparel and other merchandise bearing the University’s 
name and logo for more than forty years.139 On appeal, a panel of the Third 
Circuit reversed and held that laches did not apply based largely on the “if 
value, then right” reasoning of Boston Professional Hockey.140 The 
University’s efforts created the value of the logo; Champion “merely 
package[d] and exploit[ed] it.”141 Thus, the Third Circuit held that the 
University had enforceable rights in the logo.142 
These two decisions created an inefficient, welfare-diminishing 
merchandising right for sports teams. They both raised prices for, and restricted 
consumer choice with respect to, such merchandise. Moreover, they imposed 
these anticompetitive consequences without reducing material consumer 
confusion or search costs.143 Yet, unlike the efficient legal rule barring the 
 
 137. See Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 
1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) (holding as a matter of law that sales of 
unauthorized merchandise bearing team logos or the logos themselves created an actionable likelihood 
of confusion). 
 138. 686 F.2d 1040 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 107 (1982). 
 139. Id. at 1042–43 (noting that Champion had been selling merchandise bearing the Pitt name 
and logo since 1936). 
 140. Id. at 1049. 
 141. Id.; see also Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir. 
1982) (“[I]t is Champion which seeks to profit from Pitt’s investment, particularly in its athletic 
program.”). 
 142. Id. at 1049. 
 143. In trying to explain the nature of the consumer confusion that was present, the Boston 
Professional Hockey court asserted: 
The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that the defendant duplicated the 
protected trademarks and sold them to the public knowing that the public would identify 
them as being the teams’ trademarks. The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source 
and origin of the trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act. 
Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). The court’s explanation, however, entirely fails to show 
consumers are confused. At a minimum, confusion presumably requires that a consumer holds a belief 
that is not true. Here, consumers believe that the symbols represent the team. True. As the district court 
found, they also believe that Dallas Cap & Emblem made the emblems without a license from the 
team. Also, true. 
  Because the court’s reasoning is so weak, outside the context of sports teams, the Ninth 
Circuit expressly rejected the reasoning of Boston Professional Hockey. See Int’l Order of Job’s 
Daughters v. Lindenburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980). Even the Fifth Circuit itself later 
“re-interpreted” the language of the decision. See Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging 
Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 389 (5th Cir. 1977) (insisting that the Boston Professional Hockey decision 
required proof of a likelihood of confusion). Yet, thirty years later, when the Fifth Circuit revisited the 
merchandising right in the sports context, it reiterated the same fallacious reasoning. Bd. of 
Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. and Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 477–78 
(5th Cir. 2008) (“By associating the color and other indicia with the university, the fans perceive the 
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registration of trade dress, parties did not line up to challenge this new, 
inefficient rule. Despite the extremely weak reasoning of the two decisions 
establishing the rule, potential defendants essentially acceded to the 
merchandising right and modified their behavior to comply. As a result, it took 
more than thirty years before the sports merchandising right was challenged in 
a federal appellate court.144 
Likewise, poorly reasoned, inefficient decisions in trademark law have 
had inexplicably more staying power than well-reasoned, efficient decisions. 
For example, on the issue of whether trade dress should be eligible for 
registration on the principal register, the efficient legal rule is to deny such 
registration.145 The early decisions adopting this efficient rule and rejecting 
trade dress registration were careful and well-reasoned. They traced the 
historical usage of the terms “symbol” and “device” within trademark law to 
understand their meaning in the 1946 Act;146 they recognized and gave effect to 
Congress’s intentional adoption of a narrower definition of “trademarks” for 
registration on the principal register and a broader definition of “marks” 
eligible for registration on the supplemental register;147 and they recognized 
that Congress intended to maintain the historical practice of denying formal 
trademark status to so-called trade dress and relegating claims for trade dress 
protection to the realm of unfair competition.148 In contrast, in 1958, Assistant 
 
university as the source or sponsor of the goods because they want to associate with that source.”), 
cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1268 (2009). 
 144. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. and Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 
550 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1268 (2009). 
 145. As I have explained elsewhere, see Lunney, Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at 1162–
81, trade dress tends to stifle desirable competition. Even where a product’s design or packaging 
provides material information to consumers, there are alternative and cheaper (to competition) 
mechanisms, such as arbitrary word marks, to convey that same information. 
 146. See Ex parte Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 82 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 231 (Comm’r Pat. 1949) 
(noting that “the definition appearing in the 1946 Act appears not only entirely consistent with the 
definitions and statements of the nature of trade marks appearing in many decided cases, . . . but to 
have been taken almost literally from such cases and earlier text authority”); see also Burgess Battery 
Co. v. Marzall, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 91–92 (D.D.C. 1951) (“The omission of reference to labels or 
dress of goods in connection with the principal register and the inclusion thereof on the supplemental 
register would seem to indicate an intention to confine such matters to the supplemental register.”); Ex 
parte Am. Enka Corp., 81 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 476, 478 (Comm’r Pat. 1949) (noting that “the definition 
[of trademark] in section 45 of the Act of 1946 . . . was apparently taken, directly, or indirectly from 
that contained in the treatise on the ‘Law of Trade-Marks,’ by Francis H. Upton, published in 
1860 . . . .”). 
 147. See Ex parte Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74, 75 (Chief Exam’r 1952); 
see also Ex parte Babson Bros. Co., 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 115, 116 (Chief Exam’r 1954); Ex parte 
Boye Needle Co., 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 124 (Chief Exam’r 1953); Burgess Battery Co., 92 
U.S.P.Q. at 91–92 (noting that “[t]he omission of reference to labels or dress of goods in connection 
with the principal register and the inclusion thereof on the supplemental register would seem to 
indicate an intention to confine such matters to the supplemental register.”). 
 148. See Ex parte Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 76 (“Applicant asserts that 
a court would enjoin a competitor from any attempt to pass off its goods as those of the applicant, but 
this does not indicate that the court would base its action upon trade mark rights . . . .”); see also 
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Commissioner Daphne Leeds adopted the inefficient legal rule and allowed the 
registration of trade dress on the principal register.149 In her opinion, she did 
not address the language, history, or policy against providing such protection; 
nor did she acknowledge Congress’s deliberate decision to bar such protection. 
Instead, Leeds merely stated without reasoning or support, “[T]he contour or 
conformation of the container may be a trademark—a symbol or device—
which distinguishes the applicant’s goods, and it may be registrable on the 
Principal Register.”150 Her “reasoning,” such as it is, consists of the use of 
dashes to suggest equivalence between a “contour of a container” and a 
“symbol or device.” It is absurd on its face. Yet, over time, Leeds’s 
“reasoning” prevailed. 
We see a similar dynamic in the narrowing of the functionality doctrine, 
where weak reasoning once again prevailed to justify inefficiently expansive 
protection. Much like the initial denial of registration for trade dress, we start 
functionality’s evolution with a well-reasoned decision. In 1952, the Ninth 
Circuit considered whether a china pattern could receive protection against 
imitation under unfair competition law in Pagliero v. Wallace China.151 The 
court concluded that the pattern was functional and therefore could not be 
protected against imitation under the rubric of unfair competition.152 In 
embracing a broad, and not-incidentally efficient, interpretation of 
functionality, the court acknowledged that a defendant might be able to 
compete by creating its own designs, but held that this was irrelevant. The 
court stated, “[t]he law encourages competition not only in creativeness but in 
economy of manufacture and distribution as well.”153 As time passed, trade 
dress plaintiffs repeatedly challenged this sensible ruling until finally, the Third 
Circuit rejected this efficient interpretation of functionality and replaced it with 
its own narrow, inefficient interpretation.154 In doing so, the Third Circuit 
considered only one side of the competitive balance. Its reasoning insisted that 
 
Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lenel, Inc., 181 F.2d 3, 4–5 (5th Cir. 1950) (recognizing that “there can be no 
trade-mark in a package, the shape of a bottle, or a letter of the alphabet”). 
 149. See Ex parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 230–31 (Comm’r Pat. 1958). 
 150. Commissioner Leeds resorts to this substitute for reasoning twice. See Ex parte Haig & 
Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 230 (Comm’r Pat. 1958) (stating that “[t]he fundamental 
question, then, is not whether or not containers are registrable on the Principal Register, but it is 
whether or not what is presented is a trademark—a symbol or device—identifying applicant’s goods 
and distinguishing them from those of others.”); id. at 231 (stating that “the contour or conformation of 
the container may be a trademark—a symbol or device—which distinguishes the applicant’s goods, 
and it may be registrable on the Principal Register.”). 
 151. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). 
 152. Id. at 343. 
 153. Id. at 344. 
 154. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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only competition in creating new designs mattered.155 The court simply ignored 
the need for competition in the manufacture and distribution of goods.156 
Similarly absurd arguments have proven persuasive in inefficiently 
broadening the infringement standard. For example, to justify the recognition 
of post-sale or “onlooker” confusion, courts have pointed to, first, the statutory 
language protecting against confusion “in commerce,” and second, to 
Congress’s 1962 amendment of the infringement standard.157 Both arguments 
are flawed. 
The “in commerce” language has been part of the infringement standard 
since the Trademark Act of 1881.158 By including this language, Congress did 
not intend to provide a basis for a court a century later to recognize post-sale 
confusion as actionable. Rather, Congress included this language in the 1881 
Act, and in every subsequent Act, to tie federal trademark protection to 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.159 Congress did so because 
the Court, in its 1879 decision in The Trade-mark Cases, held that the Patent 
and Copyright Clause did not provide a basis for federal trademark 
legislation.160 Congress needed to clarify that it was acting under its Commerce 
Clause authority and therefore repeatedly included “in commerce” language at 
a number of points in subsequent Acts.161 The language is thus jurisdictional 
and should not serve as a basis for expanding the infringement standard to 
encompass post-sale confusion. 
The citation to the 1962 Housekeeping Amendment as a basis for 
recognizing post-sale confusion is equally problematic.162 In the 1962 
Amendment, Congress amended the infringement standard for registered 
trademarks by deleting the italicized phrase in the following excerpt: 
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— 
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. (criticizing Pagliero on the grounds that it “provides a disincentive for 
development of imaginative and attractive design. The more appealing the design, the less protection it 
would receive.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (mistakenly referring to 
the Amendments at issue as the 1967 Amendments, rather than the 1962 Amendments); Rolex Watch 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
 158. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 502. 
 159. See, e.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 
92–93 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the “in commerce” language was added to track Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority). 
 160. 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding Congress did not have authority to enact a trademark act 
under the Patent and Copyright Clause, article I, section 8, clause 8). 
 161. For example, in the current trademark statute, in addition to appearing in section 1114(a), 
“in commerce” appears in more than twenty other provisions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a)(1), 
(a)(2), (a)(3)(C), (b)(1), (b)(3)(C), (c), (d), (d)(1), (d)(2), 1052(d), (f), 1057, 1058(b), 1062, 1065, 
1091(a), 1125(a)(1), 1126(d)(2), 1115(a), (b), 1127, 1141, 1141(h) (2016). 
 162. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 469–75. 
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sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or 
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive purchasers as to the 
source or origin of such products or services.163 
Although, when read in isolation, the plain language of the Amendment might 
suggest that Congress intended to expand the infringement standard quite 
sharply to encompass confusion of any sort, even a superficial review in 
context suggests a far more limited change. As the “Housekeeping” title 
immediately suggests, Congress intended the Amendment to be largely non-
substantive.164 As Congress explained in the legislative history, and as is 
revealed by the other changes the Amendment made, Congress’s principal 
purpose was to ensure consistency in the language used to express the 
likelihood of confusion standard in the four provisions where it appeared in the 
Act.165 Before the Amendment, these four provisions had used the same 
likelihood of confusion standard, but had expressed it in three different 
ways.166 While Congress did intend the deletion of the word “purchasers” to 
expand the infringement standard to include a focus on prospective purchasers 
as well, Congress also intended to retain trademark’s traditional focus on 
confusion among purchasers, whether actual or prospective, as to source.167 
Nevertheless, beginning some ten years after the Housekeeping 
Amendment was enacted, courts decided that Congress had intended to effect a 
 
 163. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a)(1) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 164. The Senate Report accompanying the Amendments stated: 
The purpose of this [1962 Amendment] is to make a number of miscellaneous changes in 
the Trademark Act of 1946 so as to clarify the meaning of several of its provisions. The 
provisions of the bill affect details of registration, administrative and court procedure, 
internal organization of the Patent Office regarding trademark matters, and refinements in 
language that experience has shown to be desirable. It also corrects typographical errors in 
the Trademark Act of 1946. 
S. REP. NO. 87-2107 (1962), as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2844. 
 165. In addition to appearing in section 32 of the Act, a likelihood of confusion standard also 
appears in sections 1, 2, and 16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052, 1066, 1114 (2016). 
 166. Before the Amendment, the infringement standard in section 1114 defined likelihood of 
confusion in terms of whether a mark “is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers 
as to the source or origin of such goods or services.” See S. REP. NO. 87-2107 (1962), as reprinted in 
1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2850. Section 1 of the Act required an applicant to certify that the mark did not 
create a likelihood of confusion with a preexisting mark. Id. at 2847. Before the Amendment, the 
relevant provision, section 1051(a)(1)(A), defined likelihood of confusion in terms of whether a mark 
was “in such near resemblance thereto as might be calculated to deceive.” Id. Section 2 barred the 
registration of a mark that created a likelihood of confusion with a previously registered mark, and 
section 16 authorized an interference where a mark created a likelihood of confusion with a previously 
registered mark. Before the Amendment, these sections defined the standard in terms of whether a 
mark so resembled another’s prior mark “as to be likely . . . to cause confusion or mistake or to 
deceive purchasers.” See id. at 2845, 2847, 2850; see also Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 
2, at 470–75 (explaining the circumstances behind the 1962 Housekeeping Amendment). 
 167. S. REP. No. 87-2107 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2845, 2847, 2850; see also 
Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at 469–76. 
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far more radical expansion in the infringement standard.168 Noting how the 
Amendment changed the plain language of the infringement standard, but 
ignoring the context, the “Housekeeping” title, and the legislative history, 
courts simply asserted that Congress intended the Housekeeping Amendment 
to recognize confusion “of any kind” as actionable.169 
The role of trademark defense counsel, and their failure to make the 
appropriate arguments in lower courts, contributes a great deal to this kind of 
inefficient rulemaking at the judicial level. Courts initially interpreted the 1962 
Housekeeping Amendment to encompass confusion of any sort without citing 
the legislative history or explaining the context in which the Amendment was 
adopted, presumably because defense counsel did not raise the issue.170 
Similarly, when the Eighth Circuit first recognized federal trade dress 
protection under section 43(a), defense counsel missed a crucial opportunity to 
argue that Congress amended the provision before its enactment in 1943 to 
include the “symbol or device” language precisely to bar trade dress protection. 
Instead, defense counsel made the somewhat fatuous argument that the Court’s 
decisions in two state law unfair competition law cases preempted the 
availability of federal trade dress protection.171 Apparently, defense counsel 
mistakenly believed that one federal law, the Patent Act, could preempt another 
federal law. 
Alternatively, consider Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.172 In 
determining whether federal trade dress protection should require proof of 
secondary meaning, defense counsel again failed to argue that Congress 
 
 168. See Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971); see 
also James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976); Bos. Prof’l 
Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Rolex Watch U.S.A. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492–93, 492 n.2 
(S.D. Fla. 1986); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 694, 694 n.10 
(N.D. Ga. 1976). 
 169. For example, the Syntex Laboratories court simply asserted, without offering any support 
or analysis, that: 
In its original form, the federal infringement section required a showing that the alleged 
infringer’s use ‘is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive purchasers 
as to the source of origin of such goods or services.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). (Emphasis 
supplied.) In amending that section in 1962, Congress eliminated the italicized, qualifying 
language, thereby evincing a clear purpose to outlaw the use of trademarks which are likely 
to cause confusion, mistake, or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor simply 
as to source of origin. 
437 F.2d at 568. 
 170. Various defense counsel repeatedly had the opportunity to make these arguments, but did 
not do so. See, e.g., James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 
1976); Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 
F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971); Rolex Watch U.S.A. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492–93, 492 n.2 (S.D. 
Fla. 1986); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A&A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 694, 694 n.10 (N.D. 
Ga. 1976). 
 171. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214–16 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 172. 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
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expressly excluded protection for trade dress under the Lanham Act.173 As a 
result, when the Court asked why there was no express secondary meaning 
requirement for trade dress in the registration provision of the Act,174 defense 
counsel responded with its own pet theory. Specifically, counsel for Two Pesos 
argued that while trade dress could receive protection initially without a 
showing of secondary meaning, it would lose protection if it did not develop 
secondary meaning in a reasonable time.175 The Court rejected the argument, as 
it should have, given that the argument lacks any textual basis, policy 
justification, or common law antecedent. The Court did not discuss, and 
defense counsel apparently did not present, the correct argument: There was 
and still is no secondary meaning requirement for the registration of trade 
dress, just as there was no functionality limitation on the registration of trade 
dress at the time,176 because Congress, in enacting the Lanham Act in 1946, 
had expressly prohibited the registration of trade dress on the principal register. 
Because Congress had expressly barred substantive trade dress protection, there 
was no need for a secondary meaning requirement or a functionality limitation 
in the statute. 
Having failed to make these arguments when the issue was initially 
presented, stare decisis made it very difficult to correct them afterwards. 
Moreover, judges and justices have been reluctant to admit their mistakes. So 
when counsel for Walmart in Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Brothers pointed out 
that the premises on which Two Pesos was decided were fundamentally 
flawed,177 the Court did not take the opportunity to correct its earlier mistake in 
Two Pesos. Instead, the Court merely restricted the reach of Two Pesos’ flawed 
holding that trade dress could be inherently distinctive to only those cases 
where the asserted trade dress consisted of product packaging rather than 
 
 173. Id. at 771 (noting that defense counsel “recognize[ed] that a general requirement of 
secondary meaning impose[d] ‘an unfair prospect of theft [or] financial loss’ . . . [and] Petitioner 
argue[d] that such protection [without proof of secondary meaning] should be only temporary and 
subject to defeasance when over time the dress has failed to acquire secondary meaning”). 
 174. Id. at 774 (stating that “[w]here secondary meaning does appear in the statute, 15 U.S.C. § 
1052 (1982 ed.), it is a requirement that applies only to merely descriptive marks . . . .”). The Court’s 
assertion is incorrect, or at least, incomplete. For registration on the principal register, sections 2(e) and 
2(f), read in conjunction, currently require proof of secondary meaning for trademarks which are: (i) 
merely descriptive; (ii) deceptively misdescriptive; (iii) primarily merely a surname; and (iv) primarily 
geographically descriptive. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (f) (2016). 
 175. Id. at 771 (noting that “[p]etitioner argues that such protection [without proof of secondary 
meaning] should be only temporary and subject to defeasance when over time the dress has failed to 
acquire secondary meaning.”). 
 176. Congress added a functionality limitation to section 2 six years later, in 1998. See 
Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 150-330, § 201(a)(2)(A)(ii), 112 Stat. 3064, 
3069 (1998), (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2016)). 
 177. See Brief for Petitioner at 15, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) 
(No. 99-150), 1999 WL 1045142 (citing Lunney, Trademark Monopolies). 
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product design.178 Where a party sought to protect product design as trade 
dress, the Wal-Mart Court required proof of secondary meaning, or as the 
Court called it, “acquired distinctiveness.”179 
D. Exceptions for Exceptional Cases 
Before proceeding to a more careful examination of why judicial decision 
making in trademark law has gone awry, I should acknowledge that the 
evolution of trademark law has not been entirely one-sided. Courts have 
occasionally decided cases in ways that limit or otherwise cut back on the 
otherwise expanding scope of trademark protection. Examples include, inter 
alia: (i) the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Brothers 
requiring proof of secondary meaning for product design trade dress;180 (ii) the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi181 sharply narrowing the 
trademark infringement standard as against movie titles, specifically, and the 
titles of creative works, more generally; and (iii) the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing creating the nominative 
fair use defense.182 Each of these doctrinal developments rejected attempts to 
broaden the scope of trademark protection. 
Yet, rather than provide grounds for comfort, these decisions suggest a 
second problem with trademark’s judicial evolution: undue complexity. 
Because of stare decisis and a judicial reluctance to admit mistakes, later courts 
are unlikely to use these cases to cut back on the general expansion in 
trademark protection. Instead, they create exceptions to trademark’s general 
rules that apply only to particular defendants in particular cases. For example, 
as discussed, in Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., the Court was presented 
with an opportunity to correct its mistake in Two Pesos. Yet, the Court refused 
to do so. Instead, the Wal-Mart Court divided trade dress into product design 
and product packaging. It then required proof of secondary meaning only for 
product design trade dress.183 By doing so, the Court introduced unnecessary 
complexity into the law. The Court also failed to provide guidance to 
distinguish between packaging and design, which only made the new 
complexity even more intractable.184 
 
 178. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (requiring proof of secondary 
meaning for product design trade dress, but leaving intact Two Pesos rule for product packaging trade 
dress). 
 179. Id. at 211–16. 
 180. 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
 181. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 182. 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 183. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 215. 
 184. See id. at 212, 215 (offering two examples, the Tide detergent bottle and the Coke bottle, 
to illustrate the line between product design and product packaging, and a tie-breaking presumption 
that if trade dress could be considered either design or packaging, it should be considered design). 
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Similarly, in Rogers and New Kids, the Second and Ninth Circuits created 
exceptions when they faced cases where the expanding scope of trademark’s 
infringement standard created absurd or otherwise unacceptable results. Unlike 
the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, which was not bound by stare decisis, 
the panels of the Second and Ninth Circuit were bound in these two cases. By 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Rogers and New Kids arose, courts had 
accepted implied endorsement theories of infringement. Endorsement theory 
allowed courts to find actionable trademark infringement even where only 
small numbers of consumers believed that a trademark owner gave permission 
to or endorsed the use of its trademark by another.185 Given that broad scope, 
neither panel could easily or simply rule that there was no likelihood of 
confusion on the facts before them.186 Moreover, given stare decisis, the panels 
could not cut back on the implied endorsement theory generally, at least not 
without en banc rehearing. As a result, although Judge Kozinski cited earlier 
Ninth Circuit cases as a basis for his opinion in New Kids, including 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church from 1969187 and Smith v. 
Chanel, Inc. from 1968,188 neither of those cases recognized a nominative fair 
use defense. Rather, both found no actionable likelihood of confusion.189 
Unfortunately, given the judicial broadening of the implied endorsement theory 
through the 1970s and 1980s, by 1992, that path was no longer available to 
Judge Kozinski. Instead, to rule for the defendants at the summary judgment 
stage, Judge Kozinski in New Kids and the Second Circuit panel in Rogers had 
to create specific defenses and exceptions tied to the facts of their cases. And 
so they did, with the Rogers court creating a special trademark infringement 
rule for movie titles, and Judge Kozinski creating the nominative fair use 
defense. 
Despite exonerating the specific defendants for the specific conduct at 
issue in the two cases, these new doctrines added both unpredictability and 
 
 185. This theory initially arose in the Vogue hat case and expanded radically in Boston 
Professional Hockey. Some courts found actionable infringement based on consumers’ belief that the 
defendant needed permission for the use of the mark. Compare Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci 
Pubs., 28 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding actionable trademark infringement based on a survey 
that asked whether respondents believed that the defendant “did have to get” Anheuser-Busch’s 
permission), with Nat’l Football League Props., Inc. v. ProStyle, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1018 (E.D. 
Wis. 1998) (rejecting a survey that asked a similar “did need to get permission” question on the 
grounds that it improperly asked respondents for a legal conclusion). Other courts also found 
actionable infringement when the plaintiff “went along with” the defendant’s use. See Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding actionable trademark 
infringement for defendant’s use of slogan “Mutant of Omaha” on t-shirts where 10 percent of survey 
respondents believed that Mutual of Omaha ‘“goes along’ with” the defendant’s use). 
 186. In Rogers, in particular, the plaintiff presented both survey evidence that confusion was 
likely and evidence of actual confusion among the film’s publicists. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001, 
1001 n.8. 
 187. 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 188. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 189. Volkswagenwerk, 411 F.2d at 352; Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d at 569. 
1236 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:1195 
complexity to trademark law. In terms of unpredictability, when a circuit court 
creates a new defense or exception, an attorney can do little better than guess 
whether another circuit court will adopt it, and if so, in what form. For 
example, the Second and Third Circuits have adopted the nominative fair use 
defense, but both have modified it. While the Third Circuit modified the 
doctrine only slightly,190 the Second modified it far more substantially.191 The 
Sixth Circuit has so far rejected nominative fair use entirely.192 
In terms of complexity, while complexity in trademark rules can improve 
our ability to match actual to optimal outcomes, complexity also increases the 
cost of trademark litigation. These increased costs have led, and will continue 
to lead, to a two-tiered trademark system: one system for those who can afford 
it, and a second for those who cannot. For those who can afford it, a complex 
legal system can produce reasonably sensible, albeit expensive, outcomes. For 
the far larger number of market participants who can no longer afford 
trademark litigation, theoretically perfect but complex trademark rules offer 
only theoretical justice. In reality, for those who cannot afford to marshal them, 
such rules offer no justice at all. Unable to afford the high costs of trademark 
litigation, these market participants can neither vindicate their own trademark 
interests when infringed by others, nor defend themselves against excessive 
and overbroad assertion of trademark rights by well-funded bullies.193 
II. 
THE REASONS WHY: HOW PROCESS CONTROLS SUBSTANCE 
The judicial evolution of trademark law has made it both inefficient and 
unduly complex. Although judicial decisions have driven this evolution, 
Congress has played a role as well. In enacting the Trademark Act of 1946, 
Congress stated that it intended trademark law to serve two masters: consumers 
and trademark owners.194 Unfortunately, Congress gave only one of these 
masters a voice in the judicial evolution of trademark law. While consumers 
 
 190. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lending Tree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 191. See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153 
(2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing the concerns behind the nominative fair use doctrine, but rather than 
recognize it as a standalone defense as the Third and Ninth Circuits did, the court incorporated the 
three nominative fair use considerations as additional factors in the likelihood of confusion analysis). 
 192. See PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 193. For discussions of the rise of trademark bullies, see Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming 
Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625; Kenneth L. Port, Open Letter to Director David Kappos of 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 13 (2011). 
 194. See S. Rep. No. 1333, at 3 (1946), noting that 
[t]he purpose underlying [the Lanham Act] is twofold. One is to protect the public so it may 
be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably 
knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner 
of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, 
he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the 
well-established rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner. 
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play many important roles in trademark litigation,195 “litigant” is not one of 
them. Only trademark owners, not consumers, have standing to participate in 
trademark litigation.196 Consumers’ interests are represented, to the extent they 
are represented at all, only by proxy. 
Given this imbalance, it is entirely unsurprising that trademark law has 
come to cater to trademark owners—the master who has a voice in the 
system—and to ignore the best interests of consumers—the master who has 
none. By setting up litigation as a dispute between trademark plaintiffs and 
trademark defendants, and omitting consumers entirely, Congress has 
facilitated a common law evolutionary path for trademark law driven by 
selection, activity, and framing biases. Given these biases, the de-evolution of 
trademark law was inevitable. We now turn to a discussion of these biases. 
A. How Self-Interest Can Lead to Inefficient Legal Rules 
For years, law and economics scholars argued that the common law 
development of legal doctrine was more likely to lead to efficient rules than the 
politics of the legislature, whose outcomes are largely driven by interest 
groups.197 In theory, public choice considerations would drive legislation. 
 
 195. For example, consumer understanding determines whether a word or phrase is distinctive 
and thus entitled to protection as a trademark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2016) (stating that “[t]he 
primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation 
shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or 
services on or in connection with which it has been used.”). Similarly, trademark’s infringement 
standard focuses on whether a defendant’s use is likely to confuse consumers. See also Multi Time 
Mach., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2015) (identifying that “‘[t]he core 
element of trademark infringement’ is whether the defendant’s conduct ‘is likely to confuse customers 
about the source of the products.’” (quoting E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 
1290 (9th Cir.1992))); Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 776 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that 
“[t]herefore, the relevant inquiry is whether Plaintiff’s mark is strong enough outside of Los Angeles 
to give rise to a likelihood of confusion among consumers of Dantanna’s restaurant services in 
Atlanta.”) 
 196. See Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 689–92 (2d Cir. 1971) (ruling 
that consumers do not have standing under section 43(a)). See also Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 
86 F.3d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding in light of the “pro-competitive purpose language found in 
§ 45,” most courts agree that “consumers fall outside the range of ‘reasonable interests’ contemplated 
as protected by the false advertising prong of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act”); Serbin v. Ziebart 
Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1177 (3d Cir.1993) (same). 
 197. See, e.g., 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973); 
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 6 (1979) 
(indicating that inefficient rules “will be progressively ignored and eventually forgotten” over time 
while the efficient rules remain); BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW (1961); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 329 (1972) (noting that “[t]here is abundant evidence that 
legislative regulation of the economy frequently, perhaps typically, brings about less efficient results 
than the market-common law system of resource allocation.”); John C. Goodman, An Economic 
Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 393 (1978); George L. Priest, The Common 
Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, supra note 6. 
Although an early proponent of the theory of the efficiency of common law evolution, Judge Posner is 
reportedly now “distinctly skeptical” of the claim that the common law favors rules that ensure 
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Concentrated interest groups would hold collective action and transaction cost 
advantages over opposing dispersed interest groups. Thus, the disproportionate 
voice of concentrated interest groups would persuade the legislature to pass 
laws that generated rents for those groups, but reduced social welfare as a 
whole. In contrast, the judicial process—the theory goes—would not fall prey 
to the collective action advantages that plague the legislative process. If a party 
sued or was sued, it would have the same legal right to appearance and 
representation as any other party. The collective action advantage of 
concentrated interest groups would therefore be nullified because they could 
not have outsized influence in the courts. As a result, courts could more readily 
identify and adopt efficient legal rules, and if they occasionally made a 
mistake, they would recognize it. This would lead inefficient legal rules to be 
“progressively ignored and eventually forgotten” over time.198 
Yet, in trademark law, the exact opposite has occurred. Congress enacted 
a reasonably efficient statute in the Trademark Act of 1946, but courts 
reinterpreted it into an inefficient and sometimes-incoherent morass. To 
understand why requires a more careful examination of the law and economics 
arguments supporting efficient common law evolution. 
In the 1970s, two schools of thought developed to explain why the 
common law process would lead to efficient legal rules. One group of scholars, 
including Paul Rubin and George Priest, argued that the nature of the common 
law process itself, like the invisible hand of the market, inevitably leads to 
efficient legal rules, whether judges seek efficiency or not (the “non-
motivational” approach).199 A second group, including Richard Posner, posited 
that judges, consciously or unconsciously, seek efficient rules (the 
“motivational” approach).200 Yet, each of these approaches faces difficulties.201 
 
economic efficiency. Jurgen G. Backhaus, Efficient Statute Law, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 24 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 198. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 197, at 6. 
 199. See Rubin, supra note 6; Priest, supra note 197. See also Goodman, supra note 197. 
 200. See POSNER, supra note 197; See also Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 6; Goodman, 
supra note 197 (proposing that litigation should lead to efficient common law rules so long as the 
private interests of the parties correlate with the corresponding social interests because the party with 
more at stake will spend more on litigation, and thus have a better chance of prevailing). 
 201. The literature on these issues is extensive. Works that explore the proposition include: 
FRANCESCO PARISI & VINCY FON, THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING 85–88 (2009); PAUL H. RUBIN, 
BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE COMMON LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF EFFICIENT RULES 14 (1983); 
MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 
464–67 (2009); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic 
Analysis, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 519 (2006); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the 
Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 116 PUB. CHOICE 419 (2003); Vincy Fon, Francesco 
Parisi & Ben Depoorter, Litigation, Judicial Path-Dependence, and Legal Change, 20 EUR. J.L. & 
ECON. 43 (2005); Goodman, supra note 197; R. Peter Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of 
Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981); Georg von Wangenheim, The Evolution of Judge-
Made Law, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 381 (1993). On the role of precedent in promoting the 
development of efficient legal rules, see Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of 
Common Law, 115 J. POL. ECON. 43 (2007); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Overruling and the 
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Under the non-motivational approach, the essential insight is that private 
parties will choose to litigate when it is in their self-interest to do so.202 So long 
as the parties’ self-interests correspond to the broader public interest at stake, 
we should expect to see more litigation challenging inefficient legal rules, and 
less, or ideally, no litigation challenging efficient legal rules. As a result, even 
if judges do little more than flip a coin, judicial decisions together with the 
parties’ decisions of whether to litigate or settle, should improve the efficiency 
of legal rules.203 
Economics professor Paul Rubin, for example, has argued that parties 
would have stronger incentives to challenge inefficient legal rules than to 
challenge efficient ones.204 To support his argument, he presented a basic 
model of the choice between settlement and litigation in the context of an 
accident involving hypothetical parties A and B. In his model, each party will 
incur cost C if they litigate. Both parties have the same expectation as to the 
likely outcome in the case, where R is the probability that B will win. If B wins, 
A will pay B a sum of money, X. In addition, both parties are interested in how 
the decision in this case will affect similar disputes between them that may 
arise in the future. For example, if A wins the present case, A will win similar 
future cases with B as well. As a result, A will no longer incur a future stream 
of payments, with a present value TA, consisting of the cost of precautions to 
avoid future liability and payments to B for those accidents that nevertheless 
occur. Instead, B will incur a stream of future costs, with a present value TB, 
consisting of the cost of precautions to avoid accidents in the future and the 
cost of those accidents that nevertheless occur. 
Given these assumptions, the value VA of litigation to A is: 
VA = R(-X) + (1-R)*TA - C    (1) 
and the value of litigation to B is: 
VB = R(X) + (1-R)*(-TB) - C.     (2) 
The parties will settle, rather than litigate, if: 
VA > VB.       (3) 
Substituting for VA and VB, and simplifying the result, Rubin’s model 
suggests that the parties will litigate if and only if: 
 
Instability of Law, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 309 (2007); Thomas J. Miceli, Legal Change: Selective 
Litigation, Judicial Bias, and Precedent, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 157 (2009). 
 202. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979). 
 203. See Priest, supra note 197; Rubin, supra note 6; see also Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 
6, at 145 (showing that if every rule but the best rule is challenged, then eventually the legal system 
tends toward a stable state in which the best rule always prevails). 
 204. Rubin, supra note 6, at 55 (stating that “[w]e have thus shown that if rules are inefficient, 
parties will use the courts until the rules are changed; conversely, if rules are efficient, the courts will 
not be used and the efficient rule will remain in force.”). 
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(1-R)(TA - TB) > 2C. 205     (4) 
In his analysis, Rubin assumed that the legal rule presently favors B, and 
thus R > 0.5.206 From an efficiency perspective, the legal rule should seek to 
minimize the stream of future costs—that is, it should impose liability on the 
lower cost avoider.207 Thus, if TA > TB, the legal rule should impose liability on 
B. If TB > TA, the legal rule should impose liability on A. Given this set-up, if 
the rule imposes liability on A and is also efficient, then TB > TA, and equation 
(4) will never be satisfied.208 As a result, parties will always settle, rather than 
litigate, when the legal rule is efficient, and the efficient legal rule will remain 
in place. On the other hand, if the rule imposes liability on A and is inefficient 
(TA > TB), then litigation becomes more likely. That is, the more inefficient the 
legal rule is, the more likely litigation becomes.209 As Rubin explains: 
If the parties go to court, B will probably win, since both parties agree 
that R > .5. However, whenever this situation arises in the future A will 
again go to court. At some point, some court will find in favor of A; at 
this point, the law has been changed and is now efficient. From that 
time on, precedents will favor A in comparable cases.210 
 
 205. There is a math error in Rubin’s equations. The second expression, (1-R)*TA, does not 
represent the value A captures from litigating. If R remains unchanged, then A will continue to incur 
(1-R)*TA—regardless if A litigates or settles. The value from litigating, rather than settling, comes 
from the possibility that litigation may change R in future cases. Thus, Rubin should have used the 
change in R from litigating in setting the value of litigating to A, VA = R(-X) + (-ΔR)*TA – C, and 
similarly for B. Thus, equation (4) should be: (ΔR)(TB – TA) > 2C. Indeed, in a more realistic model, we 
should define TA and TB as functions of R, rather than as constants. Getting the model correct would 
confirm Rubin’s intuition in ways that Rubin’s own equation does not. The parties would still choose 
to litigate if they could expect litigation to lead towards a more efficient rule, i.e. decrease B’s chance 
of winning if B is the lower cost avoider, or increase B’s chance of winning if B is the higher cost 
avoider. By using ΔR, instead of (1-R), in equation (4), the correct solution can be satisfied whether B 
is the lower or higher cost avoider. If B is the higher cost avoider, then we want to shift liability to A 
and want litigation when litigation will shift liability towards A. This occurs when ΔR is positive. The 
correct equation (4) shows that such litigation can occur where both (TB-TA) and ΔR are positive. If B 
is the lower cost avoider, then we may still want litigation if it will shift liability towards B. This 
occurs when ΔR is negative. Again, correcting Rubin’s equation allows room for such litigation when 
both (TB-TA) and ΔR are negative. In contrast, in Rubin’s equation (4), (1-R) is always positive. Thus, 
equation (4) can only be satisfied if A is the lower cost avoider. As a result, while Rubin’s intuitions 
are correct, his model does not mathematically support them. 
 206. See Rubin, supra note 6, at 54. 
 207. Id. 
 208. This illustrates one of the flaws in Rubin’s specification of the model: if TB > TA equation 
(4) will never be satisfied because (1-R) is always positive. Rubin’s model improperly suggests that 
the parties will always settle rather than litigate if A is the lower cost avoider. At the same time, if B is 
the lower cost avoided by a large margin, TA > TB,, then the parties are likely to litigate even if the legal 
rule is efficient, i.e. 0 < R < 0.5. 
 209. See Rubin, supra note 6, at 54. 
 210. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, because the new rule is efficient, and hence, TA > TB, B will “not 
find it worthwhile to go to court” to challenge the new rule once it has 
arrived.211 
In short, the parties’ self-interest will lead them to a rule that imposes 
liability on the lower cost avoider. If liability is initially imposed on the higher 
cost avoider, the higher cost avoider will pursue litigation to change the rule, 
and the lower cost avoider will not be able to offer a sufficient sum to settle the 
litigation in order to keep the inefficient rule in place. If liability is imposed on 
the lower cost avoider, the lower cost avoider might still want, from its own 
self-interested perspective, to pursue litigation to shift liability to the higher 
cost avoider. However, the higher cost avoider will be able to offer the lower 
cost avoider a payment that the lower cost avoider will accept to settle the case 
and leave the existing rule in place. Thus, liability will remain on the lower cost 
avoider. 
Given this framework, Rubin argued that the common law process 
produces efficient legal rules. This efficiency comes not from judges, however, 
but from the parties’ decisions as to whether to settle or litigate any given case. 
As Rubin explained: “An outside observer coming upon this legal rule would 
observe that the rule is efficient; but this efficiency occurs because of an 
evolutionary process, not because of any particular wisdom on the part of 
judges.”212 
There are weaknesses, however, to Rubin’s approach. First, even if we 
were to accept Rubin’s framework, Rubin’s model does not predict that the 
common law process will lead to an efficient legal rule in every case. Rather, as 
Rubin himself recognized, it predicts that the common law process will lead to 
an efficient rule if and only if both parties are interested in how a decision in 
the present case will affect similar disputes in the future.213 If only one party is 
interested in the case as precedent, Rubin’s model predicts that “there will be 
pressure for precedents to evolve in favor of that party which does have a stake 
in future cases, whether or not this is the efficient solution.”214 
His model thus offers one possible explanation for the inefficiency of 
trademark law: as repeat players seeking the rents that inefficient 
interpretations of trademark law offer, trademark plaintiffs have an interest in 
the common law development of trademark law that typical trademark 
defendants lack. As a result, trademark plaintiffs continue to litigate each time 
 
 211. Id. In essence, in such a case, A and B switch places, and just as A would settle and avoid 
litigation if the legal rule favored B and was efficient, B would also settle rather than litigate if the rule 
favored A and was efficient. 
 212. Id at 55. 
 213. Id.; see also Goodman, supra note 197 (suggesting that the common law will develop in 
favor of the party who spends more resources on winning the case, and arguing that this will lead to 
the development of efficient legal rules if and only if higher expenditures correspond to the efficient 
rule). 
 214. Rubin, supra note 6, at 55. 
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an issue arises until finally they manage to persuade a court to give them the 
legal rule that they want. Potential defendants then largely accede to the new 
rule because the rents any given defendant could capture through a successful 
legal challenge are insufficient to pay for the challenge itself. 
A second weakness of Rubin’s approach is that his welfare conclusions do 
not extend beyond the tort law example on which he based his model. In the 
tort law context, the parties’ self-interests are a function of the future stream of 
payments either party will incur to limit accidents, and their self-interested 
resolution of the dispute turns ultimately on which party can avoid accidents at 
a lower cost. As it happens, in this particular context, this same consideration— 
which party can avoid the accident at a lower cost—also defines the efficient 
legal rule. In order to perfectly align the self-interest of the parties with the 
public interest in an efficient legal rule, all we need to assume is that the cost of 
avoidance for our particular plaintiff and defendant are typical or representative 
of other similarly situated plaintiffs and defendants. 
Even if we accept the welfare implications of Rubin’s model for tort 
litigation, his analysis and conclusions do not apply directly to parties’ 
decisions of whether to litigate or settle trademark cases. This is because in 
trademark litigation, parties decide whether to settle or litigate based upon their 
expected chance of success and the producer surplus they will capture by 
winning. If we follow Rubin’s model and reasoning, we come to the conclusion 
that trademark law will evolve towards the rule of higher producer surplus, 
rather than higher efficiency. 
Consider a simple example. Assume that there is a market that is 
competitive under existing trademark law.215 The goods being sold in the 
market generate total surplus of one hundred units. This total surplus is divided 
between consumers and eleven competitors in the market. Because the market 
is competitive, prices are low and each consumer can choose the version of the 
good that he or she finds most satisfying. As a result, most of the surplus in the 
market—we will assume eighty units—flows to consumers. The remaining 
twenty units flow to the eleven competitors as producer surplus. Although the 
market is competitive, there is a dominant firm that captures ten units of the 
surplus; the remaining ten competitors capture one unit of surplus each. The 
dominant firm is considering trademark litigation against one of its smaller 
competitors. Maybe it seeks an expansive interpretation of trade dress 
protection; or maybe it seeks an expansive interpretation of infringement. In 
either event, the dominant firm seeks to persuade a court to change trademark 
law: specifically, to broaden it. If the dominant firm prevails in the litigation, 
all ten competitors would have to leave the market, not just the particular 
defendant in the litigation. Therefore, if the dominant firm prevails in the 
 
 215. Moreover, I will assume that the remainder of the economy satisfies the assumptions of the 
perfect competition model so that partial equilibrium analysis is appropriate. 
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litigation, the market would no longer be competitive. Prices would rise. 
Consumer choice would be reduced. As competitors leave the market, the 
dominant firm would capture more of the available surplus—let’s assume fifty 
units. The firm’s ten former competitors would leave the market and capture 
none. Additionally, higher prices would impose a deadweight loss of twenty-
five units. Thus, because of both higher prices and reduced choice, consumer 
surplus would fall from eighty units to twenty-five units. Total surplus would 
also fall, from one hundred units with narrow trademark protection and 
competition, to seventy-five units with broad trademark protection and 
monopoly. Ultimately, because of the fall in total surplus, assuming all else 
remains constant, the broad interpretation of trademark law is inefficient and 
undesirable. Nevertheless, if litigation costs one unit, the dominant firm, acting 
as a rational profit-maximizing entity, would file the lawsuit and refuse to settle 
if it had more than a 5 percent chance of persuading a court to adopt the broad 
interpretation.216 Moreover, despite the efficiency of existing trademark law, 
none of the competing firms could afford litigation to defend it. If sued, they 
would settle and leave the market. Indeed, as soon as the threat of litigation 
became real, they would leave the market on their own. Consumers, on the 
other hand, would like to defend the existing rule, but do not have standing. 
Even if they did, collective action problems would likely limit their 
effectiveness. As a result, the dominant firm would keep suing until a court 
adopted its desired interpretation, and trademark law would become 
inefficient.217 Once it did, no competitor would have sufficient incentive to 
challenge the inefficient rule. It would therefore remain in place. 
As the example suggests, when Rubin’s analysis is applied to trademark, 
parties’ decisions of whether to litigate or settle will lead trademark law to 
evolve towards the rule of the highest producer surplus. If the existing legal 
rule generates lower producer surplus for a defendant than the alternative rule 
would generate for the plaintiff, then the plaintiff will pursue litigation to 
change the rule, and the defendant will not be able to offer a settlement 
payment sufficient to persuade the plaintiff to forego the litigation. Just as 
predicted in Rubin’s model, sooner or later the plaintiff will win and the rule 
will change. In trademark law, once that happens, the new legal rule will 
generate higher producer surplus for the plaintiff than the old rule generated for 
the defendant. Therefore, a defendant may still want to litigate to capture the 
producer surplus offered by the old rule, but the plaintiff will be able to offer 
 
 216. Using Rubin’s framework, one of the eleven competitors would offer up one unit to settle 
and be allowed to remain in the market. Assuming litigation also costs one unit, the dominant 
competitor must expect to win at least two units in remedies for the litigation to be worthwhile. If the 
litigation succeeds, then the dominant competitor will capture an additional forty units in rents. Thus, it 
needs at least a 5 percent chance of winning those forty units for the expected return to equal at least 
two units. 
 217. Or more likely, the dominant firm would use the threat of trademark litigation to drive its 
competitors from the market. 
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the defendant worthwhile settlement to leave the new rule in place. Rubin’s 
reasoning thus applies directly in this sense. 
Rubin’s normative conclusion that this self-interested process leads to 
efficient legal rules, however, does not follow in the trademark context. The 
efficient legal rule in trademark is not the one that generates only higher 
producer surplus, but the one that generates both higher producer and consumer 
surplus, combined. Once we go beyond merely redistributing surplus from one 
producer to another and offer a trademark plaintiff a higher producer surplus 
than the trademark defendants were earning, that increased producer surplus 
must come from consumers. To transfer surplus from consumers to a producer 
requires higher prices. Higher prices mean deadweight loss and reduced total 
surplus. Thus, the rule of higher producer surplus, predicted by the self-interest 
of the parties and Rubin’s model as applied to trademark law, is necessarily 
inefficient. 
The non-motivational approach to deciding trademark cases therefore 
would not lead trademark law to evolve efficiently, as some scholars have 
posited. To the contrary, further analysis suggests that trademark law will 
evolve towards inefficient rules that tend to maximize the profits, or producer 
surplus, of trademark owners. 
Under the motivational approach, on the other hand, Posner has argued 
that the common law process leads to efficient legal rules because judges seek 
efficiency.218 The problems with this approach are twofold. First, it is far from 
clear that judges seek efficiency. Relatively few legal decisions are phrased in 
terms of the efficiency considerations at stake. Rather, they are usually written 
using the language of law or morality or fairness or justice. Certainly, there is 
some overlap in these concepts, but they are not the same. Second, and more 
 
 218. Posner makes the point: 
[M]any areas of the law . . . bear the stamp of economic reasoning. Although few judicial 
opinions contain explicit references to economic concepts, often the true grounds of legal 
decision are concealed rather than illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric of opinions. 
Indeed, legal education consists primarily of learning to dig beneath the rhetorical surface 
to find those grounds, many of which may turn out to have an economic character. . . . It 
would not be surprising to find that legal doctrines rest on inarticulate gropings toward 
efficiency, especially when we bear in mind that many of those doctrines date back to the 
late eighteenth and the nineteenth century, when a laissez faire ideology based on classical 
economics was the dominant ideology of the educated classes in society. . . . Once the 
frame of reference is thus expanded beyond the immediate parties to the case, justice and 
fairness assume broader meanings than what is just or fair as between this plaintiff and this 
defendant. The issue becomes what is a just and fair result for a class of activities, and it 
cannot be sensibly resolved without consideration of the impact of alternative rulings on the 
frequency of accidents and the cost of accident precautions. The legal and economic 
approaches are not so divergent after all. 
POSNER, supra note 197, at 21–22. 
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importantly, even if judges actively sought to devise and adopt efficient legal 
rules, they may be structurally incapable of doing so.219 
As a general matter, courts are structurally ill-suited to identify and adopt 
efficient legal rules because they have: (1) a very small number of decision-
makers; (2) limited and biased information gathering capacity; (3) a lack of 
independent expertise; (4) inability to rule without a case or controversy; (5) 
inability to rule when parties choose to settle; and (6) the limitation that a 
ruling can resolve only the precise dispute before the court.220 The supposed 
advantage of courts relative to legislatures is that courts are insulated from 
interest group politics, but as Professor Gillian Hadfield has pointed out, this 
advantage “comes at the cost of limited information and consequent bias in the 
development of legal rules.”221 Courts can rule only on the cases that come 
before them. And while courts have some limited ability to gather information 
independently,222 they rely for the most part on the information that the parties 
choose to provide them.223 
In addition to the selection bias that arises from the parties’ settlement 
decisions, activity bias from prior judicial rulings also leads to inefficiency in 
trademark law.224 Whenever courts announce a given rule, individuals will 
respond to the rule differently depending on their circumstances and 
characteristics. Some parties will adjust their conduct to comply with the rule; 
others will abandon the conduct at issue altogether; while a third group will 
choose to violate the rule.225 These choices will not be random, but the result of 
differences between the individuals making the decisions.226 By the nature of 
judicial decision making,227 the next time a court revisits an issue, it will 
 
 219. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 
(1992); see also Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149 
(2001) (presenting a self-perpetuating model of judicial statutory interpretation where a given 
interpretation leads litigants to change their behavior and demonstrate the weaknesses of the 
interpretation, which leads a court to articulate a new interpretation, again leading potential litigants to 
demonstrate the new interpretation’s weaknesses, and so on). 
 220. Hadfield, supra note 219, at 604–08. 
 221. Id. at 615. 
 222. See FED. R. EVID. 706; see also Hadfield, supra note 219, at 612–14 (noting that judges 
can use judicial notice, hypotheticals, and scholarship to broaden the information available to them). 
 223. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 684 (1982) (noting that “[s]ince 
private litigants have no duty—or strong, personal incentive—to pick and choose the cases they bring 
and the arguments they espouse on the basis of their social consequences, we cannot expect them to 
apprise the courts fully of the consequences of prospective decisions.”). 
 224. This analysis draws from Professor Gillian Hadfield’s work. See Hadfield, supra note 219, 
at 591–92. 
 225. Id. at 589–90. 
 226. Id. at 590–91. 
 227. Under Article III, a court must await a case or controversy. By necessity, such a case or 
controversy can arise only when one party threatens to sue or sues another. A trademark plaintiff can 
sue only a violator of trademark law. If a party complies with trademark law or abandons the disputed 
conduct, then no trademark litigation will ensue. 
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confront one of the violators. Yet, because violators differ systematically from 
those who (1) comply with the rule or (2) abandon the conduct at issue, even if 
the court could design an ideally efficient rule for the violators, it will not 
devise a rule that is efficient for the full range of individuals that the rule 
affects.228 Indeed, the court has no real way of gathering information about 
those who comply with the rule or abandon the conduct.229 By its own earlier 
ruling, the court has eliminated those two groups from its information set, and 
restricted the information available to information concerning the violators. 
Because the characteristics of violators differ in material ways from the other 
two groups, this information set is biased.230 As a result, the court will rule 
based upon a biased information set that its earlier ruling created,231 and any 
rule the court adopts, even if it actively seeks efficiency, will prove to be 
similarly biased.232 
On top of the selection and activity bias discussed, making law through 
litigation also frames the issue to be decided in a misleading manner: as a 
conflict between the parties before the court. These are the parties before the 
court; these are the parties that can make arguments and present evidence; these 
are the parties the judge will attempt to satisfy.233 In trademark law, the 
standing rules implicitly frame the dispute as one between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. They further implicitly suggest that the court’s job is to do justice as 
between the parties before the court. 
While the way in which standing rules frame the dispute may be perfectly 
appropriate in torts or contract law, this frame becomes a likely source of error 
in trademark litigation for two reasons. First, in trademark disputes, in terms of 
efficiency or welfare for society as a whole, the interests of the parties are only 
a part of the picture. Usually, consumer welfare should be the overriding 
 
 228. Id. at 590–92. One could imagine a more complex set of possibilities where a party tries to 
comply with a rule, but violates the rule, because of uncertainty over the application of the rule. 
Adding such a category would complicate the analysis, but not in any way alter the conclusion. 
 229. Id. at 591–92. 
 230. Id. at 592. 
 231. If the cases that come before the court remain representative of all possible cases—an 
implausible assumption—then one can develop a model in which an efficiency-seeking court produces 
efficient legal rules. See Robert Cooter, Lewis Kornhauser & David Lane, Liability Rules, Limited 
Information, and the Role of Precedent, 10 BELL J. ECON. 366 (1979). 
 232. Infra notes 255–260 and accompanying text (discussing the sports merchandising cases 
and providing an example of such activity bias arising in trademark law). 
 233. Although Martin Shapiro and Owen Fiss disagree quite sharply about the nature of judicial 
motivation, both agree that the legitimacy and authority of courts come from resolving the dispute 
before the court through interaction with the parties. Compare MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A 
COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 12–13 (1981) (noting that “most of the conventional 
attachment to adversary proceedings is based not on the desire to heighten the level of conflict in 
judicial proceedings, but quite the opposite, on the need to have both parties present before the judge if 
he is to have any chance of creating a resolution to which both parties will consent”), with Owen M. 
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 
(1979) (stating that “[t]he judge is entitled to exercise power only after he has participated in a 
dialogue about the meaning of the public values”). 
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consideration. But because consumers are not parties, the litigation frame 
encourages courts to overlook or discount the consumer welfare considerations 
at stake. Second, even where a court’s ruling matches the efficient outcome for 
that case, the same decision and resulting legal principle may prove inefficient 
in future cases. A given case may be unrepresentative, and the efficient rule for 
resolving that particular case may prove inefficient for the usual run of cases to 
which the rule will likely apply. 
Consider the expansion of the trademark infringement standard in the 
Aunt Jemima and Vogue hat cases. From an efficiency perspective, both 
outcomes can be justified. Neither decision prohibited the defendant from 
selling its respective product. Both merely forced the defendant to use a non-
confusing mark in doing so. Moreover, the confusion at issue in both cases 
seems reasonably likely to have confused consumers in a material fashion. Yet, 
the test of a legal ruling is not whether it achieves justice or efficiency in a 
particular case, but whether it achieves justice or efficiency over the long run. 
Even if they were right on the facts before them, both decisions took important 
first steps on the path towards the radically overbroad infringement standard 
we have today. From an efficiency perspective, it would have been better for 
both plaintiffs to lose. Even if that would have been the inefficient outcome in 
those cases, it would have retained the 1905 Act’s far simpler double identity 
standard. Of course, the double identity infringement standard would and did 
get the answer wrong in some cases. Every legal rule does. But retaining the 
double identity standard would have avoided both the parade of false positives 
that define trademark litigation today and the undue expense that has made 
trademark law a two-tiered system. 
Moreover, the trend toward viewing trademarks as property,234 rather than 
viewing trademarks as a system for regulating competition, reinforces the 
framing bias created by the standing rules of trademark litigation. The view of 
trademarks as property encourages courts to ask whether the defendant has 
trespassed on the trademark owner’s property. Such an approach necessarily 
frames the relevant issue quite differently than would an approach that treats 
trademarks as part of a trade regulation system. In the older regime of unfair 
competition, fair competition and the imitation necessary to achieve it, served a 
properly central role in the legal rules that governed the marketplace.235 
Viewing trademarks as property does not. 
For these reasons, there is little reason to expect trademark litigation to 
lead to efficient legal rules. To the contrary, there is every reason to expect the 
 
 234. I have explored the “trademark as property” view and its influence on the development of 
trademark law elsewhere. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2. 
 235. See, e.g., Am. Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir. 1959) (stating that 
“imitation is the life blood of competition. . . . Unless such duplication is permitted, competition may 
be unduly curtailed with the possible resultant development of undesirable monopolistic conditions”). 
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common law process to continue to lead, as it has, to trademark rules that are 
both inefficient and unduly complex. 
B. The Biases in Action: A Case Study of the Merchandising Right 
The law and economics approach thus suggests several reasons why the 
common law development of trademark doctrine leads to inefficient legal rules. 
Its key insight is that parties will litigate only when it is in their self-interest to 
do so. Therefore, to the extent that the parties’ self-interests fail to fully capture 
the social interests at stake, a selection bias can arise that will bring the wrong 
cases to court for judicial resolution. 
In trademark law, self-interest will push trademark owners to litigate 
cases that will lead to inefficient trademark rules that expand the exclusivity 
associated with their marks. While exclusivity does not always mean market 
power, it offers the trademark owner at least the possibility of market power 
and corresponding rents. And we should expect trademark owners to more 
zealously pursue those cases where success offers the chance of market power 
and higher rents. 
In contrast, it will seldom be in a defendant’s self-interest to litigate cases 
that will lead to efficient trademark rules. As discussed previously, if a 
defendant prevails, any other would-be competitor can make a similar use 
given the legal path the defendant has established.236 A successful defendant 
will thus face more direct competition than a successful plaintiff, and will earn 
little in the way of rents from prevailing in litigation. Indeed, if success moves 
a market from monopoly to competition, we should expect that the combined 
profits available to all similarly situated defendants from prevailing in litigation 
will be less than those available to the plaintiff from prevailing.237 
When a successful trademark defense brings increased competition, the 
principal beneficiaries of that increased competition are not the trademark 
 
 236. As has been well recognized, this same concern arises in challenging questionable patents. 
See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that when a 
generic defendant prevails in pharmaceutical patent litigation, “consumers, rather than generic 
producers, are typically the biggest beneficiaries”); see also Thomas, Patent Bounties, supra note 11. 
To solve the problem for pharmaceutical patents, Congress created a specific duopoly incentive 
scheme in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); see also Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for 
Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 403–04, 423 (1999) (noting 
that “[t]he entire purpose of the 180-day exclusivity provision, at the time it was drafted, was to insure 
that one generic competitor would not get a free ride on the litigation effort of another generic 
competitor until the party who had borne the cost and risk of litigation had a fair opportunity to recover 
its litigation costs”); Lunney, FTC v. Actavis, supra note 11, at 385–88. 
 237. For that reason, I am skeptical of a system that relies on coerced joinder of all potential 
defendants as a means of counterbalancing the asymmetric stakes otherwise generally present in 
trademark litigation. See Stein & Parchomovsky, supra note 11, at 1520–30 (proposing such a 
scheme). 
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defendants, but consumers.238 If a trademark defendant prevails, and the 
associated market becomes more competitive, prices will fall. The benefits of 
lower prices, however, flow not to the trademark defendant, or other similarly 
situated competitors, but to consumers, in the form of enhanced consumer 
surplus. This represents a real welfare gain for society. However, because 
trademark defendants will not capture this enhanced consumer surplus, they 
have no reason to fight for it. To the contrary, we should expect them to settle 
even if the consumer welfare gains at stake far exceed the gains available to the 
trademark owner and the trademark defendants. Trademark litigation thus 
presents asymmetric stakes. 
Moreover, those stakes, by omitting the interest of consumers, fail to 
reflect the interests of society as a whole. This combination brings the wrong 
cases to court for judicial resolution. The same asymmetric stakes also create 
an activity bias in how potential trademark plaintiffs and defendants respond to 
the legal rules courts create. And by creating those legal rules through litigation 
that bars consumers’ direct participation, trademark law incorrectly frames the 
issue to be decided. 
To illustrate these biases in action, consider, for example, the rise of the 
merchandising right in the Boston Professional Hockey decision.239 The first 
question is: Why did the trademark owners bring the case? At the time they 
filed the lawsuit, they must have believed that they were going to lose. In the 
1960s and early 1970s, sales of unauthorized team merchandise were 
commonplace; they were indeed the norm. As a result, and as the district court 
expressly found, “the usual purchaser, a sports fan in his local sporting goods 
store, would not be likely to think that defendant’s emblems were 
manufactured by or had some connection with plaintiffs.”240 That fact would 
seem to have made the plaintiffs’ chance of success on their trademark claims 
vanishingly slim. Yet, the plaintiffs knew that if they could persuade the court 
to rule in their favor, they would establish a potentially perpetual licensing 
right worth billions.241 For the plaintiffs, even a small chance at those billions 
would justify the expense of litigation.242 
 
 238. Again, this is well recognized in the analogous situation of challenging questionable 
patents. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208 (noting a FTC study that found “that about one year after 
market entry an average generic pharmaceutical product takes over ninety percent of the patent 
holder’s unit sales and sells for fifteen percent of the price of the name brand product” and concluding 
that “[t]his price differential means that consumers, rather than generic producers, are typically the 
biggest beneficiaries of generic entry.”) (citation omitted); Lunney, FTC v. Actavis, supra note 11, at 
406–08 (estimating that the loss of thirty-four months of patent protection on Prozac cost Eli Lilly 
$3.29 billion in discounted net present value; of this, the first generic in the market, Barr Laboratories, 
captured just under $300 billion; the remainder went to consumers as surplus). 
 239. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). 
 240. Id. at 1012. 
 241. While a precise estimate of the merchandising right for hockey teams is not available, the 
Boston Prof’l Hockey decision became the basis for the licensing of trademarks generally on 
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The second question is: Why did the court adopt the inefficient legal rule? 
The district court got it exactly right, finding as a factual matter that consumer 
confusion, whether as to source or sponsorship, was unlikely.243 Yet the Fifth 
Circuit panel disagreed. It appears that the litigation frame, together with 
asymmetric stakes, led the court astray. In justifying its decision, the Fifth 
Circuit returned repeatedly to a single point: “the major commercial value of 
the emblems is derived from the efforts of plaintiffs.”244 If the question is 
simply who, as between plaintiff and defendant, better deserves to capture a 
given surplus, the framing “if value then right” may provide a workable 
answer. But in trademark litigation, that is not usually the real question. The 
surplus available for division is not a given, but depends upon the court’s 
resolution of the dispute. The real question then is how a court should rule in 
order to ensure the larger total surplus that is associated with a more 
competitive market, rather than the smaller total surplus associated with a less 
competitive market. To answer that question, “if value then right” is hopelessly 
inadequate.245 
The framing effect litigation imposes also appeared in the Fifth Circuit’s 
alternative justification for its ruling. As a second basis for its decision, the 
Fifth Circuit insisted that if it did not expand the plaintiffs’ rights to encompass 
the use at issue, then the defendant would obtain the right.246 The panel’s 
insistence on this issue is a bit curious. There is no reference in the court’s 
opinion to a counterclaim by the defendant, and the district court, after largely 
denying the plaintiffs’ claim for relief, did not grant the defendant an injunction 
against the plaintiffs’ further sale of team merchandise.247 But the court’s 
 
merchandise. Royalties from that market exceeded $13 billion in 2014. See LIMA Study: Global Retail 
Sales of Licensed Goods Hit $241.5B in 2014, INT’L LICENSING INDUS. MERCHANDISERS’ ASS’N 
(June 8, 2015), https://www.licensing.org/news/lima-study-global-retail-sales-of-licensed-goods-hit-
241-5b-in-2014/ [https://perma.cc/YX3X-TCVG]. 
 242. The more interesting question is why the defendant litigated, rather than settled. Indeed, 
the defendant even went so far as to file a certiorari petition. See Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc. v. 
Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) (denying certiorari petition). Presumably, the answer 
lies in some combination of a very high chance of success and the value of the defendant’s task-
specific human capital, reflecting the rents that the defendant would earn because of its specialization 
in the activity at issue. 
 243. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 
1012 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). 
 244. Id. at 1011; see also id. at 1012 (noting that “[t]he argument that confusion must be as to 
the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where the trademark, originated by 
the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the emblem”). 
 245. See Cohen, supra note 124 (setting forth and then criticizing the “if value, then right” 
justification for legal rights). 
 246. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, 510 F.2d at 1011 (noting that “defendant sought and ostensibly 
would have asserted, if obtained, an exclusive right to make and sell the emblems”). 
 247. Id. at 1008 (“The district court denied Lanham Act relief and granted only limited relief 
for unfair competition, requiring solely that defendant place on the emblems or the package a notice 
that the emblems are not authorized by or have not emanated from the plaintiffs. The claim for 
damages was denied.”); see also Univ. Book Store v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 33 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (allowing the University of Wisconsin to register a Bucky 
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insistence makes somewhat more sense when we consider that the court must 
have viewed the dispute as a battle between the plaintiffs and the defendant—if 
the plaintiffs did not hold the right, the defendant must. From that view, if the 
plaintiffs lose, the defendant must win. Viewing the trademarks at issue as 
property reinforces this mistaken perspective; property must belong to 
someone. 
Asymmetric stakes played a role as well. True, the plaintiffs got lucky and 
happened to draw a sympathetic panel in the first case, rather than having to 
litigate case after case for ten years as would-be trade dress registrants did. 
Nonetheless, given the law of large numbers, such lucky (or from society’s 
perspective, unlucky) draws are going to happen. Of course, had the plaintiffs 
lost this first case, the monopoly rents potentially available would have drawn 
these plaintiffs, or others similarly situated, back. While the unlucky draw 
made such repeated litigation unnecessary, the asymmetric stakes nevertheless 
influenced this litigation. 
Trademark litigation’s generally asymmetric stakes create an ecosystem 
around trademarks biased towards the trademark owner’s perspective. 
Trademark owners not only have more at stake in particular cases, but 
generally. As a result, trademark owners have more incentive to spend 
resources protecting their trademarks than trademark defendants. For that 
reason, a trademark lawyer is almost necessarily a trademark owner’s lawyer; 
there is no organized trademark defense bar. Additionally, for trademark 
owners, the International Trademark Association (or INTA) files amicus briefs 
seeking to expand trademark protection.248 For trademark defendants, there is 
no similar advocacy or trade organization. Even the treatise writers have 
demonstrated a bias in favor of trademark owners.249 
 
Badger trademark even though others had developed and initially used the nickname in connection 
with the University on apparel and merchandise because the others did not claim Bucky as their own 
trademark). 
 248. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 
206, 211 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that INTA filed an amicus brief supporting plaintiff); Rosetta Stone 
Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 149 (4th Cir. 2012) (same); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011) (same); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. 
Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 253 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); WarnerVision Entm’t, Inc. v. 
Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting the brief filed by INTA that sought 
to expand the legal effect of filing an intent-to-use application); see also Ruben J. Garcia, A 
Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 339–40 (2008) (noting the 
importance of amicus briefs to judicial decision-making). 
 249. Note, for example, how the Callman treatise changes its description of the 1962 
Housekeeping Amendments. Compare 3 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
AND TRADE-MARKS, § 80.1, at 120 (2d ed. Supp. 1965) (noting that the Amendment expanded 
confusion inquiry to encompass “potential as well as actual purchasers,” but arguing that the 
Amendment did not “go far enough”), with 3A LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES, § 20.01, at 4 (boldly proclaiming that the 
Housekeeping Amendment means that the Lanham Act is no longer limited to confusion of source and 
instead covers all kinds of trade identity confusion). 
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As a result, when the Fifth Circuit panel looked for a legal basis for its 
decision, the plaintiffs could point to—and the court could seize on—the 1962 
Housekeeping Amendment as expanding the infringement standard.250 While 
the court’s expansive interpretation of the Amendment overstated Congress’s 
intent,251 other plaintiffs had already argued for such a broad interpretation; 
multiple courts had already adopted it; and treatise writers had rejoiced.252 
Even though Congress intended something far narrower with the Amendment, 
Dallas Cap & Emblem had no similarly convenient and available authority to 
rebut the broad interpretation. No defense counsel had argued for the narrower 
and proper interpretation of the 1962 Housekeeping Amendment based on the 
Amendment’s plain language, context, and legislative history until 1990.253 
Thus, asymmetric stakes not only bias the selection of cases for judicial 
resolution, they also support an entire ecosystem that facilitates the 
presentation of arguments favoring the expansion of trademark protection. 
The third question, then, is: Given that the Boston Professional Hockey 
decision was widely criticized at the time as a matter of fact, law, and policy, 
why did no defendant challenge it directly for thirty years? The answer is that 
for parties with standing, it was not in their interest to do so. The licensing 
requirement imposed substantial losses on consumers because every dollar in 
licensing revenue that trademark owners captured through the right had to 
come out of consumers’ pockets. In addition, every dollar in licensing revenue 
 
 250. See, e.g., Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, 510 F.2d at 1010 (“A broadening of the protection 
afforded by the statute occurred by amendment in 1962 which deleted the previously existing 
requirement that the confusion or deception must relate to the ‘source of origin of such goods or 
services.’” Pub.L. 87–772, § 17, 76 Stat. 773 (1962). Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental 
Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 860 at n. 8 (5th Cir. 1967).”). 
 251. See supra notes 162–67 and accompanying text. 
 252. See Cont’l Motors Corp. v. Cont’l Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 860 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(“The statute was amended in 1962 to delete the previously existing requirement that the confusion or 
deception must relate to the ‘source of origin of such goods or services.’ Pub.L. 87–772, § 17, 76 Stat. 
773 (1962). Doubtless this could only serve to broaden, not restrict protection.”); Syntex Labs., Inc. v. 
Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971); 3A LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES, § 20.01, at 4. Professor McCarthy is a little 
more careful. 4 THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 23:7 (4th ed.) (“Congress struck out language in the Lanham Act which required confusion, mistake 
or deception of ‘purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods and services.’ Several courts have 
noted this expansion of the test of infringement and held that it supports a finding of infringement 
when even non-purchasers are deceived.”). 
 253. In United States v. Hon, counsel for the defendant pointed to the legislative history 
accompanying the 1962 Housekeeping Amendment and argued that Congress intended to expand the 
likelihood of confusion standard in a narrow fashion, to encompass potential purchasers. 904 F.2d 803, 
807 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990). The court rejected the argument and reiterated the longstanding (by that time) 
and erroneous view that Congress intended through the Housekeeping Amendment to make actionable 
any type of confusion at all. Id. As Hon pointed out: 
[T]he Senate Report suggests that the amendment’s purpose was to make clear that the 
confusion requirement includes potential purchasers as well as actual purchasers. See S. 
Rep. No. 87-2107 (1962), as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847, 2850–51. Still, 
nothing in the legislative history or the statute as amended excludes from its reach public, 
nonpurchaser confusion in the case of counterfeits. 
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also imposed on consumers some additional loss, perhaps thirty to seventy 
cents, in deadweight and cost conversion.254 But consumers did not and do not 
have standing under trademark law, so they could not challenge the ruling 
directly. Instead, they had to rely on a proxy, some manufacturer or retailer, to 
represent their interest. But for the manufacturers and retailers who had 
standing, challenging the ruling was a no-win proposition: On the one hand, if 
they funded the necessary litigation and won, they would be able to sell team 
merchandise without paying a license fee to the team. On the other hand, 
winning the litigation would also open the door for their competitors. Taking 
advantage of the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel to insulate their 
actions from litigation, competitors could enter the same market without 
bearing the actual costs of litigation.255 Moreover, the litigating company 
would have had to price its goods to recoup the litigation costs. The other 
competitors would not. As a result, the non-litigating retailers and 
manufacturers could undercut the litigating competitor’s price and potentially 
drive the litigating competitor from the market. Alternatively, if a retailer or 
manufacturer chose to litigate and lost, they would be out the money spent on 
the litigation. 
Either way, a company choosing to litigate the issue would lose 
economically. In contrast, if a retailer acceded to the ruling, it could continue to 
sell team merchandise with a license from the team. Although the license 
royalty would necessitate a higher price for the merchandise, that higher price 
would apply to all manufacturers and retailers equally. Any given retailer’s 
competitive position would not change vis-à-vis its competitors. Because that 
relative competitive position determines the retailer’s revenue, profit, and 
market share, being forced to sell authorized team merchandise would not 
significantly affect a retailer’s bottom line. Altogether, mainstream 
manufacturers and retailers thus had no interest in challenging the ruling in 
Boston Professional Hockey and instead complied with it. 
Eventually, however, the Boston Professional Hockey decision was 
challenged directly in litigation. This brings us to the fourth question: Why 
didn’t the later court correct its earlier mistake when it was given the 
opportunity? Here, along with the same framing bias that led to the initial 
mistake, an activity bias arose that hampered the court’s ability to recognize its 
 
 254. There is no general rule as to the likely size of the deadweight losses that will occur. It will 
depend upon the precise shape and elasticity of the marginal cost and demand curves. If, for example, 
the demand curve is linear and marginal cost is constant, then the deadweight loss will be fifty cents 
for every dollar in surplus transferred from consumers to producer. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 557 n.283 (1996). 
While the number is easy to calculate, it is not clear that it is the most common ratio that would be 
observed in real-world markets. 
 255. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; See also Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of 
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (recognizing non-mutual collateral estoppel in patent litigation 
and holding that a patentee is estopped from asserting a patent against a defendant after a court has 
found the patent invalid in litigation involving another defendant). 
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own earlier mistake. By ruling that a license was required to sell team 
merchandise, the Boston Professional Hockey court changed the associated 
markets. As explained previously, mainstream manufacturers and retailers 
followed their self-interest and acceded to the new rule. As a result, licensing 
and authorized apparel became the norm, and consumer expectation changed 
accordingly. The next time the issue arose, some thirty years later, the nature of 
the defendant had also changed. All of the mainstream manufacturers and 
retailers who might have challenged the rule chose instead to comply. They 
chose to comply with the rule not because the rule was just or right or efficient, 
but because complying with the rule was in their self-interest. Only those 
manufacturers and retailers operating outside the mainstream continued to sell 
unauthorized team merchandise, and they did so knowing that they were 
breaking the law. Given the court’s initial ruling, their products were now 
unlawful and subject to seizure. As a result of the risk of seizure, the optimal 
level of investment in product quality fell. Thus, their now-counterfeit products 
became cheaper and lower quality. For the same reason, these unauthorized 
merchandisers moved to less reputable locations, such as flea markets. 
Consequently, the next time the issue came before a court, consumers’ newly 
developed expectations as well as the new “fly-by-night” characteristics of the 
defendant and its products reinforced the seeming desirability of the court’s 
initial ruling against the defendant. Thus, when the Fifth Circuit had the 
opportunity to correct its mistake in Boston Professional Hockey, some thirty 
years later in Board of Supervisors for Louisiana State University Agricultural 
and Mechanical College v. Smack Apparel Co., it did not. Instead, the Fifth 
Circuit reiterated and strengthened its earlier decision.256 
Thirty years later, not only was the defendant’s seeming opportunism 
even more apparent to the court, given that mainstream manufacturers and 
retailers had complied with the initial ruling, but the defendant itself, Smack 
Apparel, had an economic incentive to lose. As a business concern, Smack 
Apparel operated in the shadows of the Boston Professional Hockey decision. 
Instead of selling t-shirts bearing team emblems, Smack Apparel sold t-shirts 
replicating the color schemes of various universities, not the issue precisely 
presented and resolved in Boston Professional Hockey. At issue in the litigation 
were six specific t-shirts bearing the scarlet-and-grey, purple-and-gold, 
crimson-and-crème, and cardinal-and-gold color schemes of Ohio State, LSU, 
the University of Oklahoma, and the University of Southern California, along 
with words either touting their participation in the 2004 Sugar Bowl (for LSU 
and Oklahoma) or the number of national football titles each had captured (for 
Ohio State and USC).257 
 
 256. 550 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1268 (2009). Confirmation bias, the 
human tendency to interpret new facts to confirm old beliefs, likely played some role as well. 
 257. Id. at 472–73. 
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In approaching the litigation, Smack Apparel faced two possible 
outcomes. Either it could have prevailed in the litigation or it could have 
lost.258 If it had prevailed, then it could have continued to sell the six t-shirts at 
issue. But having prevailed, it would have established the legality of such 
conduct and thereby opened the door to competitive entry by other competitors. 
If these new entrants were more efficient or enjoyed economies of scale, they 
might have not only taken some of Smack Apparel’s market share, but also 
might have competed Smack Apparel out of the market entirely. At the very 
least, these new entrants would not have had to price their goods to recoup their 
litigation costs, as Smack Apparel would have. Moreover, depending on how 
broadly or narrowly the court ruled, Smack Apparel might have faced 
competition from new entrants not only with respect to the six t-shirts at issue, 
but across its product line. For Smack Apparel, winning the litigation battle 
might have meant losing the business war. 
On the other hand, losing might have meant being ordered to stop selling 
the six t-shirts and any others confusingly similar, which is exactly what 
happened.259 While Smack Apparel would lose the revenue associated with 
those six t-shirts, it could continue to capture the revenue for the rest of its t-
shirt line. And, by losing, Smack Apparel would have reinforced and perhaps 
expanded the legal rules prohibiting its conduct. Because the conduct remained 
infringing, mainstream manufacturers and retailers would remain out of the 
market, as they have. A loss in the litigation would thereby safeguard Smack 
Apparel’s margins and its market share on the rest of its t-shirt line. While 
losing left Smack Apparel open to the possibility that other universities would 
follow suit and sue regarding their own color schemes, litigation is expensive. 
As yet, no other universities have found it worthwhile to engage in the 
necessary litigation. In short, by losing the litigation battle, Smack Apparel 
won the business war. Like a bootlegger, Smack Apparel could exist only so 
long as there was a demand that the law prohibited mainstream manufacturers 
and retailers from satisfying. By losing, Smack Apparel kept the prohibition in 
place, preserving both its margins and its market in the shadows of the law. 
In enacting the Trademark Act of 1946, Congress barred direct consumer 
standing and left the representation of consumer interests in trademark 
 
 258. It could also have settled. In many areas of the law, we assume that an individual intends 
the natural and foreseeable outcome of a given course of conduct. Applying that approach here, we 
can assume that Smack Apparel litigated and lost, with an appellate court rejecting every conceivable 
argument that might have supported the legality of Smack Apparel’s conduct, precisely because 
Smack Apparel wanted such a ruling. Why would Smack Apparel want to lose? There are, at least, 
two possibilities. First, perhaps Smack Apparel wanted to lose in order to discourage other potential 
non-mainstream—but not quite as far out as Smack Apparel—competitors from entering its market. 
Second, perhaps Smack Apparel wanted to establish its reputation so that other universities would note 
that if they too sued, Smack Apparel would not go down easily. 
 259. Id. at 474 (“The district court also enjoined Smack from manufacturing, distributing, 
selling, or offering for sale any of the six t-shirt designs found to be infringing or any other similar 
designs.”). 
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litigation to a proxy: either the trademark plaintiff or the trademark defendant, 
depending on the facts of the particular case. But the Smack Apparel litigation 
illustrates the reality of trademark litigation. Trademark plaintiffs and 
defendants represent their own interests. The consumer interest is not 
represented at all. 
The rise of the merchandising right thus effectively illustrates the dangers 
to the common law evolution of trademark law that selection, activity, and 
framing biases present. These considerations do not mean that trademark 
defendants will never have an interest in challenging inefficient interpretations 
of trademark law. In some cases, a single defendant may have a sufficient 
economic stake to undertake the cost of establishing an efficient trademark 
rule. Some defendants may also have a business model built on imitation and 
copying, so that they have an interest both in the resolution of a particular case 
and the precedent it establishes for the future. Our exceptional cases, such as 
Wal-Mart Stores, Rogers v. Grimaldi, and New Kids on the Block,260 illustrate 
these propositions. Walmart pursued an efficient interpretation of the secondary 
meaning requirement for trade dress to preserve its leeway not just to copy 
Samara Brothers’ clothing designs, but also to imitate popular products more 
generally. That Walmart chose to pursue the litigation, despite its costs, 
demonstrates the value of the resulting legal rule, from Walmart’s self-
interested perspective. Motion picture distributors and newspapers presumably 
pursued the Rogers and New Kids litigation for similar reasons. In other 
instances, particular defendants will pursue litigation even when the average 
defendant would not, because of a grudge against the trademark owner or to 
vindicate their principles or for other idiosyncratic reasons. 
As discussed, however, the fact that the self-interest of particular 
defendants in particular cases has led some defendants to challenge overbroad 
trademark protection has not been sufficient to slow trademark’s de-evolution 
generally. Rather, given stare decisis, it has forced trademark law to become 
unnecessarily complex as trademark’s generally expansive tide encounters 
unmovable seawalls. 
III. 
CHANGING THE PROCESS TO CHANGE THE SUBSTANCE OF TRADEMARK LAW 
We can now see why trademark law has become such a bloated and 
incoherent morass. Courts repeatedly make mistakes in trademark law because, 
first, asymmetric and unrepresentative stakes lead to selection and activity bias, 
and second, making law through litigation inaccurately frames the question to 
be decided. As a result, parties bring the wrong cases to court for judicial 
resolution, and courts resolve them incorrectly. 
 
 260. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 
994 (2d Cir. 1989); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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Substantive trademark reform will not solve this problem. No matter how 
clear congressional amendments to correct trademark’s overbreadth might 
seem today, in ten or twenty or fifty years, courts will simply reinterpret 
Congress’s actions to support broader trademark protection.261 If that seems 
implausible, remember Congress added the phrase “word, name, symbol, or 
device” in 1943 to the bill that would become the Trademark Act of 1946 
specifically to bar protection of trade dress.262 Fifty years later, the Court touted 
this exact language as proof that Congress had intended to provide protection 
for trade dress all along.263 
This suggests a need for more fundamental reform that will: (1) bring 
more of the right cases to court; (2) provide courts with better information to 
resolve the disputes before them; and (3) reframe the dispute to more 
accurately reflect the overriding consumer interests at stake. The simplest 
solution would be to give consumers direct standing in trademark litigation. 
Unfortunately, while simple, this will probably not solve the problem because 
of collective action issues. Nevertheless, a range of potential solutions may 
move the system in the right direction. At one end, awareness of the problem, 
together with the broader availability of low-cost or pro bono representation for 
trademark defendants, may help. At the other, we could abolish private 
enforcement of trademarks altogether and leave enforcement entirely to the 
Federal Trade Commission.264 
Rather than advocate either doing nothing or burning the system down, I 
propose a middle course and initially advocate three reforms to improve the 
selection and judicial resolution of trademark cases. I believe that these reforms 
 
 261. Moreover, the legislative process has flaws, too. Congress got it right in the Trademark 
Act of 1946 because the Department of Justice intervened in the process and secured key amendments 
in 1943. See Trade-Marks: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong. 
58-71 (1944) (Department of Justice, Report on H.R. 82, The Trade-mark Bill). See also Lunney, 
Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 421–22, 421–22 nn. 214–15. If recent history is any 
indication, Congress is less likely to get a balanced process for more narrowly tailored and specific 
amendments. 
 262. See supra notes 83–94 and accompanying text; see also Lunney, The Trade Dress 
Emperor, supra note 1 (explaining Congress’s intent in more detail). 
 263. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (“Since human beings 
might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this 
language, read literally, is not restrictive.”). 
 264. Professor William Baxter has proposed a similar solution for antitrust enforcement. See 
Baxter, supra note 223 (arguing that the selection bias that arises from private antitrust enforcement 
can be mitigated by substituting public for private enforcement). But as Professor Gillian Hadfield has 
argued, public enforcement may not overcome activity bias. Professor Hadfield explains: 
[Professor Baxter] argues that ‘the’ bias can be mitigated by introducing public enforcers 
who can select cases in a more representative fashion. It is clear, however, that if potential 
defendants are sufficiently heterogeneous so that some falling within the ambit of a rule 
choose to comply or drop out rather than create a dispute by violating the existing legal 
rule, then public enforcement cannot ameliorate the more fundamental bias—the activity 
bias—created by heterogeneity. Laws cannot be enforced against those who have chosen 
not to violate them. 
Hadfield, supra note 219, at 598. 
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will improve the process through two mechanisms. First, they will provide 
potential trademark defendants with a bounty265 for challenging inefficient 
interpretations of trademark law and for defending efficient interpretations. 
Second, they will re-frame the issue presented for the court, so that the 
overriding interests of consumers are more directly relevant and readily 
apparent. These three reforms are: (1) enhanced availability of attorneys’ fees 
for prevailing trademark defendants; (2) reinvigoration of attempted 
monopolization counterclaims; and (3) broader use of Federal Rule of Evidence 
706 to appoint a neutral expert witness to identify and explain the consumer 
interests at stake in trademark litigation. Courts can implement all three under 
existing law without legislative action. 
Though these three reforms will partially ameliorate trademark law’s de-
evolution, for a complete correction, I propose that Congress amend the 
Trademark Act to recognize a new defense: the Strategic Lawsuit Against 
Competition (or SLAC) defense. Modeled after existing Strategic Lawsuit 
Against Public Participation (or SLAPP) statutes,266 the proposed amendment 
would allow a trademark defendant to show that a trademark lawsuit is an 
effort to reduce competition by increasing the defendant’s costs, by increasing 
the degree of product differentiation otherwise present in a market, or by 
excluding the defendant from a relevant market altogether. If the trademark 
defendant successfully established the lawsuit’s potential for reducing 
competition, then the burden would shift to the plaintiff to show that it is likely 
to prevail. The litigation would proceed only if the trademark plaintiff could 
make that showing. The following Sections discuss these proposed reforms in 
turn. 
A. Reform Within Existing Law 
To the extent possible under existing law, courts should take the following 
three steps in trademark litigation to reduce the selection and activity bias and 
reframe the issue presented. First, courts should expand the availability of 
attorneys’ fees awards and increase the amount of such awards to prevailing 
trademark defendants. Second, courts should allow trademark defendants to 
assert viable antitrust counterclaims. Third, courts should make more liberal 
use of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 to appoint neutral expert witnesses who 
can identify and explain the consumer interests at stake in trademark litigation. 
 
 265. Professor Thomas has proposed a similar approach to encourage validity challenges 
against questionable patents. See Thomas, Patent Bounties, supra note 11. 
 266. For an introduction to SLAPP statutes, see John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory 
Solutions to the Problems of SLAPPs, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395 (1993); Marc J. Randazza, The Need 
for a Unified and Cohesive National Anti-SLAPP Law, 91 OR. L. REV. 627 (2012). 
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1. Enhanced Attorneys’ Fees 
Prevailing trademark defendants should receive enhanced attorneys’ fee 
awards. The awards should be enhanced, relative to existing law, in two senses: 
first, they should be awarded more often; and second, they should be larger. 
Such awards would provide a cost-based267 bounty to trademark defendants for 
challenging inefficient interpretations of trademark law and for defending 
efficient interpretations. To some extent, having to pay such a bounty would 
also discourage trademark owners from pushing ever more inefficient 
interpretations of trademark law. 
The proposal would not require congressional action. Section 35(a) of the 
Trademark Act already provides for the award of reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party in “exceptional” cases.268 The proposed awards are 
consistent with the statutory language, but would require two changes to 
existing practice. First, courts would need to redefine and expand the category 
of “exceptional” cases. Second, courts would need to expand their willingness 
to award “reasonable” attorneys’ fees that exceed the actual attorneys’ fees 
incurred. 
First, courts should replace the “relative” standard for determining 
whether a case is exceptional with an “absolute” or “constant” standard that 
defines “exceptional” with respect to the zone of protection that lies at 
trademark’s core. In Octane Fitness, the Court defined an exceptional case for 
purposes of the parallel attorneys’ fee provision in the Patent Act as: 
one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength 
of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and 
the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was 
litigated.269 
Given Congress’s identical use of “exceptional” case language in the 
Trademark Act, courts will likely apply—and indeed already have applied—the 
Octane Fitness standard to trademark cases as well.270 The problem with this 
standard as applied to trademark cases is that it uses a relative standard. The 
standard asks whether one litigated case “stands out” from other litigated cases. 
 
 267. The bounty would be cost-based in the sense that the award would be based upon the cost 
to the trademark defendant of undertaking the desired action, rather than based upon the social value 
generated by that action. Cf. Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards 
for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 695–731 (2004) (surveying different approaches 
to bounties in the patent context). 
 268. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). 
 269. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014). 
 270. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 781 F.3d 710, 720–
21 (4th Cir. 2015); Donut Joe’s, Inc. v. Interveston Food Servs., 116 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1292–94 (N.D. 
Ala. 2015); RCI TM Corp. v. R & R Venture Grp., LLC, No. 6:13-cv-945-Orl-22, 2015 WL 668715, 
at *9–11 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2015); High Tech Pet Prods., Inc. v. Shenzhen Jianfeng Elec. Pet Prods. 
Co., No. 6:14-cv-759-Orl-22TBS, 2015 WL 926023, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2015). 
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Such a relative standard for identifying which cases are “exceptional” in 
trademark litigation is problematic because asymmetric stakes mean that only 
exceptional trademark cases are litigated to judicial resolution. As discussed, 
trademark defendants usually have very little to gain by litigating, even if they 
prevail. As a result, they will seldom litigate cases to judicial resolution unless 
they feel that they have a very high likelihood of prevailing and are therefore 
correspondingly certain to capture the very little they have to gain. When faced 
with a case squarely in the center of trademark law’s prohibition on unfair 
competition, trademark defendants will avoid the conduct at issue so that a 
litigated case never arises. Or if they should accidentally stray into trademark’s 
core prohibition, the defendant will settle when litigation does arise and thereby 
preclude judicial resolution. For that reason, judging whether one trademark 
case litigated to judicial resolution is an outlier relative to other such cases is 
inherently misleading. The very fact that a trademark case is litigated to 
judicial resolution establishes that it is an outlier. 
Instead of judging whether a case is relatively exceptional, courts should 
use a constant standard. This constant standard would ask whether the 
plaintiff’s claims fall within trademark’s core zone of protection. On 
infringement claims, for example, courts could define trademark’s core zone of 
protection using either the 1905 Act’s double identity standard or the 1946 
Act’s standard that assesses the likelihood of confusion of purchasers as to the 
good’s source. Both of these standards define cases where consumers are likely 
to purchase a product by mistake and be dissatisfied. They thereby define the 
sorts of cases where a finding of trademark infringement is likely to enhance 
consumer welfare. If a trademark plaintiff advocates a theory of such core 
confusion, and loses, then the case would not be considered exceptional and no 
award of attorneys’ fees would be made. On the other hand, if a trademark 
plaintiff advocates a recognized but more esoteric theory of confusion, such as 
post-sale or initial interest, and loses, then the case should be considered 
exceptional because the theory of infringement falls outside trademark’s core 
zone of protection. 
The key point, however, is that the core remains unchanged, even as 
trademark law’s outer limits expand. Even if courts define that unchanging core 
zone of protection using today’s expansive infringement standard, such an 
approach would still be better than Octane Fitness’s relative standard because 
it would limit future expansion. As the pressures of selection bias, activity bias, 
and framing effects continue to influence courts, trademark protection will 
continue to expand. Cases that are close calls, and therefore worth litigating 
today, will become slam dunks and therefore quickly settle if they arise in the 
future. Claims for trademark protection that seem absurd today will become the 
new norm, just as claims for trademark protection that seemed absurd fifty 
years ago are the norm today. A relative “exceptional” case standard will 
follow the evolving norms and shift similarly. At any given time, only the 
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outlier of the litigated outliers will seem exceptional. On the other hand, a 
constant or absolute standard that defines exceptional cases based on an 
unchanging core can permanently tie trademark law to its welfare-enhancing, 
consumer-protection goals. A constant standard would thereby provide an 
incentive for potential trademark defendants to fight against inefficient, and for 
efficient, interpretations of trademark law. 
Merely reimbursing trademark defendants for their attorneys’ fees will 
likely prove insufficient, however. Defending a trademark case entails costs 
beyond attorneys’ fees. It also entails risk. Even where, from a social welfare 
perspective, the defendant should win, there is no guarantee that the defendant 
will win in trademark litigation. In trademark cases where the defendants 
prevail, the defendants need to receive a bounty that compensates them for the 
risk that they would have lost. If all that a defendant stands to gain by litigating 
is reimbursement of their attorneys’ fees, but not their risk and other costs, 
potential trademark defendants may still lack the necessary incentive to bring 
cases. 
For example, after the New Orleans Saints won the Super Bowl for the 
very first time in 2010, a dispute broke out over the phrase “Who Dat.”271 
Numerous parties were selling merchandise bearing the phrase, or a clever 
variation thereof, such as “Who Dat,” in connection with the Saints’ 
championship season and Super Bowl victory.272 A pair of brothers, through 
their corporation, Who Dat, Inc., claimed ownership of the phrase as a 
trademark.273 Their claims were particularly weak. They had not coined the 
slogan or even been the first to use it in connection with sporting events 
generally or the Saints specifically.274 They had merely been one of many 
parties to exploit the phrase, in their case by releasing a version of the song 
“When the Saints Come Marching In” with the phrase “Who Dat Say Dey 
Gonna Beat Dem Saints” chanted over a portion of the song.275 After releasing 
the song, the brothers sporadically licensed the claimed mark, but their use of it 
was intermittent at best.276 Nonetheless, they threatened to sue a number of 
local merchants who were selling merchandise bearing the slogan. In response, 
the merchants filed for declaratory judgment, asserting that Who Dat, Inc. did 
not own a valid trademark in the phrase “Who Dat.”277 Despite pro bono 
representation, when the district court denied their summary judgment motions, 
the merchants settled and allowed Who Dat, Inc. to retain ownership of the 
 
 271. Who Dat Yat Chat, LLC v. Who Dat, Inc., 2012 WL 1118602, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 3, 
2012). 
 272. Id. at *1. 
 273. Id. at *2. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at *2; Associated Press, NFL Claims Trademark Infringement (Jan. 30, 2010), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/playoffs/2009/news/story?id=4871697 [https://perma.cc/YU7Z-T7M5]. 
 276. Id. at *2, 5. 
 277. Id. at *2–4. 
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mark.278 Even though they were receiving free legal representation, the 
litigation took their time and effort away from running their businesses. That 
distraction and litigation’s other costs made further litigation unattractive, 
relative to a settlement. 
From a welfare standpoint, New Orleans consumers would have been far 
better off with competition than with a monopoly in the market for Who Dat 
merchandise. With competition, prices would not have been artificially inflated 
by a license royalty. Consumers would have had more and better choices as 
merchants competed to come up with the cleverest Who Dat merchandise. But 
consumers do not have standing in trademark disputes. And for the merchants 
who did have standing, a chance of winning the case—even a substantial 
chance—was not worth fighting for, even with free legal representation. 
For that reason, my second proposal with respect to attorneys’ fees awards 
is that courts award prevailing trademark defendants “reasonable” attorneys’ 
fees that routinely exceed the defendant’s actual fees by two to three times. 
Like treble damages in antitrust cases, the purpose of treble attorney fee awards 
to prevailing trademark defendants would be to encourage trademark 
defendants to serve as a private attorney general of sorts, and to vindicate the 
public interest in efficient interpretations of trademark law. 
Granting attorneys’ fees in excess of actual fees would not require a 
change to existing law, but would require a change in judicial practice. In 
calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees generally, courts begin with the lodestar: 
multiplying the number of reasonable hours worked on the case by a reasonable 
hourly rate.279 However, after calculating the lodestar, courts retain discretion 
to award enhanced fees based upon the “results obtained.”280 As the Court has 
explained, “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should 
recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours 
reasonably expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional 
success an enhanced award may be justified.”281 Applying these rules, courts 
have already approved awards of attorneys’ fees as reasonable where they 
exceed actual fees incurred.282 Most commonly, this occurs where an attorney 
represents the prevailing party on a pro bono basis, or at a subsidized or 
nonprofit rate, and the plaintiff incurs no or minimal attorneys’ fees.283 But 
 
 278. Today, Who Dat?, Inc. holds four principal register registrations for Who Dat or Who 
Dat?. See U.S. Registration Nos. 5,186,320; 4,948,826; 4,402,283; and 4,310,960. 
 279. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 
 280. Id. at 434. 
 281. Id. at 435. 
 282. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894–95 (1984) (requiring attorneys’ fees awards 
in Fair Housing Act litigation to be calculated using private market rates even if prevailing party was 
actually represented by lower price non-profit); DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 
1985) (awarding attorneys’ fees based upon higher private market rates despite representation by a 
non-profit legal services organization). 
 283. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894–95 (1984) (requiring attorneys’ fees awards 
in Fair Housing Act litigation to be calculated using private market rates even if prevailing party was 
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nothing in the law limits an award of reasonable fees in excess of actual fees to 
that situation. It would, however, require some change to existing practice. 
Courts today rarely award attorneys’ fees to prevailing trademark defendants, 
and when they do, those awards rarely award trademark defendants their full 
actual fees. That needs to change. 
2. Antitrust Counterclaims 
Trademark defendants need to be able to present viable antitrust 
counterclaims that can survive summary judgment in order to make the stakes 
of trademark litigation more symmetric. At present, the stakes in trademark 
litigation are not merely asymmetric, but fundamentally one-sided in favor of 
plaintiffs. A plaintiff seeking to expand trademark protection in a manner that 
reduces total surplus has everything to gain and very little to lose. Consider 
again the merchandising rights for sports teams. If the National Hockey League 
can persuade a court to change the law and establish the merchandising right, it 
stands to gain billions. If it loses, it is merely out the costs of the litigation. 
Enabling trademark defendants to present viable antitrust counterclaims could 
shift this incentive structure. Allowing these counterclaims could sharply 
reduce the selection and activity bias that plagues the common law evolution of 
trademark law and re-frame the issue presented. 
In terms of selection and activity bias, a counterclaim for antitrust 
damages offers a value-based bounty for potential trademark defendants. 
Antitrust counterclaims and their associated damages offer a trademark 
defendant not only a chance to recover the costs incurred in defending efficient 
legal rules, but an opportunity to generate value for the public by keeping the 
market at issue competitive. 
The damages potentially available through an antitrust counterclaim 
would not only encourage the potential trademark defendant, they would also 
independently discourage the potential trademark plaintiff. Because these 
damages are, at least in part, value-based, a bounty measured in antitrust 
damages can more readily rise to the high levels necessary to deter trademark 
plaintiffs from seeking inefficient interpretations of trademark law in markets 
where billions are at stake. For example, in the sports merchandising context, 
threatening to award Dallas Cap & Emblem enhanced attorneys’ fees is 
unlikely to deter the National Hockey League from pursuing litigation given 
the billions of dollars in rents it could capture through a monopoly over the 
merchandising markets. But a potential antitrust damages claim might deter 
 
actually represented by lower price non-profit); DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 
1985) (awarding attorneys’ fees based upon higher private market rates despite representation by a 
non-profit legal services organization). 
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them, both because such a claim can consider the monopoly rents at stake284 
and because it is trebled.285 
In addition, including antitrust counterclaims in routine trademark 
litigation re-frames the dispute to more accurately reflect the true and full 
interests at stake. When the trademark dispute between the National Hockey 
League and Dallas Cap & Emblem arose, the real issue was not whether one or 
the other should capture a given surplus from the merchandising market at 
issue. Rather, the real issue was whether that market should be competitive or 
monopolistic. Despite the focus on consumers in trademark law, trademark 
litigation considers the overall welfare of consumers only incidentally. In 
contrast, an antitrust counterclaim for attempted monopolization would force 
the parties, and allow the court, to confront that real issue directly. It would 
also re-frame the dispute from a property dispute into a regulatory dispute. 
Instead of asking whether one party has gone too far and thereby trespassed on 
another’s property, an antitrust counterclaim would ask whether allowing or 
prohibiting the defendant’s conduct would promote or disserve competition in 
the associated markets. 
At the very least, reinvigorating the antitrust counterclaim would remind 
courts and juries that many assertions of trademark rights are little more than 
strategic lawsuits against competition. Trademark owners use litigation as a 
tool to increase would-be competitors’ costs, increase product differentiation, 
and otherwise deter or bar competition. Allowing a trademark defendant to 
more readily assert an antitrust counterclaim would make a broader swath of 
evidence on the competitive structure of the market and the associated 
consumer interests relevant and therefore admissible.286 It would thereby give 
the court or the jury more complete information on which to resolve the case. 
Unfortunately, antitrust counterclaims have become rare in intellectual 
property litigation, and when asserted, rarely survive summary judgment. Two 
judicial interpretations of antitrust law in particular have made such claims 
difficult to establish. First, courts have abolished the presumption that an 
 
 284. For attempted monopolization, a prevailing plaintiff may recover based upon its “estimate 
of sales it could have made absent the antitrust violation.” Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 
F.3d 768, 794 (6th Cir. 2002). Antitrust damages are therefore not a true value-based bounty. A true 
value-based bounty would force a losing trademark plaintiff to pay the defendant the expected 
monopoly rents the plaintiff would have captured had the plaintiff prevailed. Thus, if Boston 
Professional Hockey had lost the suit, they would have had to pay Dallas Cap the billions in monopoly 
profits they captured. The threat of such a payment could deter Boston Professional Hockey from 
bringing such a suit in the first place. 
 285. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2017) (stating that “any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages 
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee”). 
 286. As the Court has recognized, “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare 
prescription.’” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). In antitrust, “whether the ultimate 
finding is the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the 
same—whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition.” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984). 
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intellectual property right, such as a patent or copyright, confers market 
power.287 Courts therefore require proof of market power. At the same time, 
courts are often reluctant to define a market narrowly for antitrust purposes.288 
Most courts, for example, would be reluctant to define Coca-Cola as its own 
product market for antitrust purposes.289 Most courts would almost certainly 
include Pepsi and other colas in the relevant market. From an economic 
perspective, however, Coca-Cola is almost certainly its own market.290 In 
economics, two products compete, or are in the same market, if and only if a 
“small but significant and nontransitory” price increase on the first product 
would prove unprofitable because it would lead too many consumers to switch 
to some other product.291 The cross-elasticity of demand between Coke and 
Pepsi is probably insufficient to limit Coke’s ability to profitably raise its 
prices.292 Of course, consumers could switch if Coke prices increased, but my 
own sense is that they would not.293 
 
 287. The Court initially created the presumption that a patent confers market power in a patent 
misuse case, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), and then 
subsequently extended the presumption to antitrust cases. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 
(1947). In Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), the Court retained and 
reiterated the presumption: “[I]f the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly 
over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller 
market power.” Id. at 16. However, in 1988, Congress amended the Patent Act to abolish the 
presumption of market power in the context of patent misuse. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2016). In 2006, 
the Court, based in part on Congress’s abolition of the presumption in the misuse context, abolished 
the presumption for antitrust claims as well. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 
(2006). While the Illinois Tool Works Court formally abolished the presumption, it remanded the case 
to allow the respondent, Independent Ink, to try and establish such market power through evidence. Id. 
at 46. 
 288. The Court requires market definition to establish attempted monopolization: 
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade or commerce under 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, it would then be necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of 
the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market for the product involved. Without a 
definition of that market there is no way to measure [the defendant’s] ability to lessen or 
destroy competition. 
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965). 
 289. See Lemley & McKenna, Market Definition, supra note 121, at 2056–59; Lunney, 
Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 424–25. 
 290. For an explanation, see Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 424–25; see also 
Lemley & McKenna, Market Definition, supra note 121, at 2056–59 (offering the same example). 
 291. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
§ 1.11 (1992); see also Satellite Television & Associated Res., Inc. v. Cont’l Cablevision of Va., Inc., 
714 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying Guidelines approach to define relevant product market), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984); Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860, 
872 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (using Guidelines approach to define relevant product market). 
 292. For an explanation, see Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 424–25; see also 
Lemley & McKenna, Market Definition, supra note 121, at 2056–59 (offering the same example). 
 293. See Lemley & McKenna, Market Definition, supra note 121, at 2056–59; Lunney, 
Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 424–25. As the Court has explained: 
For every product, substitutes exist. But a relevant market cannot meaningfully encompass 
that infinite range. The circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to 
which, within reasonable variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will turn; in 
technical terms, products whose “cross-elasticities of demand” are small. 
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Market definitions must be more realistic for attempted monopolization 
counterclaims to be viable in trademark litigation. Merchandise bearing hockey 
team emblems do not compete with merchandise bearing football team 
emblems. Further, merchandise bearing the emblems and name of the Dallas 
Stars probably do not compete with merchandise bearing the emblems and 
name of the Boston Bruins. Courts should recognize the reality that in many 
circumstances, popular brands define their own product market. True, not every 
trademark confers market power. But as self-interested economic actors, 
trademark owners are more likely to engage in litigation to protect trademarks 
that do confer market power.294 All that is necessary to solve this particular 
problem is a more realistic application of the existing cross-elasticity of 
demand standard. Two products compete only when consumers will or do in 
fact switch in response to a “small but significant and nontransitory” price 
increase. 295 
Second, to show attempted monopolization, a party must demonstrate 
predatory or anticompetitive conduct.296 Courts usually treat mere assertion of 
a losing claim—whether patent, copyright, or trademark—as insufficient to 
establish predatory or anticompetitive conduct. In the United States, citizens 
have a First Amendment right to petition the government, including the courts, 
for redress.297 Finding predatory conduct in every instance where a patent or 
trademark plaintiff files a lawsuit and loses would encroach on that First 
Amendment right too greatly.298 In addition, it is not clear that Congress 
intended the general language of the Sherman Act, aimed at more traditional 
 
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n. 31 (1953). 
 294. In Illinois Tool, the respondent made an analogous argument. Specifically, respondent 
argued for a rebuttable presumption of market power for patents used to create tying arrangements. Ill. 
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006). The Court rejected the argument. Id. at 
43–44. 
 295. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.11 
(1992); see also Satellite Television & Associated Res., Inc. v. Cont’l Cablevision, Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 
355 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying Guidelines approach to define relevant product market), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1027 (1984); Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860, 872 
(W.D.N.Y. 1994) (using Guidelines approach to define relevant product market). 
 296. As the Court has stated, “it is generally required that to demonstrate attempted 
monopolization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power.” Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
 297. U.S. CONST., amend I (stating that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right 
of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”); see Cal. Motor Transp. Co. 
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 
381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 
136–38 (1961) (exempting from antitrust liability lobbying efforts directed at obtaining legislation that 
would restrict competition). 
 298. See, e.g., Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 
(2014) (stating that “[w]e crafted the Noerr–Pennington doctrine—and carved out only a narrow 
exception for ‘sham’ litigation—to avoid chilling the exercise of the First Amendment right to petition 
the government for the redress of grievances.”). 
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restraints of trade, to reach such petitioning activity.299 As a result, courts have 
limited the availability of antitrust counterclaims for losing intellectual 
property claims to exceptional circumstances. 
The Court’s Noerr-Pennington doctrine limits antitrust liability to “sham” 
litigation where a plaintiff asserts claims that are: (1) “objectively baseless in 
the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the 
merits”; and (2) improperly motivated by a subjective intent “to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor,” through the “use [of] 
the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process . . . .”300 
For example, under this “sham” exception, attempting to enforce a patent that a 
party has obtained through fraud or inequitable conduct on the Patent Office 
would constitute predatory conduct.301 Because a trademark defendant will 
rarely be able to prove that a trademark plaintiff’s assertions are both 
objectively baseless and improperly motivated, the Court’s interpretation of the 
First Amendment sharply limits the availability and viability of antitrust 
counterclaims in response to overzealous assertion of trademark rights. To be 
sure, there remains some room when a trademark plaintiff’s claims are 
“objectively baseless,” but that is not likely to prove a sufficient deterrent.302 
For antitrust counterclaims to become a viable deterrent, courts would 
need to expand the “sham” exception, or otherwise limit the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine. This would not be unprecedented. In California Motor Transport Co. 
v. Trucking Unlimited, for example, one trucking company sued its 
competitors, alleging a violation of the antitrust laws when the competitors 
joined together to “institute state and federal proceedings to resist and defeat 
 
 299. As the Court explained: 
Although such associations [to lobby Congress jointly for legislation that would restrain 
trade] could perhaps, through a process of expansive construction, be brought within the 
general proscription of ‘combination(s) . . . in restraint of trade,’ they bear very little if any 
resemblance to the combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act, combinations 
ordinarily characterized by an express or implied agreement or understanding that the 
participants will jointly give up their trade freedom, or help one another to take away the 
trade freedom of others through the use of such devices as price-fixing agreements, 
boycotts, market-division agreements, and other similar arrangements. This essential 
dissimilarity between an agreement jointly to seek legislation or law enforcement and the 
agreements traditionally condemned by § 1 of the Act, even if not itself conclusive on the 
question of the applicability of the Act, does constitute a warning against treating the 
defendants’ conduct as though it amounted to a common-law trade restraint. 
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 136–37. 
 300. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993). 
 301. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965) 
(holding that “the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 
2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present”); Transweb, 
LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1306–09 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming antitrust 
liability for attempted enforcement of a patent procured through inequitable conduct). 
 302. Adopting the abuse of right prohibition commonly found in civil law states might also 
address the issues. For a discussion of the abuse of right prohibition, see, for example, Annekatrien 
Lenaerts, The General Principle of the Prohibition of Abuse of Rights: A Critical Position on Its Role 
in a Codified European Contract Law, 6 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 1121 (2010). 
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[the plaintiff’s] applications” to transport goods in trade.303 The defendants 
insisted that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunized their conduct from 
antitrust scrutiny.304 But the Court rejected the argument.305 The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendants had conspired to institute multiple administrative 
and judicial proceedings to effectively deny the plaintiff “free and unlimited” 
access to those same agencies and courts.306 The Court held that these 
allegations stated a viable antitrust claim and fell within the scope of the 
“sham” exception.307 In reaching that conclusion, the Court explained: “First 
Amendment rights may not be used as the means or the pretext for achieving 
‘substantive evils’ which the legislature has the power to control.”308 
As this decision suggests, First Amendment rights are not absolute. Of 
course, the California Motor Transport decision on its own is not enough to 
ensure the effective viability of antitrust counterclaims as a deterrent to 
overzealous trademark enforcement in every case. However, it recognizes the 
need to balance the scope of the First Amendment against the substantive evil 
of monopoly that the antitrust laws aim to prevent. The decision also suggests 
that courts have some discretion in setting that balance. For the threat of an 
antitrust counterclaim to become an effective deterrent to rent-seeking 
trademark litigation, we may simply need to tilt that balance slightly more 
towards preventing the evils of monopoly. 
3. Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses 
Courts should take advantage of their authority under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 706 to appoint neutral expert witnesses to identify and explain the 
consumer welfare interests at stake in trademark litigation.309 As a general rule, 
courts have proven reluctant to use their authority under Rule 706 and have 
preferred instead to let the parties shape the course and content of the 
litigation.310 While this is the general American approach to litigation, the 
 
 303. 404 U.S. 508, 509 (1972). 
 304. Id. at 509–10, 511. 
 305. Id. at 514–16. 
 306. Id. at 511. 
 307. Id. at 514–16. 
 308. Id. at 515 (citation omitted). 
 309. FED. R. EVID. 706(a) authorizes a court to appoint a neutral expert of its own choosing. 
The Rule provides: 
(a) Appointment Process. On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the parties 
to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and may ask the parties to 
submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of 
its own choosing. But the court may only appoint someone who consents to act. 
Id. (emphasis added). In the trademark litigation context, the cost of a court-appointed expert becomes 
a part of the costs of the case generally. Like other court costs, they are paid by the parties as the court 
directs. FED. R. EVID. 706(c). 
 310. See Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 449 (2009) (noting that 
“[p]arty control over case presentation is a central tenet of the American adversarial legal system.”). If 
we look at the appellate decisions regarding Rule 706 over the last two years, all of them involve either 
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adversary system works well only when all of the real parties in interest are 
present and have an opportunity to be heard. 
This adversary system generally has not worked well in trademark 
litigation because one of the real parties in interest, the consumer, has neither 
the right nor the opportunity to be heard. Moreover, neither trademark plaintiffs 
nor trademark defendants have proven to be effective representatives for the 
missing consumers. 
Given that consumer welfare lies near the heart of trademark law, 
consumers should have a more direct and vital role in trademark litigation. 
Standing rules limit their direct participation as a party. Moreover, even if they 
had standing, collective action issues would likely limit consumer participation. 
Rule 706 gives courts an opportunity to give consumers a direct voice in 
trademark litigation—one that is not subject to the whims and litigation 
strategies of the parties. 
Under Rule 706, courts have the authority to appoint a neutral expert 
witness to identify and explain the consumer interests at stake in trademark 
litigation. A court may do so on its own initiative.311 And it may appoint a 
witness of its own choosing.312 Given the undeniable and overriding 
importance of the consumer interest in trademark litigation and the parties’ 
unwillingness to represent that interest at the expense of their own, courts 
should routinely employ their authority under Rule 706 to appoint a neutral 
expert witness and to thereby give consumers a direct voice in trademark 
litigation. 
Using Rule 706 in this manner would not only give consumers a more 
direct voice in the litigation but would also re-frame the issue presented for the 
court. A neutral expert can help remind the court that resolving trademark 
litigation represents a choice between not two, but three possible outcomes. 
The court can rule in favor of the trademark plaintiff; it can rule in favor of the 
trademark defendant; or it can rule in favor of consumers. 
B. Anti-SLAC Legislation 
Congress should amend the Trademark Act to provide trademark 
defendants with a strategic lawsuit against competition defense.313 While courts 
 
section 1983 claims or other claims by prisoners who could not afford to hire their own experts. See 
Kennedy v. Huibregtse, 831 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting court’s authority to appoint neutral 
expert under Rule 706 in the context of a prisoner’s in forma pauperis motion); Foster v. Enenmoh, 
649 Fed. Appx. 609 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing application of Rule 706 in connection with section 
1983 claim). 
 311. FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (stating “[o]n a party’s motion or on its own. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 312. Id. (stating “[t]he court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of its own 
choosing.”) (emphasis added). 
 313. The proposed SLAC defense is similar to the antitrust counterclaim approach. Like the 
antitrust counterclaim, the SLAC defense would focus on the harm to consumers, in the form of higher 
prices and reduced consumer choice, that might result from the litigation. Some elements, such as 
1270 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:1195 
can use existing law to help correct the selection, activity, and framing biases 
that have led to trademark law’s de-evolution, I do not believe that they go far 
enough. In particular, I worry that the First Amendment limits on antitrust 
counterclaims so tightly constrain the availability and viability of such 
counterclaims that the incentives for trademark plaintiffs to push for inefficient 
and anticompetitive interpretations of trademark law will remain fundamentally 
one-sided in favor of trademark overreach. For that reason, I propose a strategic 
lawsuit against competition (or “SLAC”) defense modeled on state-strategic-
lawsuit-against-public-participation (or “SLAPP”) statutes. 
Enacted in twenty-seven states,314 SLAPP laws are designed to encourage 
the public’s exercise of their free speech rights and to discourage the use of 
lawsuits to coerce silence.315 Although the statutes differ somewhat in their 
details, their basic structure is similar. SLAPP statutes give defendants a 
special defense or motion to strike where a plaintiff seeks to deter public 
participation through litigation. A defendant has the initial burden to 
demonstrate that the litigation arises out of acts that constitute public 
participation. For example, the California statute provides a special motion to 
strike for a cause of action “arising from any act of that person in furtherance 
of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States 
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public 
issue.”316 Once a defendant has shown that the cause of action arises out of the 
 
damages and the need to show antitrust injury, would differ. While similar, I propose the SLAC 
defense as an express alternative because I believe that courts will continue to limit antitrust 
counterclaims under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 
 314. See Tex. Civ. Prac. and Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.001–27.011 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 4.24.525 (2010); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 70-a, 76-a (2008); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211; 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 110/1–
110/99 (2007); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-751–12-752 (2006); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-63-501–16-63-508 
(2005); 12 V.S.A. § 1041 (2005); Md. Code Ann., Cts. and Jud. Proc. § 5-807 (2004); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 537.528 (2004); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F-1–634F-4 (2002); N.M. Stat. §§ 38-2-9.1–38-2-9.2 (2001); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150 et seq. (2001); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-1401–1405 (2001); Fla. Stat. 
§§ 768.295, 720.304 (2000); 27 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7707, §§ 8301–8303 (2000); La. Code Civ. Proc. 
Ann. art. 971 (1999); Ind. Code § 34-7-7-1 et seq. (1998); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-1001–21-1004 
(1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-11.1 (1996); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14 § 556 (1995); R.I. Gen. Laws 
§§ 9-33-1–9-33-4 (1995); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231 § 59H (1994); Minn. Stat. §§ 554.01–554.05 
(1994); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,241–25-21,246 (1994); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.635–41.670 (1993); 
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (1992); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 8136–8138 (1992). 
 315. The purpose of the Texas SLAPP statute, for example, is “to encourage and safeguard the 
constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in 
government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a 
person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” Tex. Civ. Prac. and Rem. Code Ann. 
§ 27.002. 
 316. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). The statute then goes on to define specifically what 
constitutes public participation. After generally defining acts in “furtherance of a person’s right of 
petition or free speech,” the statute identifies four specific categories: 
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial 
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral 
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, 
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public 
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defendant’s public participation, the burden switches to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the plaintiff is more likely than not to prevail on its cause of 
action.317 
In addition to requiring a plaintiff to make an early showing that it is more 
likely than not to succeed on the merits, SLAPP statutes include three other 
elements designed to reduce the cost and facilitate the early resolution of 
lawsuits that target public participation. First, once a defendant has filed a 
motion to strike under a SLAPP statute, discovery is stayed pending resolution 
of the motion.318 This reduces the ability of a plaintiff to coerce settlement from 
a defendant through expensive and invasive or otherwise harassing discovery 
requests. Second, like a preliminary injunction, an order granting or denying a 
motion to strike under a SLAPP statute is immediately appealable.319 Third, 
prevailing defendants under SLAPP motions are entitled to a mandatory award 
of their attorneys’ fees.320 Indeed, some states go further and authorize courts to 
award heightened sanctions and bounties to deter would-be plaintiffs from 
filing such lawsuits and to encourage defendants to vindicate their rights.321 
The reason for SLAPP statutes is that the private interests of the parties to 
this type of litigation are often asymmetric and unrepresentative of the public 
interest. Public participation is valuable to society as a whole, but any given 
defendant’s self-interest in defending that public value is usually small. A 
consumer who posts a critical review of a business, for example, is offering a 
valuable service to all other consumers in the same market. While the poster 
may derive some satisfaction from the act itself, most of the welfare gain from 
such speech goes to other consumers. In contrast, the costs of such criticism are 
fully concentrated on the target business. As a result, a potential plaintiff will 
usually have far more to gain by stifling public criticism than any potential 
defendant has to gain through espousing such criticism. When the inevitable 
lawsuit comes, a self-interested defendant will seldom have enough at stake to 
 
forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance 
of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech 
in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. 
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e). California expressly exempts commercial speech from the protection 
of its SLAPP statute. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.17(c). 
 317. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). Some states require a heightened showing 
by the plaintiff. Washington state, for example, requires a plaintiff to prove that it is likely to prevail by 
clear and convincing evidence. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525(4)(b). Resolution of the SLAPP motion is 
not admissible in any subsequent trial of the matter nor does it affect the burden of proof at trial. See, 
e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(3); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525(4)(d)(i), (ii). 
 318. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(g). 
 319. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(i). 
 320. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(1). 
 321. See¸ e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525(6)(a)(2) (requiring court to award prevailing 
defendants on SLAPP motions ten thousand dollars in addition to the costs of litigation and attorneys’ 
fees); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525(6)(a)(3) (requiring the court to award “[s]uch additional relief, 
including sanctions upon the responding party and its attorneys or law firms, as the court determines to 
be necessary to deter repetition of the conduct and comparable conduct by others similarly situated”). 
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merit defending the lawsuit in the absence of a SLAPP statute. Instead of 
defending the public interest in free speech, the defendant will protect her own 
interests and settle. Thus, in the absence of a SLAPP statute, we lose not only 
the individual opinions enjoined and otherwise chilled, but the integrity of the 
public participation process itself. 
These interests and concerns closely parallel those we have identified in 
trademark litigation. In trademark litigation, the threat is to competition, rather 
than to public participation. But in both cases, the self-interest of the particular 
defendant does not encompass the full public interest at stake. As a result, 
defendants will usually settle when, from a broader public interest or consumer 
welfare perspective, we would prefer that they fight. 
Congress should therefore amend the Trademark Act to include an 
analogous SLAC defense and motion. While the key elements would largely 
track the existing state SLAPP statutes, two issues warrant particular attention. 
First, in defining a defendant’s initial burden, Congress must take care to set 
that initial burden neither too low nor too high. As discussed, essentially every 
trademark lawsuit is an attempt to restrict competition; at the very least, a 
trademark lawsuit seeks to stop the specific form of competition in which the 
defendant is engaging. If Congress sets the standard too low, a SLAC defense 
would apply in every trademark case and require a mini-trial under the SLAC 
provisions before any trademark case could move forward. Not every 
trademark case warrants such scrutiny.322 For example, when a market has 
robust competition between substitutes with high cross-elasticities of demand, a 
trademark defendant that chooses a fanciful mark identical to that of an existing 
competitor should not be able to satisfy its initial SLAC burden. 
At the same time, however, Congress should not set the standard 
unrealistically high. Market definition should be realistic by defining markets 
in terms of products between which consumers readily switch. If the initial 
showing is too high, requiring proof of market power in an unrealistically 
broad market, for example, then the SLAC provisions would never apply. The 
standard should require a realistic showing by the defendant that at least some 
consumers would be worse off if the defendant were forced to stop the 
behavior at issue. If a defendant could do so, then the burden would switch to 
the plaintiff to show a probability of success. 
Second, under the proposed defense, a successful defendant should be 
entitled to a bounty on top of a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees. As to the 
amount of the bounty, I propose that a trademark plaintiff who loses on a 
SLAC (or anti-SLAC) motion shall pay the prevailing defendant a bounty of 25 
percent of the advertising budget the plaintiff spent on the trademark at issue in 
 
 322. I am not convinced a formal classification system and associated nomenclature will help 
us separate the cases where spillover effects are likely from those where such effects are unlikely. See 
Stein & Parchomovsky, supra note 11, at 1484–86 (dividing defenses in intellectual property disputes 
into general, individualized, and class defenses depending upon their spillover effects). 
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the relevant geographic and product market for the preceding two years. Courts 
have already approved the 25 percent of advertising expenditures standard for 
damages in cases involving reverse confusion.323 While these courts have 
pretended that the standard is compensatory, I believe the standard is better 
seen as a method for enabling small trademark owners to finance trademark 
litigation.324 
As a bounty, the plaintiff’s advertising expenditures provide some 
measure of, and can thus serve as a rough but effective proxy for, the consumer 
surplus potentially at risk in the litigation. Awarding prevailing defendants 
such a bounty offers them a reward proportional to the public interest that we 
are asking them to vindicate. At the same time, the threat of such awards will 
deter overzealous trademark plaintiffs in a manner proportional, at least to 
some extent, to the monopoly profits they could capture through trademark 
litigation. It thereby remedies the otherwise asymmetrical stakes trademark 
parties face in cases where a plaintiff brings litigation advancing overbroad and 
anticompetitive interpretations of trademark law. 
The proposed SLAC amendment would thus shift the incentives facing 
both parties in deciding whether to bring, defend, or settle trademark litigation. 
It would also influence potential parties’ decisions whether to engage in 
conduct that might lead to trademark litigation. A SLAC defense would thereby 
reduce the selection and activity bias that have contributed to trademark law’s 
de-evolution. Moreover, even if a trademark defendant’s SLAC motion fails, 
forcing a court to resolve an anti-SLAC motion at the outset of the litigation 
would remind the court of consumers’ central interest in the litigation. It would 
thereby re-frame the dispute. Instead of seeing trademark litigation as a 
property dispute between the parties, the court would recognize the case as a 
regulatory adjudication over the nature and extent of competition permissible in 
the marketplace. 
IV. 
CHARTING A PATH FORWARD 
Trademark plaintiffs repeatedly challenge efficient interpretations of 
trademark law because it is in their self-interest to do so. Persuading a court to 
 
 323. See Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1375–76 
(10th Cir. 1977). 
 324. In my view, no reasonable person can see the measure as compensatory. As Judge 
Easterbrook has explained: 
Any compensatory award depends on loss, and in treating the need for advertising as a 
“loss” the court overlooked the principle that a trademark cannot be worth less than zero. 
“Corrective advertising” is a method of repair. Defendant diminishes the value of plaintiff’s 
trademark, and advertising restores that mark to its original value. . . . Expenses for repair 
cannot be justified when they exceed the value of the asset. If a car worth $4,000 is crushed 
in a collision and repair would cost $10,000, the court awards damages of $4,000, not 
$10,000 . . . . 
Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 1992). 
1274 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:1195 
adopt a less efficient, less competitive interpretation of trademark law offers 
trademark owners the possibility of capturing economic rents, and in some 
cases, very substantial rents. The prospect of capturing such rents can in turn 
justify spending money on litigation, even repeated litigation, to challenge 
efficient interpretations of trademark law. In contrast, potential trademark 
defendants do not have a similarly strong interest in either defending efficient 
or challenging inefficient interpretations of trademark law. Even if a successful 
defense or challenge sharply increased social welfare, almost all of the benefits 
of increased competition would flow to consumers generally in the form of 
lower prices and greater consumer choice. Very little of the resulting welfare 
gains will flow to any one competitor in the form of economic rents. As a 
result, potential trademark defendants will seldom have much interest in 
defending efficient, or challenging inefficient, interpretations of trademark law. 
The stakes in trademark litigation are thus both asymmetric as between the 
parties and unrepresentative of the true social interest at stake. As a result, 
since the enactment of the Trademark Act of 1946, and even before, we have 
seen a steady de-evolution of trademark law from efficient market regulator to 
inefficient rent protector. 
Correcting this will require more than mere substantive change in 
trademark doctrine, and even substantial substantive reform will not suffice. 
Correcting trademark doctrine requires something more fundamental: a change 
in the incentives to bring and defend trademark lawsuits and a change in the 
way we see these disputes. Trademark litigation is not simply a conflict 
between a given plaintiff and a given defendant, though the standing rules of 
trademark law unfortunately frame the dispute in that misleading way. Rather, 
in almost all trademark cases, the real dispute is over the nature, kind, and 
extent of competition that will be permissible in the marketplace. While 
trademark law gives standing only to trademark owners and their competitors, 
consumers are the real party in interest. 
While giving consumers standing directly would probably not solve these 
problems because of collective action issues, this Article proposes two types of 
change to the process of trademark litigation intended to help mitigate and 
hopefully solve the selection, activity, and framing biases that have driven 
trademark law’s de-evolution. Courts can accomplish the first type of change 
under existing law, without the need for legislative intervention. This type of 
change includes: (1) more routine and enhanced award of attorneys’ fees to 
prevailing trademark defendants; (2) broader availability and viability of 
antitrust counterclaims; and (3) broader use of Rule 706 to appoint neutral 
experts to identify and explain the consumer interests at stake. The second type 
of change cannot be accomplished through existing law, but requires 
congressional action. Specifically, Congress should amend the Trademark Act 
to recognize a strategic lawsuit against competition (SLAC) defense—and a 
corresponding motion to strike—for all trademark defendants. 
2018] TRADEMARK’S JUDICIAL DE-EVOLUTION 1275 
Both types of change seek to shift the incentives otherwise facing 
trademark plaintiffs and defendants in litigation and to align them more closely 
with the relevant public interest. These changes are necessary to encourage 
trademark defendants to vindicate the public interest in efficient trademark 
laws and to discourage trademark plaintiffs from seeking interpretations of 
trademark law that reduce competition in the marketplace. 
At the same time, these two types of change also strive to re-frame the 
question presented in trademark litigation. In trademark litigation, the core 
question should not usually be whether the plaintiff or the defendant should 
win. In most trademark cases, the central question, and the only question that 
matters is: How should the court rule so that consumers win? Unfortunately, 
the existing practice of trademark litigation conceals that central issue. The 
proposed changes help reveal it. 
By adopting and implementing the proposed changes, we can bring a halt 
to trademark law’s otherwise ongoing de-evolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
